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Abstract
We address the problem of protecting the privacy of individuals in the information society.
Our goal is to devise technical means that allow users to actively participate in the manage-
ment and use of information related to them.
The advent of the information society creates serious challenges for the privacy of individ-
uals. Due to the drastically improving communication infrastructure, ever larger amounts of
ever more precise information become available. The problem with the free availability of this
information is not only the risk that the information can be abused by powerful institutions,
but also that this can lead to an unconﬁned mutual surveillance of individuals, which can
have adverse eﬀects on society as a whole.
We argue that individuals should be empowered to deﬁne for themselves the level of privacy
they are comfortable with. This can be achieved by notifying them whenever information on
them is created, accessed, or modiﬁed and by giving them some control over the use of this
information. The notiﬁcation informs individuals who is using what information on them and
allows to detect possible problems with this use. The control allows individuals to resolve most
(or at least some) of these problems. Obviously this requires that the individuals can trust the
users of information to properly implement these notiﬁcations and to oﬀer an eﬀective control.
We analyze the concept of trust more closely and distinguish between the optimistic and the
pessimistic approach to trust, which can both provide the foundation for the protection of
privacy. The former is based on the classical concepts of control and sanctions, while the
latter tries to prevent malicious behaviour.
We choose to pursue the pessimistic approach and investigate in technical means that
can be used for this purpose. A promising technology is the mobile agent paradigm, which
is a new approach to structure distributed applications. Its main idea is to move both the
code and the state of an object to another principal for remote execution. This indicates
that the mobile agent paradigm also embraces the object-oriented programming paradigm,
which allows us to encapsulate a data item and to specify an access control policy on it.
Since the mobile agent is physically moved to a remote location that is under the control of
a diﬀerent principal, it needs to be protected from this principal who is responsible for its
execution. This problem constitutes the major diﬃculty for using the mobile agent paradigm
for privacy protection and is explored in great detail. Based on the discussion in the relevant
literature, we decide on an approach that relies on a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware
device, which is developed on a conceptual level.
The approach is further explored in the context of the mobile agent paradigm, where it
allows us to realize more elaborate protection goals that may be desirable for the owner of
the mobile agent. These are developed in the form of conducts, which regroup the goal, the
requirements, as well as a speciﬁcation of the necessary collaboration to achieve this goal.
Finally, we return to the original problem and describe how the presented technology can
iv
be used to improve the protection of privacy. This results in a rather complex framework,
in which information on individuals cannot be used freely, but where this use is constrained
by the level of privacy desired by the subject of the information. The major problem of this
framework is the increased complexity that individuals have to deal with. This problem is
addressed with an additional level of indirection that attempts to conﬁne the complexity and
to delegate it to trusted experts.
We believe that this approach, despite its complexity, is a viable means to address the
urgent problems of privacy protection, which do not lend themselves to simple solutions.
Re´sume´
Nous nous inte´ressons au proble`me de la protection de la vie prive´e des individus dans la
socie´te´ d’information. Notre objectif est de concevoir des moyens techniques qui permettent
aux utilisateurs de participer activement a` la gestion ainsi qu’a` l’utilisation de l’information
qui se re´fe`re a` eux.
L’arrive´e de la socie´te´ d’information pose d’importants de´ﬁs pour la vie prive´e des indi-
vidus. Les progre`s conside´rables des syste`mes de communication permettent d’acce´der a` des
quantite´s d’information toujours plus grandes et toujours plus pre´cises. Le proble`me du libre
acce`s a` cette information n’est pas uniquement le risque qu’elle puisse eˆtre utilise´e de manie`re
abusive par des institutions puissantes, mais e´galement que cela puisse mener a` la surveillance
mutuelle et sans bornes des individus, ce qui peut provoquer des eﬀets de´favorables sur la
socie´te´ dans son ensemble.
Nous soutenons que les individus devraient pouvoir de´ﬁnir pour eux-meˆmes le niveau de
vie prive´e qui leur convient. Ceci peut eˆtre eﬀectue´ en les avertissant chaque fois qu’une
information sur eux est cre´e´e, acce´de´e, ou modiﬁe´e et en leur donnant un certain controˆle sur
l’utilisation de cette information. Cet avertissement informe les individus de qui utilise quelle
information sur eux et leur permet de de´tecter les proble`mes possibles de cette utilisation.
Le controˆle permet aux individus de re´soudre la plupart (ou au moins quelques uns) de
ces proble`mes. Bien suˆr, ceci ne´cessite que les individus puissent avoir conﬁance dans les
utilisateurs d’information aﬁn d’imple´menter correctement ces avertissements et d’oﬀrir un
controˆle eﬃcace. Nous analysons le concept de conﬁance plus en de´tail et diﬀe´rencions une
approche optimiste d’une approche pessimiste de la conﬁance. Toutes deux peuvent fournir
les bases pour la protection des donne´es personnelles et ainsi de la vie prive´e. La premie`re
est base´e sur le concept classique du controˆle et des sanctions, alors que la seconde essaie de
pre´venir les comportements de´lictueux.
Nous choisissons de poursuivre l’approche pessimiste et de rechercher les moyens tech-
niques pouvant eˆtre utiles a` ces ﬁns. Une technologie prometteuse est le paradigme des
agents mobiles, qui est une approche re´cente pour structurer des applications re´parties. Son
ide´e principale est de de´placer a` la fois le code et l’e´tat de l’objet vers une autre entite´ pour
une exe´cution a` distance. Ceci indique que le paradigme des agents mobiles englobe e´galement
le paradigme de la programmation oriente´e objet, qui nous permet d’encapsuler un ensemble
de donne´es tout en speciﬁant une politique de controˆle d’acce`s sur celle-ci. Puisque l’agent
mobile est physiquement de´place´ vers un endroit distant qui se trouve sous le controˆle d’une
entite´ diﬀe´rente, il doit eˆtre prote´ge´ de cette entite´ qui est responsable pour son exe´cution. Ce
proble`me constitue la diﬃculte´ majeure pour l’utilisation du paradigme des agents mobiles
pour la protection de la vie prive´ et est e´tudie´e sous tous ses aspects. Base´s sur la discussion
dans la litte´rature approprie´e, nous de´cidons d’une approche base´e sur un pe´riphe´rique invi-
olable et dans lequel on peut avoir conﬁance. Un tel pe´riphe´rique est de´veloppe´ de manie`re
vi
conceptuelle.
L’approche est e´tudie´e plus en de´tail dans le contexte du paradigme des agents mobiles,
ou` elle nous permet de re´aliser des objectifs de protection plus e´labore´s, qui pourraient eˆtre
de´sire´s par le proprie´taire de l’agent mobile. Ceux-ci sont de´veloppe´s sous forme de conduites,
qui regroupent l’objectif, les exigences, ainsi que la spe´ciﬁcation de la collaboration ne´cessaire
pour atteindre cet objectif.
Enﬁn, nous retournons au proble`me initial et de´crivons de quelle manie`re la technologie
pre´sente´e peut eˆtre utilise´e pour ame´liorer la protection de la vie prive´e. Ceci aboutit a`
un cadre assez complexe, dans lequel l’information sur les individus ne peut eˆtre utilise´e
librement, mais ou` cette utilisation est contrainte par le niveau de vie prive´e de´sire´ par le sujet
de l’information. Le proble`me le plus important de ce cadre est la complexite´ accrue, que les
individus doivent traiter. Ce proble`me est aborde´ avec un niveau d’indirection supple´mentaire
qui tente d’isoler la complexite´ et de la de´le´guer a` des experts dignes de conﬁance.
Nous pensons que cette approche, malgre´ sa complexite´, est un moyen viable d’aborder
les proble`mes urgents de la protection de la vie prive´e, qui ne se preˆtent pas a` des solutions
simples.
To Aldous Leonard Huxley,
for his brave vision.
May the warning be understood.
To M-J,
for ...1
1This is a work on privacy, remember?
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Introduction
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
– Benjamin Franklin
After the industrial revolution, which replaced muscle power with machines and thus
enabled people to become exceedingly more productive, the information revolution promises
a similar upheaval in our working environment as well as in our social system. The information
era’s prospect of high quality information at the right place and time, which allows companies
and individuals to make better decisions, will again considerably increase the productivity of
people.
This trend can be illustrated with many examples from the World Wide Web (WWW),
which enables us, for instance, to almost instantaneously access scientiﬁc publications or
to eﬀectively plan business trips. Another, less visible, but equally potent example is the
emergence of data-warehouses within large corporations. These data-warehouses gather and
concentrate all the available information within the corporation, make it amenable to sophis-
ticated analysis, and assist in the decision process.
New developments will further intensify this by providing users with on demand access
to information and communication services at any time, any place, in any volume, and in
any form [BBI93]. All the diﬀerent communication infrastructures (e.g., POTS, ISDN, GSM,
UMTS, or Internet) will become increasingly integrated. Information and communication
services will be adapted to share the same terminal equipment and will thus be accessible
from a wide range of deployed hardware (e.g., cell phones, TVs, or game consoles).
Due to the requirements of work, people become more mobile and more physically dis-
persed. This is already the case today and technologies such as the telephone or satellite TV
allow people to stay – more or less – in touch with the people that are important to them or
with their home country (i.e., their culture). New communication infrastructures can make
this situation more tolerable. For instance, imagine a group of old high-school friends meeting
regularly in a bar in cyberspace where they can engage in group interaction as well as have
private chats, while being physically scattered all over the globe. Other, more straightforward
usages of the new technology are to conduct various transactions, that are currently accom-
plished by physical interaction, via the new information and communication infrastructure,
such as booking a ﬂight from one’s work PC or buying a cinema ticket via a cell phone.
On the other hand, all of the interactions carried out on digital media are potentially
subject to eavesdropping, spooﬁng, or traﬃc analysis. It is therefore vital to eﬀectively
protect these interactions.
2 Introduction
Protection of Confidentiality
The ﬁrst requirements for the protection of information and communication were identiﬁed
by the military (e.g., Caesar’s Cipher [Sch94] or Enigma [Sch28]), which has led to a close
association between research on encryption technology and military research [Kah67]. With
the appearance of information processing, the role of information and communication pro-
tection has also gained importance in several information centric branches of the commercial
domain (e.g., banks and insurance companies had to protect ﬁnancial transactions). The ma-
jor requirements in these applications are the authentication of well-known principals as well
as the conﬁdentiality and integrity of information communicated between mutually trusting
principals. These requirements can be fulﬁlled by symmetric encryption mechanisms and
symmetric message integrity mechanisms.
In the information era, information has become one of the most valuable goods. The fact
that this good needs protection has meanwhile been recognized and applied in the context
of most companies, which protect their operational data as well as their data exchange with
geographically dispersed branch oﬃces but also with competitors. This has led to the de-
velopment of powerful concepts to establish protection domains as well as more open and
ﬂexible conﬁdentiality and integrity protection mechanisms, such as public-key encryption
and digital signatures. The in-depth discussion of these complex technologies is not within
the scope of this thesis. For more information, please refer to [MvOV97, For94, CZ95].
Protection of Privacy
While the necessity to protect military or operational data of corporations is widely accepted,
the same is not the case for information on individuals. If we consider this type of information,
then we often talk about privacy, which was deﬁned by Westin in [Wes67] as “the claim of
individuals, groups, and institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others”. More precisely, we are concerned
with the protection of informational privacy, which was identiﬁed by Rosenberg in [Ros92]
as one of three aspects of privacy. The other two aspects, which are territorial privacy and
privacy of the person, relate to physical issues. In this context, we will also refer to individuals
as data subjects.
The increasing use of communication and information systems makes a lot of data about
our everyday life available in digital form, which was previously not even accessible to ourselves
(e.g., how many tubes of toothpaste a person consumed during the last 5 months). This
data can be used in many diﬀerent ways, some of which are desired by the data subject
(e.g., to receive a quantity discount or for accounting purposes), while others are not (e.g., a
medical insurance company that covers expenses for dentist treatment may use the data as
an argument to raise premiums due to an increased risk or even to reject future payment due
to presumed negligence on the part of the insured person).
An important diﬀerence between the information on individuals and the information in
military or commercial systems is that in the former case the principal that generates and
holds the information, which is often called controller, is not the only one who has a legitimate
interest in the information.
There are many arguments both in favour and against the deliberate use and exchange
of information on individuals. However, due to the discrepancy in power between individu-
als, who usually are the data subjects, and governments or multinational corporations, who
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usually are the controllers, and due to the fact that individual users are not necessarily very
well informed about their rights, there is a strong argument supporting the regulation and
control of this issue. This has led to the whole discipline of data protection, which is one
of the measures that can ensure informational privacy [FH98]. The advent of powerful and
ubiquitous communication and information services will make the protection of informational
privacy much more important but also much more diﬃcult. This is due to the dissolution
of two “natural” protections of privacy: the cost of information processing and the compart-
mentalization of information (at diﬀerent organizations). We will further discuss the issue of
privacy in Chapter 1.
Goal of this Thesis
We want to address the problem of data protection and privacy on a technical level. The
visionary goal would be to deﬁne an architecture that allows to realize arbitrary information
and communication services in such a way that they protect the privacy of their users suﬃ-
ciently well. This requires a precise deﬁnition of what constitutes a suﬃcient protection of
privacy, which is not only dependent on the individual to whom this protection should apply,
but also on the society in which he3 lives. The discussion of this is far beyond the scope of
this thesis (and probably also of computer science as a discipline).
Therefore, we want to concentrate on three simple principles, which we consider to be basic
building blocks to achieve the visionary goal: notification, control, and trust. The principle
of notiﬁcation states that data subjects should have complete knowledge about what data
on them exists, who has access to this data, and who actually uses this data (under special
circumstances, that have to be deﬁned by legal institutions, this notiﬁcation may be made
available with a certain delay). The principle of control states that data subjects should have
some control over this data (within limits that have to be deﬁned by legal institutions), so that
they can actively participate in the eﬀort to keep the data accurate and maybe even restrict
the access to data they would prefer to remain conﬁdential. The principle of trust states that
the data subject has reason to believe that the ﬁrst two principles are actually observed. Thus
it is not directly concerned with the management of personal data, but provides the basis on
which the others are built.
The ﬁrst two principles are grounded in the right of informational self-determination,
which was identiﬁed by the German Constitutional Court in its Census Decision of
1983 [FH98] and are, for instance, identiﬁed in Art. 10 to 12 of the EU-Directive on Data
Protection [EC95], which identiﬁes the data subject’s right to information about the collec-
tion of data and the right to rectiﬁcation, erasure, or blocking of incorrect or illegally stored
data. The data subject then has to trust the legal system to actually enforce these principles.
We believe the principles to be ethically neutral in the sense that we assume that nobody
would reasonably object to them in the generic way in which they are stated.
3We are aware of the problems caused by pronouns that are biased towards a single gender. However, due
to the complicated nature of our subject, we do not want to complicate the presentation further by using
multiple or alternating pronouns. The words “person”, “he”, and “him” (in the corresponding context) are
supposed to refer to all human beings.
4 Introduction
The Overall Approach
In contrast to the most frequently pursued purely legal approach, which has to rely on su-
pervision and sanctions to enforce the basic principles (see also Section 1.6.1), we want to
devise a technical mechanism that supports the direct enforcement of the basic principles.
This should give legislators technical tools to accomplish their task more eﬀectively. The
idea is to replace the supervision of compliance with the basic principles by a supervision of
proper usage of the technical enforcement mechanism. The latter can be more tractable if the
technical enforcement mechanism is constructed such that an improper usage is easy to detect
and prove. This should then also increase the trust of the data subject in the enforcement of
the principles of notiﬁcation and control.
The mechanism we propose, consists of encapsulating data on individuals in an object.
This object can be located in a domain that is physically controlled by the principal who
uses the data, but protects its data in the interest of the data subject. The object does this
mainly by communicating information on accesses to its data back to the data subject and
by implementing ﬁne-grained access control on its data.
The main problems that we encounter here are scale and enforcement. The problem of
scale is concerned with the sheer scope of the proposed solution, which requires a means to
notify the data subject about data accesses, some support for the data subject to process
these access notiﬁcations, and the deﬁnition of an access policy for each particular data item.
The problem of enforcement is actually twofold. First, it requires a mechanism to prevent
that the notiﬁcation about the access is suppressed or the access control of the encapsulating
object is broken. Second, it must be prevented that data that was correctly accessed is simply
copied, so that it can later be accessed without the protection of the encapsulating object,
potentially by a diﬀerent principal.
The latter is a fundamental problem, for which no satisfying technical solution exists. It
is the reason why our approach can not enforce the basic principles directly, but can only
support their enforcement. The problem is that once some information is disclosed to another
principal, the original holder of the information loses all control over this information. The
receiver can use it without any constraints, duplicate it, or disclose it to a third party. This
problem has also been explored in the context of the protection of intellectual property [Ste96]
and constitutes a problem for electronic cash (to prevent double spending [Cha92]). We will
return to this issue as well as to the problem of scale in Chapter 5.
The ﬁrst problem of enforcement is explored in the context of mobile agents, which suﬀer
from a very similar problem. Mobile agents are active objects that can move to remote
locations in order to accomplish some task for a user (see Section 2.4.1 for a more precise
deﬁnition). These remote locations provide an execution environment where the agent can
accomplish its task (for the user), which is under the physical control of another principal.
Since a mobile agent may contain conﬁdential or otherwise valuable information, it should
be protected from access and manipulation by possibly malicious principals that may try to
abuse the mobile agent. This problem has been explored in a considerable body of work,
which identiﬁes several diﬀerent approaches to the problem. The one we have chosen is based
on tamper-resistant hardware [AK96, NIS94] and public-key cryptography [DH76, MvOV97].
The notion of tamper-resistance indicates that the hardware is physically protected from its
environment and that it only interacts with its environment through an interface it controls.
We will present the mobile agent paradigm in Chapter 2 and discuss our approach to protect
mobile agents from their execution environment together with several other approaches in
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Chapter 3.
We can now interpret the object that encapsulates the data on individuals as a mobile
agent, and will also refer to it as data agent. It is, thus, possible to apply the same protection
mechanisms that protect a mobile agent when executing at a remote location, to a data agent.
These mechanisms can prevent that the access control of the data agent is broken. The
problem of preventing that the access notiﬁcation is suppressed can be resolved by delaying
any access until the data agent has received an acknowledgement from the data subject,
stating that the access notiﬁcation has been received. If the tamper-resistant hardware is
trusted by the data subject, then he has a reason to believe that the principles of notiﬁcation
and control will be enforced.
The close connection between data agents and mobile agents explains why a lot of the work
presented in this thesis is centered on the protection of mobile agents. This topic is in itself
an interesting and challenging problem and has led to some results that are not immediately
relevant to data agents. However, it was originally only addressed as a vehicle to solve the
problem of informational privacy.
Contributions of the Thesis
The thesis provides an analysis of the problems related to privacy in the information society
and points out the importance of trust in this context. A closer examination of trust leads
us to the identiﬁcation of the mobile agent paradigm as a technical means to address the
problem of trust.
We discuss the mobile agent paradigm and recognize the problem of protecting a mobile
agent from its executor as the major issue that needs to be resolved. We then classify the
approaches to this problem that can be found in the literature and develop our own approach,
which is based on a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device.
The investigation of the proposed approach in the context of the mobile agent paradigm
leads to the identiﬁcation of numerous conducts. These describe how and under what assump-
tions particular protection goals, which may be desirable for the owner of a mobile agent, can
be realized.
Finally, the thesis presents a conceptual framework, in which the presented approach is
used to address the problem of privacy protection and proposes a mechanism to reduce its
complexity.
Organization of the Thesis
As explained in the previous section, the work presented in this thesis is centered on two
related issues:
• protection of privacy: this is discussed in Chapters 1 and 5;
• protection of mobile agents: this is discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
More precisely, the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 1 we further explore the
issue of privacy, identify the importance of trust for security (and consequently for privacy) in
distributed systems, and discuss why we believe that a technical approach to enforcement can
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be superior to other approaches. Chapter 2 introduces the mobile agent paradigm and iden-
tiﬁes the particular problem we are concerned about. This problem, which is the protection
of a mobile agent from its execution environment, is addressed in Chapter 3 with an ap-
proach based on tamper-resistant hardware. This chapter also presents alternate approaches
to address the problem. In Chapter 4 we further develop the approach by introducing several
extensions to the basic technology and explore their usage for various purposes. Then, in
Chapter 5 we return to the problem of privacy protection and explain how the presented
technology can be used to support the enforcement of the principles of notiﬁcation and con-
trol. Finally, in the Conclusion, we summarize the major results of this work and outline
future research and possible developments around the presented technology.
∞∞∞
Chapter 1
The Protection of Privacy
If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy.
– Phil Zimmerman
1.1 Introduction
To illustrate our concern for privacy, we want to return once more to the industrial revolution
and explore the problem of safety, which we believe has certain similarities with the problem
of privacy today. The following discussion is based on the extensive presentation by Leveson
given in [Lev95].
In the beginning of the industrial revolution, the working conditions in factories were harsh
and dangerous. Workers were considered expendable since they cost nothing to hire or replace.
Modern standards for working safety that are deﬁned and enforced by government institutions
to protect the life and health of workers were almost non-existent. On the contrary, it was
considered the responsibility of the workers to protect their safety. There was no social
protection (other than family and friends) for a worker who suﬀered an accident or contracted
a disease that was caused by the conditions in his working environment. A worker would have
had to sue his employer to obtain some compensation, which was expensive and diﬃcult. The
workers were dependent on the salary paid by their employer and often not even aware of
potential or actually existing dangers (e.g., toxic chemical substances).
This situation changed only gradually, when more and more workers started to organize
in unions to protest against their working conditions and when social ideas (i.e., communism
and socialism) gained more political inﬂuence. This led to laws for workers’ compensation,
security insurance, and the establishment of safety standards. When employers were forced
to pay for accidents of their workers, they attempted to prevent these accidents. Another
market motivated factor was that the machines in the factories became more complex and
required extensive training of workers who only became productive after a considerable time.
In the case of a severe accident, the overall productivity was diminished and the investment
in the training of the employee was lost. This general interest in safety sparked increased
investment in safety technology (e.g., two-handed operation or improved illumination and
ventilation), which actually protected the life and health of workers (instead of oﬀering ﬁnan-
cial compensation for caused harm).
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Fortunately, a violation of privacy does rarely endanger the life and health of an individual
and is therefore less critical than a violation of safety. Nevertheless, as we will discuss below,
it may have severe eﬀects on the social life of a person and thus on society in general.
The similarities that we identiﬁed between safety and privacy are the following. In both
cases there is a substantial discrepancy in power between the principals, i.e., the employers
or controllers on one side and the workers or data subjects on the other. This is further
aggravated by a discrepancy in knowledge about the actual operation of the system and the
legal situation. An evaluation phase is necessary to detect and assess the inherent dangers,
which results in an organization of the weaker principals into associations that promote the
common interest (i.e., unions and consumer rights groups). Eventually, these interest groups
gather suﬃcient inﬂuence to constrain the more powerful principal either by changing the
legal situation, by creating or exposing market oriented incentives, or by a combination of
both. This issue has not been fully realized in the context of privacy protection but there is
evidence for increasing political support [EC95] as well as for organized self-regulation (e.g.,
TRUSTe [Dys97]). The last step, which consists in the development of privacy technology
and privacy protecting infrastructures that can be used by individuals to actively protect
their privacy, has started in particular application domains, such as communication or pay-
ment (e.g., PGP [Zim94], Mixes [Cha81], or anonymous electronic cash [Cha85]). A more
comprehensive eﬀort that aims to deﬁne a speciﬁcation for privacy policies in the context of
WWW usage data is the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) of the W3C [RC98].
The goal of this thesis is to address the underlying problem of the dissemination and usage
of personal data on a technical level and in a more generic way.
The question of whether and to what extent privacy should be protected is diﬃcult to
answer. Issues of this type have been discussed by Weinberg in [Wei72], where he introduces
the concept of trans-science. “Many of the issues that lie between science and politics in-
volve questions that can be stated in scientiﬁc terms but that are in principle beyond the
proﬁciency of science to answer [...] I propose the term “trans-scientiﬁc” for such questions
[...]”. Answering trans-scientiﬁc questions requires the establishment of values which must
be determined by political processes. This is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis, but we
would like to point out that privacy has been declared a fundamental human right in Art. 12
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations [UN48].
1.2 The Concept of Privacy
In order to discuss the technical problems it is necessary to have a clear understanding of
the concept of privacy, beyond the intuitive one that we have assumed until now. An exact
meaning of privacy is quite diﬃcult to deﬁne since it has many diﬀerent meanings in every
day language. For instance, the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language gives eight deﬁnitions for the adjective and the noun private and ﬁve more for the
noun privacy. This ambiguity can be useful for a spoken language, but it makes a scientiﬁc
approach diﬃcult.
One of the earliest legal deﬁnition of privacy was given by Warren and Brandeis in [WB90],
who identiﬁed privacy as “the right to be left alone”. This deﬁnition is very general and
includes various issues concerned with physical intrusion that we will not address. This
distinction has been identiﬁed by Rosenberg in [Ros92], where he presents three aspects of
privacy:
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• territorial privacy, which is concerned with the physical area of a person (e.g., his home);
• privacy of the person, which is concerned with direct physical access to a person (e.g.,
a physical search);
• informational privacy, which is concerned with information about a person (e.g., the
processing of personal data).
The last aspect is the one that Westin has identiﬁed in one of the classical works on
privacy [Wes67], in which he discusses the importance of privacy for free societies. There he
deﬁnes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for them-
selves, when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.
This deﬁnition is well accepted by consumer rights groups (e.g., Center for Democracy and
Technology – CDT, Electronic Frontier Foundation – EFF, Electronic Privacy Information
Center – EPIC, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse – PRC, or Privacy International – PI) and in
concordance with the information related parts of the deﬁnitions given by Margulis [Mar77]
and Lunheim and Sindre [LS94]. We will later see that it also matches well with our technol-
ogy driven approach to address the protection of privacy (see Section 1.4)
Since we adopt this somewhat restricted view of the concept of privacy, we will in the
following understand the term privacy to refer only to the aspect of informational privacy.
We believe that this restriction causes no problems for our application domain due to the
inherent lack of physical interaction in the use of communication and information systems.
We now want to give an overview of the actual problems related to privacy. These are
mainly concerned with the increasing amount of data on individuals, the data subjects, that
is created in modern communication and information systems. This data is generated and
held by a principal, the controller, who shares a legitimate interest in the data with the data
subject. Due to the decreasing cost of data storage and processing it becomes technically
possible and economically justiﬁable to gather and analyze large amounts of data. Further-
more, due to the improving communication facilities, data can easily be accessed from a
physically remote location and linked with local data. This leads to a considerable reﬁnement
of the quality of information that is contained in the data1 and can be used to supervise the
behaviour of data subjects.
1.2.1 Examples where Privacy is at Stake
In order to more easily situate our concerns and to illustrate the type and depth of information
that is created, we want to start by discussing some real-life examples. We will see that these
examples touch almost every aspect of our daily life.
Shopping
The increasing use of cashless payment methods and personalized discount cards allows shops
to identify customers and to analyze their buying habits. This is obviously not restricted to
the purchase of physical goods, but also applies to other merchandise, such as entry tickets to a
theater or a museum. This will probably be magniﬁed by electronic commerce systems, which
make the collection of data more eﬃcient and comprehensive (a customer who is repeatedly
looking at the description of a particular item is probably interested in buying it).
1We will often use the terms data and information in a very similar way. Usually both are interchangeable,
with data referring to the encoding in bits and information referring to the interpretation of these bits.
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Telecommunications
Telecommunication systems always gathered information about the communication relations
of people. This is called transactional data and concerned with who is communicating when,
how often, and from where with whom. With the advent of mobile communication systems
(e.g., GSM, IS-41, IS-95, JDC) this information becomes much more personal and reﬂects
the communication relations of a single person instead of a group of people (e.g., a family
that shares a single phone). It also reduces the amount of anonymous communications, which
occurred naturally when people used public phones. Modern mobile communication systems
create a new type of information since they have to store the location of a user in order to
route an incoming call [MP92]. This allows to construct a complete trace of the movements
of a user carrying a mobile phone in standby-mode. These movement proﬁles [FJK+97] will
become more and more accurate with the projected decrease of cell sizes [Ste94].
Medical Information Systems
The increasing cost of healthcare and the specialisation of practitioners mandate a more ef-
ﬁcient sharing of medical information. Researchers also have a legitimate requirement for
comprehensive access to medical data (which can be anonymized) for statistical analysis.
Even though people may be quite willing to provide all relevant information to doctors and
hospitals, they might be reluctant to provide their medical information to employers or in-
surance companies [And96]. The increasing interconnection of these systems and the growing
number of principals who can potentially access them will make an eﬀective control of who
accesses what information for what purpose an indispensable requirement. Otherwise, people
might hesitate to speak freely with their doctor about their health problems.
“Public” data
All the messages that are posted to usenet newsgroups or the information on WWW pages
are public data that can be accessed by everyone. However, the creation of huge news archives
(such as Deja News [Dej] with powerful search primitives that allow us to ﬁnd all the messages
posted by a single person over an extensive period of time to diﬀerent newsgroups, gives
these messages a new dimension by revealing the various interests and opinions of the person
in question. The same is true for personal pages on the WWW, which are temporarily
buﬀered by search engines (e.g., Google [Goo]) but also permanently archived by The Internet
Archive [Kah97] to save them for historical research. This precludes the possibility of the
poster of the page to simply remove it by removing the access rights.
A related problem is the global distribution of public records that are collected for spe-
ciﬁc purposes and only relevant in restricted contexts (e.g., Florida’s list of Sexual Preda-
tors [Flo97] or the National Association of Security Dealers’ list of stockbroker’s back-
grounds [NAS]). This information, which previously had to be searched for in the appropriate
context, may now easily show up in a general search on a person’s name (this may even cause
problems for diﬀerent people who have the same name).
Identification Systems
Several proposed systems (some of which are in experimental stages) for access control to or
localization within buildings (active badges) [WHFG92], public transport systems (personal-
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ized token cards), or highways (automatic toll collection) will also allow their operators to
create movement proﬁles.
Even more futuristic proposals to use radio emitters for precisely localizing trucks2 (to
track the location of goods), cars (to prevent theft), or even children (to protect them from
crimes) can hardly be evaluated in their possible eﬀects.
1.2.2 Dataveillance
The information that is generated in the cited examples can obviously be used for surveillance
purposes. In this context we will also refer to this form of surveillance as dataveillance, which
is a term coined by Clarke in [Cla89], as meaning “the systematic use of personal data systems
in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons”.
There are two well understood arguments against dataveillance. First, there is a possibil-
ity that the system does not function correctly and returns wrong information on the data
subjects. This is a well-known problem of current information systems, which are frequently
found to contain erroneous data due to false entries by operators or an incorrect operation of
the system. Such a slip can lead to serious problems for a data subject (e.g., refused credit
applications). This is also the reason for the right of the data subject to rectify inaccurate
data, which is identiﬁed in many legislations on data protection (see Section 1.3.2). The main
problem for the data subject then remains to ﬁnd out about the existence of the inaccurate
data. On the other hand, the same argument of inaccurate data is also used by advocates of
dataveillance systems to argue for improved systems which contain more accurate informa-
tion [LS94].
Second, there is the possibility that a dataveillance system can, even though it was in-
stitutionalized by democratic forces, fall under the control of totalitarian forces. This could
support or even enable an Orwellian [Orw48] type state where a dictatorship uses the avail-
able technical means to control the population. The example of the Third-Reich, which grew
out of a democracy (the Republic of Weimar) shows that this issue can not simply be ignored.
According to Lunheim and Sindre [LS94] these are not the only possible problems. Even
in a properly functioning democracy with strong safeguards against faulty data, there are
considerable dangers due to a lack of privacy. Given the increasing amount of personal
information that becomes accessible to everyone (e.g., “public” records on the WWW) there
is a severe risk that “the danger of dataveillance is not that the masses may be controlled
by a narrow elite – it might equally well be the elite being controlled by the masses, or the
masses controlling themselves” [LS94], and in particular any possible elite that might begin
to distinguish itself from the masses. This can, as Lunheim and Sindre further argue, lead
to cultural inﬂexibility and stagnation. The problem is that a person who deviates from
the norm or engages in legal but socially unaccepted actions (e.g., abortions [Tim99]) can
easily become the subject of harassment, which might lead to undesirable self-restraint. Also,
if every statement that is made to a well deﬁned group of people can later be taken out of
context and provided to people not known in advance, then one might be much more reluctant
to speak freely, which leads to a loss of freedom of expression.
Consider, for instance, a person who committed a serious crime during his youth and
2In a recent report aired on German Television (ARD), a police oﬃcer explained that tired truck drivers
sometimes call them for a control to be ordered by the police to take a break of several hours. The police
oﬃcer explained that this was often their only possibility to take a break without subsequent problems with
their employer.
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served an appropriate sentence. In the past it was always possible to move to a remote place
to start anew without having to cope with prejudice from others and to become a valuable
and respected member of the new community. Due to the extensive amount of information
available to everyone, this is hardly possible any more – often the information about a previous
conviction will be the ﬁrst information available to someone who investigates and will not be
tempered with additional information about positive changes (a similar example is discussed
by Wasserstrom in [Was84]).
1.2.3 Privacy is not the Exclusive Goal
Despite the described problems, we do not want to advocate a society where privacy is the
most important social good. However, it should be clear that privacy has a social utility,
which can serve to advance the goals of the entire society. In this context, privacy should
be considered as a means to an end, where the end has to be deﬁned in democratic political
processes by the society as a whole3.
This means that complete privacy is not desirable, since it may be abused by individuals
(or groups) to advance goals that are opposed to those of the society (e.g., criminals or
non-democratic forces). It is, thus, necessary to ﬁnd a balance between the interests of an
individual and those of society. Another example where privacy needs to be constrained, is
medical data on an individual. Even though this data is highly conﬁdential and any access
to it should be extremely limited, it is in the data subject’s own interest that any protection
can easily be overcome. This is important in the case of an accident where the data subject
would like to provide a doctor with complete access to his medical data, but is not capable
to provide this access if he is unconscious.
Since people have very diﬀerent standards concerning what constitutes an unacceptable
privacy intrusion and what is still acceptable4, it seems appropriate to let them deﬁne for
themselves the level of privacy they are comfortable with. Our goal is therefore to devise
mechanisms that allow individuals to control the access to their personal data within con-
straints deﬁned by society that limit the achievable level of privacy.
1.2.4 Complete Privacy is not Achievable
The possible level of privacy that is achievable is not only limited by constraints imposed by
society. Even if the society would not restrict privacy in any way, there is still a principle
problem, to which we will refer to as the problem of information disclosure. Once some
information is disclosed to another principal, the original holder of the information loses all
control over it. The receiver can use it without any constraints, duplicate it, or disclose it to
a third party. This is a fundamental problem, for which no technical solution exists.
The same political processes that were identiﬁed to limit an individual’s achievable level
of privacy should also restrict the use of data legally acquired by the controller. Since there
is no way to enforce such restrictions directly, our goal is to devise mechanisms that support
the enforcement.
3This tension can be observed in the EU-Directive on Data Protection [EC95], which identiﬁes privacy as a
fundamental human right (Preamble §2) but then restricts it (Art. 13) for reasons of (among others) national
security, public security, and important economical interests of the society.
4For instance, the UK has resisted to a photo ID for reasons of privacy, which is perfectly accepted in
Germany, France, and the United States [Bel97].
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1.3 Current Approaches to Privacy Protection
The concept of privacy is not only hard to deﬁne, but it is also diﬃcult to identify appropriate
measures to ensure privacy. All possible measures are mainly constrained by the problem of
information disclosure. It leads to the situation that the controller and the data subject are
two diﬀerent principals, who both have a legitimate interest in the data but probably diﬀerent
goals concerning its use. This is quite diﬀerent to classical security, where the controller is
the only one who has a legitimate interest in the data and can therefore take every necessary
measure to protect it. Since the data subject has lost any direct control over the data, he
is in an inherently weaker position than the controller. This is the issue that needs to be
addressed by measures to ensure privacy.
We want to brieﬂy explore three diﬀerent approaches that are most often pursued to ensure
privacy protection. We consider these approaches in the context of an arbitrary interaction,
which can be any form of transaction (e.g., purchase) or communication between multiple
parties.
1.3.1 Data Avoidance
The simplest and also one of the most eﬀective measures for privacy protection is not to
disclose data in the ﬁrst place, which limits the amount of available data. By investigating
for every data item whether it is actually necessary for the desired interaction, and by omitting
needless data, an interaction can be conducted with the disclosure of a minimal amount of
data.
This measure is not always helpful since the data may be inferred from the context of the
interaction (e.g., the time or location) or generated by another entity (e.g., the phone number
of a caller in the ISDN system or the recording of a surveillance camera). Furthermore, any
deliberately omitted data can often be obtained from other sources, based on the identity of
the data subject. Therefore, the main utility of data avoidance is in the context of anonymous
interactions, where one (or sometimes even both) of the principals does not identify itself to
the other (e.g., the use of public phones for communication or cash transactions). Obviously
this measure limits the possible activities of a principal to those that can be conducted anony-
mously and where the other party in the interaction accepts to interact with an anonymous
principal (this might be mandated by legislation).
Another possible measure that leads to data avoidance is the removal of identiﬁcation
information when it is no longer needed. This can often be used for statistical analyses, which
need to ensure that provided data is correct and authentic, but do not need the identifying
information for the actual usage of the data.
A major advantage of data avoidance is, that it is self-enforcing. Data that has not been
disclosed is not subject to the problem of information disclosure and can not be abused by
another principal. Therefore, it should always be considered ﬁrst, whenever a problem of
privacy protection needs to be addressed.
1.3.2 Data Protection
The most established approach to privacy protection is what is widely referred to as data
protection. Its goal is to deﬁne legislation or voluntary guidelines (the latter is often referred
to as self-regulation) that regulate and control how data that was disclosed by a data sub-
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ject (either deliberately or in the course of an interaction) can subsequently be used by the
controller.
The measures that are most often identiﬁed are those of the principles of fair information
practices, which prescribe basic principles that have to be guaranteed when personal data are
collected or processed. For instance, they require openness about data collection and the right
to rectify inaccurate data [Gel97]. The principles of fair information practices were originally
developed for the United States’ Privacy Act of 1974 [USC74], and can be found in many
other legislations, such as the EU-Directive on Data Protection [EC95]
The Privacy Act is limited to legislation of the public sector, while the private sector in
the United States is only covered by isolated and uncoordinated laws, such as the Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) [USC70] or the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 [USC88]
(as well as others for various sectors, such as cable viewing or educational records). According
to the analysis of Gellman in [Gel97], the Privacy Act was not very successful due to statutory
and administrative shortcomings in its implementation.
The EU-Directive, which was adopted in 1995 and had to be integrated into the national
laws of the member states by October 1998, is more comprehensive (it addresses both the
public and the private sector) and is based on a strong European precedent of successful
privacy protection legislation [MS97]. For instance, it prescribes that companies can only
process personal data if the data subject has given his consent or if it is necessary to handle
a transaction, to fulﬁll a legal obligation, or in the data subject’s or the public interest.
The law further prohibits the export of personal data to countries that do not observe the
legal requirements. The EU-Directive is considered the most advanced legislation for privacy
protection that “may be a valuable model for countries currently without data protection
laws” [Gre96].
Examples for self-regulation are the initiatives of TRUSTe [Dys97], the Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences (P3P) by the W3C [RC98], and the guidelines of the Individual References
Services Group (IRSG) [IRS98].
The goal of TRUSTe is to oﬀer companies a trustmark for their web pages. To obtain the
right to use such a trustmark, a company has to choose a privacy policy from a set of policies
deﬁned by TRUSTe, undergo an audit with an approved auditing ﬁrm to verify if its internal
operation complies with this policy, and pay a fee to TRUSTe. As a result, customers are
informed about the privacy policy of a company and can be reasonably sure that this policy
is actually adhered to.
This approach is very inﬂexible and will be complemented by P3P, which provides a
framework for informed online interactions. The goal is to allow more ﬁne grained deﬁnitions
of the privacy policies and to facilitate automated negotiations between a service provider
and a user. This informs users about the privacy practices and allows them to control the
disclosure of information. The approach does not inherently enforce the privacy policies and
relies on other mechanisms to achieve this (e.g., TRUSTe).
The guidelines of the Individual References Services Group (IRSG) were formulated to
comply with the EU-Directive and took eﬀect in January 1999. These guidelines urge infor-
mation vendors to publish their policies for data usage and should limit the distribution of
data. However, even though they prescribe a regular audit of the signers, there is no simple
way to seek relief from violations of the guidelines. There is no mechanism through which a
data subject can gather evidence of a violation of the guidelines [Law98].
In contrast to data avoidance, data protection is not self-enforcing, but compliance with
laws and guidelines has to be actively controlled by the data subjects or some other inde-
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pendent institution. This is a major problem of data protection and we will defer its general
discussion to Section 1.6.
1.3.3 Multilateral Security
The general idea of multilateral security (which is sometimes called multi-party security)
can be traced back to Chaum, who identiﬁed in [Cha85] a “new approach [to security that]
allows all parties to protect their own interests”. The deﬁnition we will use here is based
on Rannenberg et al. [Ran94, RPM97]: multilateral security is a concept that recognizes
the fact that all participating parties in a particular service interaction should be equal and
should be capable to deﬁne their security requirements, which then must be respected by the
implementation of the service. It removes the still often present constraint that security and
protection mainly or only apply to the operator of some IT or telecommunications equipment.
A typical example for privacy protection in the context of multilateral security is that
of a principal, say Alice, who wants to interact with another principal, say Bob, without
revealing her real identity. Bob might be willing to accept this, but still needs to protect his
own interests (e.g., to be able to prosecute Alice in the case of a dispute). To resolve these
conﬂicting interests, both principals can agree on a mutually trusted principal T , which is
usually called a trusted third party (TTP)5. Alice identiﬁes and authenticates herself to T ,
which in turn issues a pseudonym PA that it guarantees to reveal only under certain well-
deﬁned circumstances. Since Bob trusts T to reveal PA if he convinces T of a problem, he
will accept to interact with Alice using the pseudonym PA.
This approach has the advantage that Bob does not learn Alice’s real identity and, since
Alice can (and should) use a diﬀerent pseudonym P ′A in interactions with another principal,
say Carol, Bob and Carol will not be able to exchange data on Alice since both have diﬀerent
pseudonyms PA and P ′A that only T and Alice can identify to belong to the same principal
(the data of Bob and Carol on Alice is unlinkable). If P ′A was issued by a diﬀerent TTP, say
T ′, then linking PA with P ′A would require a collusion of T and T
′. Therefore, the approach
removes many of the disadvantages that we have identiﬁed for anonymity in data avoidance,
while retaining most of the advantages.
Other examples for the use of protocols and technologies that can be identiﬁed as imple-
menting the concepts of multilateral security for privacy protection are, for instance, mixes,
anonymous electronic cash, or fair exchange.
The concept of mixes was ﬁrst presented by Chaum in [Cha81], where he presents the
general idea of hiding the communication relation between a sender and a receiver in the
context of electronic mail. This is usually referred to as untraceable communication and can
be achieved with the help of a special principal, who acts as a TTP and operates the mix.
This mix changes the order and the encoding of messages that pass through it in such a
way that an external observer can not link incoming with outgoing messages. We will brieﬂy
return to this topic in Section 4.2.4. For more information please refer to [Pﬁ93, Cot95].
The concept of anonymous electronic cash is also due to Chaum, who presented it
in [Cha83]. It allows to transform an electronic coin in such a way that the withdrawal
and the deposit of the coin can not be linked with each other. Since a user has to identify
and authenticate when he withdraws money from his account, but not when he spends the
money (the identity of the receiver is suﬃcient), a purchase performed with such a coin can
5The integration of a mutually trusted third party is a recurring theme in the context of multilateral security
(often simply in the role of a certiﬁcation authority), which explains the usage of the term multilateral.
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not be linked to his identity via the payment information. More comprehensive discussions
can be found in [Cha85, PWP90].
The concept of fair exchange is described in [ASW96, BP90] and is concerned with pro-
tocols for the exchange of electronic goods. These protocols have to guarantee that at the
end of the exchange, either each party has received what it expects or no party has received
anything.
The generic deﬁnition of multilateral security opens it up to many other usages that are
not speciﬁcally geared towards the protection of privacy, but can be applied to any security
related problem that needs to resolve the disparate security requirements of several princi-
pals. The principals can identify and formulate their security (and privacy) requirements,
which can be very diﬀerent depending on the concerns of the individuals and often be in
conﬂict with each other. This then necessitates a negotiation phase that identiﬁes a mutu-
ally acceptable compromise. This negotiation can be accomplished in a static way, as was
assumed in the pseudonym-based interaction, where Alice agreed to reveal her real identity
to T and Bob accepts this arrangement since he trusts T to resolve problems, or result in
a dynamic negotiation of a compromise. The latter approach is often inevitable since the
security requirements of the interacting principals may sometimes not be known in advance.
If no mutually acceptable compromise can be found, then this can also lead to a complete
abort of the interaction. Finally, the requirements that were agreed upon in the compromise
will then be respected by the implementation of the interaction.
An example for a not primarily privacy related usage of the concept of multilateral security
is the reachability manager [DFRB97, RDFR97], which allows a callee to specify when and
by whom he wants to be reachable. Among other possible requirements, it allows a callee
who does not want to be disturbed by incoming phone calls to specify a deposit (payable
in electronic cash) that a caller has to transfer before a connection will be established. If
the callee decides that the interest of the caller was legitimate, he will refund the deposit.
However, if he feels disturbed by the call, he can keep the deposit, which provides some
compensation for his disturbance and might prevent the caller from repeating the interaction.
Many other examples for security and privacy measures in the context of multilateral
security are discussed in [MP97].
1.4 Basic Principles for Privacy Protection
One of the foremost tasks that has to be accomplished for the conception of this thesis is to
obtain a more pragmatic understanding of the abstract concept of privacy, which does not
lend itself to direct technical approaches (i.e., it is diﬃcult to identify technical measures
that protect privacy in general). Since it is our explicit goal to address the problem of
privacy protection on a technical level, we have to base it on more tractable principles. These
principles should be easy to analyze in respect to how they can serve to protect privacy
and it should be possible to address them with technical measures. This has resulted in the
identiﬁcation of the following three principles:
• notiﬁcation, which states that a data subject should be notiﬁed about the ﬂow and
usage of data related to him;
• control, which states that a data subject should have some well-deﬁned control over the
ﬂow and usage of data related to him; and
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• trust, which states that a data subject should have reason to believe that the data
related to him will be used fairly and that the principles of notiﬁcation and control are
actually observed.
The notion of fair use means that data is used to the advantage of both the controller
as well as the data subject or in a way that is mandated by society. This aspect of trust
is highly subjective and can not be addressed with technical measures. However, since the
data subject has some limited control over the use of data, we would assume that he can
withdraw the right to use the data when he discovers unfair use. In the following, we will use
the term trust only in the second meaning, i.e., the data subject has reason to believe that
the principles of notiﬁcation and control are observed.
The three principles can immediately be mapped to Westin’s deﬁnition of privacy. (“Pri-
vacy is the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves, when,
how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.) According
to his deﬁnition, the data subject himself is in control of the ﬂow of data, which obviously
requires that he is notiﬁed about this ﬂow of data. The deﬁnition further identiﬁes some
other entity as the designated receiver of the data, which the data subject implicitly has to
trust to use the disclosed data fairly. Since, according to the deﬁnition, the data subject is
still in control of the ﬂow of data even though it has been disclosed to some other entity and
the problem of information disclosure applies, the data subject must have reason to believe
that this other entity will not circumvent his control.
The principles cover in addition also the usage of data, which Westin’s deﬁnition ignores.
Therefore, they allow us to deﬁne a stronger protection of privacy. On the other hand, they are
also weaker than Westin’s deﬁnition, since he does not foresee any restriction to the control.
We could strengthen the principles by requiring that the data subject has complete control
over the ﬂow and usage of data, but this would be counter to the limitations of achievable
privacy, discussed in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4.
This set of principles is not necessarily complete and it is certainly possible to identify
others that are not covered by the ones mentioned above, but that can nevertheless serve
to protect privacy. However, it should be clear that a proper implementation of the ones
we identiﬁed, would lead to a considerable empowerment of the data subjects. They would
be better informed about who uses data related to them for what purposes and would be
in a much stronger position to negotiate a fair use of this data. We will now discuss the
principles in more detail, in particular their relevance for privacy protection and how they
can be addressed with technical measures.
1.4.1 Notification
This principle is based on the notion that the more knowledge a data subject has on what
data on him is available, who can access it, and who actually uses it, the better he can
decide on possible actions to actively protect his privacy. A notiﬁcation on the ﬂow of data
is identiﬁed in the sixth principle of fair information practices as stated in the Privacy Act of
1974 [USC74] as well as in Art. 10 and 11 of the EU-Directive on Data Protection [EC95].
A naive implementation of this principle would require a controller to send a notiﬁcation
to the data subject every time it accesses, changes, or discloses data on the data subject.
The major problem with this approach is information overload, where the data subject will
simply not be capable to process the large number of notiﬁcations, and in particular to extract
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those that signal irregularities. This problem can be addressed by aggregating and ﬁltering
the notiﬁcations, so that the data subject can, for instance, deﬁne that he only wants to
be notiﬁed of important changes in the use of data related to him. In the ideal case, the
aggregating and ﬁltering would be done at the point where the notiﬁcations are created in
order to reduce the communication overhead.
The requirements of this principle may be too strong for certain data accesses. It is
possible to weaken them in some well-deﬁned circumstances, where the notiﬁcation of the
data subject may be delayed. This could, for instance, be necessary in the context of law
enforcement, where a suspect should not immediately be informed about the opening of an
investigation on him. Such an operation would require the order of a judge and would deviate
the notiﬁcations about the accesses in the context of the investigation to a third party that
is trusted by the law enforcement agencies, but also by the data subject. This third party
collects the notiﬁcations and forwards them to the data subject after the investigation is
terminated.
1.4.2 Control
This principle is based on the notion that the more control a data subject has on the storage,
disclosure, and processing of data related to him, the better he can initiate actions to actively
protect his privacy. This inclusive interpretation of continued control over access to infor-
mation can also be found in [Sch84b], where Schoemann deﬁnes that “a person has privacy
to the extent that others have limited access to information about him”. A much weaker
form of control is identiﬁed in the second principle of fair information practices as stated in
the Privacy Act of 1974 [USC74] as well as in Art. 12 and 14 of the EU-Directive on Data
Protection [EC95].
The basic means of control that a data subject almost always has, is to decide whether
he wants to disclose some data at all (see Section 1.3.1). However, there are many examples
of interactions where this decision is severely limited, for instance in the case of data that is
required to facilitate an interaction (e.g., a postal address for a mail order delivery). If not
disclosing this data is the only means of control that the data subject can exert, then he can
only refrain from the interaction altogether, which might be a too severe limitation.
Once the data is disclosed, a naive implementation of this principle would require the
controller to query the data subject every time it accesses, changes, or discloses data related
to the data subject. Actively exerting this control would completely overwhelm the data
subject and prevent any eﬀective data processing due to the additional latency on every
data access. This problem can be addressed by annotating each data item with a usage and
disclosure policy6, which should automatically be derived from preferences of the data subject
at the time when the data is originally disclosed. The idea of such a policy is closely related
to the security requirements that were identiﬁed in the context of multilateral security. In
the ideal case, the policy would be enforced at the point where the data is located in order
to reduce the latency of data access by eliminating the otherwise necessary communication.
Again, the imposed requirements of this principle may be too strong and might have to be
moderated according to the constraints identiﬁed in Section 1.2.3. This can be achieved by
not accepting data that has been annotated with too restrictive policies or by simply ignoring
6This poses the additional problem of deﬁning the policy. Since we assume that data subjects do not have
great expertise, there must be some mechanism to contain the complexity of this task.
1.5. Two Approaches to Trust 19
overrestrictive policies. This last measure should be a rare exception and (inevitably) result
in a (possibly delayed) notiﬁcation of the data subject.
1.4.3 Trust
This principle is not directly concerned with the management of data, but provides a founda-
tion for the principles of notiﬁcation and control. It is based on the notion that the more trust
a data subject can have in the correct operation of the overall system, the more he has reason
to believe that he will actually be notiﬁed of any access, change, or disclosure of his data.
Furthermore, due to the fundamental problem of information disclosure, the data subject can
not exert any direct control over the data and must have reason to believe that the control he
exerts will actually be put into practice by the controller. Therefore trust represents the data
subject’s view on the problem of enforcement. The principle of trust is implicit, though not
always justiﬁed [Gel97], in any legal approach (such as the Privacy Act or the EU-Directive
on Data Protection) where it is based on the trust people have in the legal system.
Trust is itself a rather abstract concept and it is not obvious how it can be addressed
with technical measures, which was one of the prerequisites that we identiﬁed for the basic
principles. We have investigated this issue and are convinced that a technical approach
that relies on legal support can better satisfy the principle of trust than a legal approach
alone. In the following section we will present two diﬀerent approaches to trust and then, in
Section 1.6.2, we will explore how trust can be motivated based on technical measures.
1.5 Two Approaches to Trust
The concept of trust has long been recognized as being of paramount importance for the
development of secure systems. For instance, any conceivable system for authenticating
users needs trusted functionality that holds the necessary authentication information (see
e.g., [SNS88, WL92]). Other examples are the trust one has in the proper operation of a TTP
(e.g., a certiﬁcation authority) or in the creator of a shrink-wrapped program. A pragmatic
approach to address the notion of trust can be found in [BFL96], where the authors identify
the domain of trust management as an important problem to provide security in network ser-
vices. However, the meaning that is associated with trust or the notion of a trusted principal
is hardly ever clearly deﬁned and a user is left with his intuition.
A reason for this lack of a clear deﬁnition could be that trust is rather a social than a
technical issue, which mixes the goals of a principal with its behaviour to achieve these goals.
This means that in order to trust some principal, it is necessary to approve of its goals (which
are not always clearly stated) and to believe that it will behave accordingly.
1.5.1 The Policy
In our deﬁnition of trust, we identify the central role of a policy, which is a set of rules that
prescribes the behaviour of a principal for all relevant situations. This policy has to be written
down, signed by the issuer7, and made available to all other principals that interact with its
issuer. Since the issuer is supposed to observe this policy, it is also in its interest that the
policy is consistent with its goals.
7This can include a timestamp on the policy or even its certiﬁcation by a notary.
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With the help of this policy, the notion of trust can now be separated into two compo-
nents: adequacy of the policy and trustworthiness of the issuer of the policy. In order for a
principal, say Alice, to trust another principal, say Bob, Alice ﬁrst has to verify Bob’s pol-
icy and must decide if it adequately protects Alice’s interests. This can be quite simple if
the policy states “we will protect your interests” (which would in turn require a very high
degree of trustworthiness from its issuer). In general, though, this is a diﬃcult problem that
can be addressed with various methods, for instance, similar to the approach for security
architectures in [Rue91]. A very restrictive approach could consist of the deﬁnition of several
static protection classes that can easily be assessed by Alice (e.g., the three classes proposed
by TRUSTe [Dys97]). Another, more ﬂexible solution is to deﬁne a formal speciﬁcation of
a policy and an ordering that allows us to compare two arbitrary policies to decide if one is
stronger than the other. This forms the mathematical structure of a partial order. If both
the speciﬁcation of the policy and the ordering relation are well chosen, then Alice can assess
Bob’s policy by identifying a minimal policy, which guarantees that all of Alice’s requirements
will be met, and then comparing it with Bob’s policy. If Bob’s policy is stronger than Alice’s
policy, then Alice knows that Bob’s policy is adequate for her (see Figure 1.1). We will re-
turn to this issue in Appendix B, where we address this problem in a particular example and
introduce a simple speciﬁcation of a policy together with a suitable comparison operation.
Policy
Generation,  Signing, and Dissemination
Goals Requirements
Policy
MinimalPolicy
Verification and Decision
Figure 1.1: Assessing the adequacy of a policy
Then, in a second step, Alice has to assess Bob’s trustworthiness, which requires to estab-
lish a motivation for the belief that Bob will adhere to his published policy. This problem is
quite diﬃcult to formalize. Depending on how the trustworthiness of a principal is established,
we have identiﬁed two fundamentally diﬀerent approaches to trust8:
• the optimistic approach and
• the pessimistic approach.
In the optimistic approach, we give a principal the beneﬁt of the doubt, assume that it
will behave properly, and sanction any violation of the published policy afterwards. In the
pessimistic approach we prevent any violation of the published policy in advance by eﬀectively
constraining the possible actions of a principal to those conforming to the policy.
8The approaches were named according to similar concepts in the domain of transaction processing.
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1.5.2 The Optimistic Approach
This approach is easy to implement, since it does not require any special measures to make
trusted interaction possible, which is probably the reason why it is the basis for most business
conducted today. On the other hand, it requires a reliable mechanism to discover a policy
violation after it has occurred. If such a mechanism does not exist, then there is no particular
motivation to believe that a principal will adhere to its published policy other than its own
assertion. This extreme case of the optimistic approach, which would require that one has
blind trust in the other principal, is obviously a very weak foundation for trust and not
recommended for any important interaction. It is therefore important to make the probability
that a policy violation is discovered as high as possible by establishing an eﬀective supervision
of the principal’s behaviour.
Once a policy violation is discovered, its eﬀect should be compensated and, if it can
irrefutably be attributed to one of the participants in the corresponding interaction, the
violator should be sanctioned according to the damage caused by the policy violation. The
primary goal of this sanction is to deter potential violators from committing a policy violation
in the ﬁrst place.
By deﬁnition, the optimistic approach cannot prevent malicious behaviour, but it only
tries to compensate for it after it has been discovered. For many situations in real-life, where
a policy violation can have an irreparable eﬀect (e.g., the public disclosure of a conﬁdential
information cannot be undone) or where a proper functioning of the system is absolutely
essential, this guarantee may not be strong enough. These are problems of our every-day life
and therefore quite well understood — the question is if we can do better than that.
1.5.3 The Pessimistic Approach
The pessimistic approach removes these disadvantages by simply preventing any violation of
the published policy. Thus, it prevents malicious behaviour in advance rather than correcting
it after it has occurred. This would clearly be the best foundation for trust since we can solely
rely on a principal’s policy to verify that its behaviour will be adequate. The behaviour of the
principal becomes completely transparent as far as it is constrained by its policy without the
need to actually supervise any particular action. If a rule of the policy prescribes a particular
action for some event and if any violation of this policy is prevented then it is guaranteed
that the action will take place.
The disadvantage of the pessimistic approach is that it is diﬃcult and often expensive to
implement, since it requires the deployment of a comprehensive infrastructure that guarantees
the enforcement of the policies. It cannot be realized in its full generality, but is limited to
those rules of a policy that can eﬀectively be enforced with some uncircumventable mechanism;
for non-enforceable rules, we still have to rely on optimistic approaches to trust. Finally, the
pessimistic approach may not always be capable to unconditionally prevent policy violations,
but is limited to making them more diﬃcult to commit and easier to detect. Despite all
these disadvantages, we believe that it still constitutes an improvement over the optimistic
approach, since it allows us to reduce the number of possible violations as well as the number
of possible violators.
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1.6 Enforcement of Privacy Protection
We now want to discuss how the various approaches to privacy protection can actually be
enforced and, in particular, how technical measures can support the enforcement of privacy
protection. This discussion is organized according to the two approaches to trust, which can
be interpreted as the data subject’s point of view on the underlying enforcement mechanism
(i.e., how the enforcement is perceived by the user).
The laws and guidelines that we identiﬁed in Section 1.3.2 as well as the security require-
ments of Section 1.3.3 can be interpreted as the policy for each of the two approaches to trust.
Therefore, the approach used to specify the privacy protection is independent from the actual
enforcement.
1.6.1 Enforcement in the Optimistic Approach
As we have already explained, this requires the cooperation of three components:
• supervision of a principal’s behaviour,
• compensation for policy violations (if possible), and
• sanctioning of the violator.
Since the compensation is inherently dependent on the actual policy violation and not
always possible, we do not want to comment on it any further.
An eﬀective means to supervise a principal’s behaviour is to require a high degree of
transparency for all its actions, so that everybody who interacts with the principal can su-
pervise its behaviour in respect to its policy. However, this is diﬃcult to achieve and it is
quite likely that many principals might not be eager to accept it in order to protect internal
business processes. A better approach is to designate specialized appraisal companies that
execute frequent in-depth controls of the conduct of companies, which is precisely the idea of
TRUSTe [Dys97] (see Section 1.3.2). If a principal does not agree to voluntary audits, this
approach provides no help. In such a case it is at most possible to supervise the externally
visible actions of a principal and to start legal actions in the case of a suspicion. The problem
of appropriate supervision is also highly dependent on the actual interaction and can not be
addressed in its generality.
Convincing means to sanction a policy violation can be quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd. Depending
on how such sanctions are enacted, we can break this issue further down into:
• implicit sanctions based on (a good) reputation and
• explicit sanctions based on punishment.
Implicit sanctions rely on the fact that the principal in question is well known and has very
little to gain through a violation of its own policy but a lot to lose in case a policy violation
is discovered. Since the policy is neutral in the sense that it allows all parties to beneﬁt from
the interaction, a policy violation can only result in a temporarily increased gain, but once it
is discovered, would lead to a long term loss. This loss is supposed to transpire from the lost
revenue due to customers taking their business to another principal. Reputation is an asset
that is expensive to build up and that is invaluable for any company. Thus, we assume that a
principal would not risk to lose its good reputation for a relatively small and temporary gain
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and will consequently rather adhere to its policy. This deterrent can obviously be increased
by additional explicit sanctions (explained below).
This form of sanctions can be very eﬀective since it puts immediate pressure on a principal
who is under suspicion of improper behaviour – the market can react immediately. Further-
more, it is not dependent on national laws and thus more eﬀective in international relations.
The major problems are that it is only eﬀective if a principal actually does have a good rep-
utation that it is interested to keep and it can not eﬀectively cope with malicious insiders.
These can commit policy violations that are against the interest of their company for strictly
personal reasons or ﬁnancial beneﬁts [Tim96, Win96].
Explicit sanctions based on punishment are the classical approach to enforce a certain
behaviour. They rely on a comprehensive legal framework such as those discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3.2. The goal is to create an environment where mutual beneﬁcial behaviour is rewarded
over anti-social behaviour by imposing disciplinary actions9 such as ﬁnes or imprisonment (de-
pending on the severity of the oﬀence). These are supposed to negate the short term gain
that may be achieved through a policy violation, which introduces a similar tradeoﬀ as in
sanctions based on reputation. However, the legal threat that deters most people from com-
mitting a policy violation may not be suﬃcient for a person who may readily risk some years
of imprisonment for the possibility of a relatively large gain.
The non-compliance with a policy can be quite diﬃcult to prove. This is further aggra-
vated by many other well-known problems of laws, which are in general diﬃcult to deﬁne,
to understand, and to apply. Moreover, in the case of a particular dispute their enforcement
is usually expensive, slow, and complex (in particular if the laws of diﬀerent countries are
applicable as can be expected for transactions on the Internet). Finally, laws require that
the damaged party is aware that the legal protection exists and can only be applied after
the problem has occurred, when the damage is already done. These problems have led to the
institution of a data commissioner (also called data protection ombudsman), who is an expert
in questions of legal enforcement of privacy protection and who can start investigations on
behalf of an individual or autonomously.
1.6.2 Enforcement in the Pessimistic Approach
Due to the considerable problems of the optimistic approach, we want to devise technical
measures that can support the direct enforcement of a policy. This should give legislators
technical tools to accomplish their task more eﬃciently.
The idea is to legally mandate the use of technical measures that are assumed to prevent
any violation of the policy as long as they are used properly. The supervision of a principal’s
behaviour can then be replaced (or, if a stronger protection is required, supplemented) with
a supervision of the proper usage of the technical measures10. If these technical measures are
constructed such that an improper usage is easy to detect and prove, then we assume that
this supervision is more tractable than the supervision of the principal’s behaviour. In the
9In the case of voluntary guidelines, which do not have the power of actual laws, this might require the
establishment of a contract, which binds a principal also legally to its issued guidelines.
10It may be possible to conceive elaborate protocols that make an improper usage infeasible, which would
make the supervision unnecessary. They could, for instance, rely on mechanisms such as contract signing
without a third party [EGL85]. These protocols would be trivial from the point of view of enforcement,
though highly complex in their realization. We have not investigated this approach.
If an improper usage of the technical measures were infeasible, which is a purely hypothetical assumption
since no technical measures can guarantee total safety, then the supervision would be no longer necessary.
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case when an improper use is detected, the approach resorts to the same means for sanctions
explained above (and, if possible, compensation).
The advantages of this approach are that a policy violation becomes easier to discover and
more diﬃcult to commit11. A pessimistic approach that relies on well-constructed technical
measures can, thus, provide a better privacy protection for the data subjects than an opti-
mistic approach alone, since it can be pursued in addition to everything that is done in the
optimistic approach. However, if the technical measures are not adequate, they provide a false
security, which results in less supervision and possibly more undiscovered policy violations.
The technical measures have to be deployed such that they are not accessible to the
issuer of the policy, which requires that they are encapsulated in some physically protected
domain12. This domain can either be the administrative domain of a trusted third party
(TTP) or a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device that can safely be operated in the
administrative domain of an untrusted entity. Such a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware
device is physically protected from its environment and interacts with its environment only
through an interface it controls. It can be a simple chip-card (also called smart card), a
complex PC-card (PCI or PCMCIA), or even a dedicated computer system with its own
peripheral devices. The reason why the TTP or the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware
device should be trusted more than the issuer of the policy can, for instance, be based on the
fact that the former enjoy a good reputation, while the issuer of the policy is not well-known.
This issue requires a more profound explanation, which will be discussed in Section 3.5.1 for
the case of the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware (the arguments for a TTP would be
quite similar).
From a theoretical point of view, both methods are very similar and can be used to
achieve many of the same goals (the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device can be
seen as a miniature TTP). However, from an engineering point of view they are quite diﬀerent,
since they provide almost complementary system properties. For instance, a TTP disposes
of more resources (e.g., computational power or storage) and has control over its access to
the communication facilities (i.e., no other entity can permanently block its connectivity).
On the other hand, a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device provides more eﬃcient
connectivity to its operator (bandwidth and latency are only limited by the local installation),
oﬀers a more predictable performance (it is not shared with other principals as is usually the
case with a TTP), and will not temporarily be inaccessible due to communication problems
that are not under the operator’s control.
We already mentioned that the pessimistic approach can not guarantee the enforcement
of arbitrary policies (e.g., it can not force the issuer of the policy to execute a particular
action or prevent it from storing a value), but is restricted to the enforcement of very limited
(but nevertheless useful) policies. Therefore, the policy has to be investigated by an impartial
principal (either the TTP or the manufacturer of the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware
device), to decide whether it can be enforced. The impartial principal will then guarantee
this by certifying (digitally signing) the policy. During normal operation, the issuer of the
11A potential violator who wants to overcome the technical measures needs more knowledge, determination,
and has to make a greater investment. This can easily be translated in more criminal energy and thus be
punished more severely, which results in an additional deterrent to commit the policy violation (stealing an
item from a closed car as opposed to an open car requires more determination and special knowledge on how
to open a car).
12We will later discuss the approach by Sander and Tschudin [ST98], which allows to provide some limited
protection to a mobile agent without requiring them to be encapsulated in a physically protected domain.
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policy is required to cooperate with the TTP or the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware
device, which will ensure that no policy violation can occur.
Based on the diﬀerent properties of the two methods and for reasons that should become
clear later on, we have chosen to pursue the one based on a trusted and tamper-resistant
hardware device. The use of such a device constitutes an application of the general concept
of transferring trust in a tamper-resistant device over to the untrusted operator of this device
(e.g., a sealed electricity meter in a private home or the balance of an oﬃcial buyer (of goods)
calibrated and sealed by an appraisal organization). We will describe a trusted and tamper-
resistant hardware device in Chapter 3 and discuss the requirements that have to be met in
order to enforce certain policies in Chapter 4. The tamper-resistant hardware device that we
will explore is not restricted in its use to address privacy related problems only, but can be
used in other contexts. We will explore several of them before returning to the problem of
privacy protection in Chapter 5.
1.6.3 A Similar Approach
A speciﬁc application that uses very similar ideas with respect to trusted hardware is the one
discussed by Brands in [Bra94]. It uses a wallet with an observer for the implementation of
an anonymous oﬀ-line electronic cash system. The problem with such a system is that an
electronic coin, which is simply a digital information with a corresponding digital signature
of a bank, can easily be copied and, thus, spent several times at diﬀerent receivers (this is
called double spending). Since the system is anonymous (i.e., the withdrawal and the deposit
of a coin can not be linked with each other), a bank can not identify the oﬀender.
Here, the observer is the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device that operates in a
wallet that is physically controlled by a user. Both the observer and the wallet do not trust
each other. The observer participates in every withdrawal transaction, and has to authorize
every payment transaction; so it knows what coins the user received from the bank and it
authorizes every spending of an electronic coin at most once. Thus, its task is to implement
a prior restraint on the double spending of electronic coins.
Since this pessimistic approach is entirely dependent on the tamper-resistance of the
observer, the approach integrates another optimistic mechanism that provides an additional
safety in case the tamper-resistance of the observer is broken. This mechanism allows to easily
detect coins that were spent more than once and to deanonymize the principal who committed
the double spending. This entire approach has actually been implemented in the ESPRIT
Project CAFE [BBC+94]. For more information on the underlying technology, please refer
to [CFN88, Cha92, PWP90].
This approach is signiﬁcant since it relies on a similar assumption of multiple lines of
defence that we also assume for the trusted and tamper-resistance hardware device. The
device forms a ﬁrst, potent barrier that eliminates all occasional oﬀenders that do not have
the knowledge or the resources to eﬀectively attack the system. Among the remaining, suﬃ-
ciently potent principals, there is only a small fraction that can realistically expect a higher
proﬁt from attacking the system than by using it according to its speciﬁcation. This remain-
ing risk is then addressed with appropriate mechanisms that allow to discover an attacker.
Such an attacker can then be punished for a successful attack on a legally protected system.
This punishment can be signiﬁcantly higher than that for proven double spending (since it
constitutes a systematic attack instead of a single proven oﬀence).
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1.6.4 An Overview of our Approach
The idea of our approach for technical privacy protection is to encapsulate every data item on
individuals within an object that implements the basic principles of notiﬁcation and control.
This means that the object sends a notiﬁcation to the data subject whenever the data in the
object is accessed and enforces the access control policy that was provided by the data subject.
In order to accomplish these tasks, it has to be protected from its controller. More precisely,
the data object, which consists of code and state, has to be protected against illegitimate
access on its data and from any interference with the execution of its code.
We can interpret the object that encapsulates the data on individuals as a mobile agent
(see Chapter 2), and will also refer to it as data agent. Therefore, the identiﬁed problem of
protecting the data agent from its controller can be mapped to the problem of protecting a
mobile agent from its executor. The latter problem will be addressed in Chapter 3, where we
present an approach that is based on a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device, which
can protect the code and state of a mobile agent from disclosure and manipulation. These
mechanisms that protect a mobile agent when executing at a remote location can also be
applied to the data agent. They can prevent any illegitimate access to its data or interference
with the execution of its code and allow the data agent to enforce its access control policy.
The problem of preventing that an access notiﬁcation is suppressed by the controller can be
resolved by delaying any access until the data agent has received an acknowledgement from
the data subject, stating that the access notiﬁcation has been received. This may have to be
cryptographically protected to prevent that the acknowledgement is forged by the controller.
Furthermore, the approach can prevent the unauthorized transfer of a data agent to
another controller. The decision about a transfer is left to the data agent, which can decide
based on its policy or relay the decision to the data subject. This allows the data subject to
either indirectly (via the policy) or directly control the ﬂow of data.
The presented approach can be identiﬁed as a generic application of the concept of mul-
tilateral security discussed in Section 1.3.3. The policy allows the data subject to express his
security requirements within the limits of enforceable policies, which are then implemented
by the data agent and enforced with the help of the trusted and tamper-resistant hardware
device. This allows to specify complex and dynamic security requirements of diﬀerent data
subjects on top of the same generic enforcement method.
1.7 Relevance of Privacy
Numerous recent studies have shown that the concern for the protection of privacy that we
have discussed in this Chapter is not only theoretically relevant, but a real issue for users on
the Internet.
The 8th GVU WWW User Survey [GVU97] that was conducted internationally identiﬁed
privacy (30.49%) as the most important issue facing the Internet, followed by censorship
(24.18%), and navigation (16.65%). In the same study 39% (33%) of the respondents agreed
strongly (somewhat) that there should be new laws to protect privacy on the Internet. This
last ﬁgure was conﬁrmed in a poll by Business Week [Ham98], which found that 53% of the
respondents wanted the government to “pass laws now for how personal information can be
collected and used on the Internet”. According to the same poll, 61% of poll respondents say
they would use the Internet more if their privacy would be protected and 43% (42%) of the
respondents say that privacy policies posted on a company’s web site help not at all (a little)
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to encourage them to purchase products or services from that company. This has to be seen
in the context of 33% of the respondents who do not trust the company at all to actually
follow its policy, while 58% trust the company at least somewhat.
This indicates that people may actually be willing to pay for privacy. This can in turn be
used by companies, who succeed in convincing users that they will protect their privacy, to
increase their proﬁt. This is a market that is currently being explored by TRUSTe, but also
by big accounting ﬁrms such as Coopers & Lybrand and KPMG [Dys97].
∞∞∞
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Summary
This chapter deﬁnes the concept of privacy and establishes the importance of protecting
it. Various current approaches to privacy protection are discussed. We present the approach
that we propose to pursue, which is based on the principles of notiﬁcation, control, and trust.
The principle of trust is investigated in greater detail. This leads to the identiﬁcation of
two approaches to trust, which can be interpreted as the data subject’s point of view on the
underlying enforcement mechanisms. We identify the pessimistic approach to trust that is
supported by technical measures as the one we want to pursue. The chapter terminates with
an overview of the approach that is developed in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2
System Model and Mobile Agents
And trust no agent; for beauty is a witch
Against whose charms faith melteth into blood.
– W. Shakespeare (deliberately taken out of context)
2.1 Introduction
The term agent is probably one of the most overused words in computer science and has very
diﬀerent meanings in the area of artiﬁcial intelligence, network management, or distributed
systems. It is therefore very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to give a widely accepted deﬁnition
for what constitutes an agent. Adding the adjective mobile allows us to more clearly center
the corresponding research area on distributed systems, where mobile agents are considered
as an interesting and innovative approach to structure distributed applications [HCK97].
Since we are, in the context of this thesis, primarily interested in the protection of mobile
agents and the use of these protected agents for privacy protection, we do not consider this
lack of focus as a disadvantage. It is one of our explicit goals to keep the approach of mobile
agent protection as general as possible so that it can be applied to most systems that fall
into the category of mobile agent systems. Therefore, we will keep the following discussion
of what we consider to be a mobile agent system quite broad and simply identify the basic
properties and requirements of mobile agent systems that we have to assume in order to apply
our approach. This is the subject of this chapter, which will explore various technical issues
in the context of mobile agents in order to identify these basic properties and requirements.
2.2 The World of Mobile Agents
In order to prepare for the following detailed discussion of the possible features and paradigms
that a particular mobile agent system can implement or adhere to, we ﬁrst want to discuss
the environment in which we envisage mobile agents to thrive and then provide a rather
comprehensive example of what an agent can do. The example is supposed to illustrate some
of the less technical issues in a mobile agent system. These are the autonomy of the mobile
agent, which does not need to ask the permission of the user for standard decisions, and the
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fact that a mobile agent executes a task on behalf of a user, from whom it also obtains its
authority. It is these issues that justify the use of the term mobile agent instead of the more
technical mobile object.
2.2.1 The Environment for Mobile Agents
The underlying infrastructure that we envision as the environment for mobile agents is very
similar to what currently exists in the Internet and in the World Wide Web (WWW). However,
the Internet is not the only existing infrastructure in which mobile agents can subsist. The
various interconnected national telecommunication networks also provide suﬃciently powerful
computing technology to serve as an environment for mobile agents and the network’s opera-
tors are more ready to accept new ideas from the area of distributed computing and computer
networking. As a matter of fact, it is not obvious to separate both infrastructures from each
other since the Internet is in part realized on top of the telecommunication networks and
conversely there are considerable eﬀorts to provide classical telecommunication services over
the Internet, such as classical voice communication in the form of IP-telephony [Sch97b].
This indicates that there is a powerful trend for convergence between the Internet with
its IP-based protocols and more traditional telecommunication networks. Examples for this
convergence are the adoption of ideas from the Internet for the provision of services in future
telecommunication networks as illustrated in the TINA eﬀort [DNI95] and the increasing in-
terconnection of services via gateways as can be seen in the possibility to send SMS messages
to GSM compliant mobile phones [MP92] from the Internet (SMS Gateway). Another impor-
tant and very well established gateway are the Internet Service Providers (ISP), which allow
to access the Internet via conventional telecommunication facilities. We therefore assume that
future computing devices will be able to take advantage of any available communication links,
which will all provide a connection to the Internet and, thus, to all possible service providers
on the Internet:
• wireless telecommunication networks based on infrared, radio, or satellite,
• ﬁxed telecommunication networks, and
• IP or ATM networks.
Another major trend can be observed in the increased mobility of end-users, who want
to have access to communication and computing services at any time, at any place, and in
any form. This can be conﬁrmed in the rapidly increasing number of subscribers to mobile
communication services, such as GSM [MP92], IS-41, IS-95, or JDC (Japanese Digital Cel-
lular) [Lor93], but also in the more recent success of very small computing devices that are
often called personal digital assistants (PDA), such as 3Com’s PalmPilot or palm-size devices
based on Windows CE. The merge of these end-user equipment will lead to completely new
communication and computing devices that will be both a mobile phone and a PDA. Re-
cent products such as Qualcomm’s pdQ [Qua], which is a PDA phone, clearly point in this
direction.
Concerning the computing hardware, also called hosts, in the infrastructure for mobile
agent systems that serve as the platforms for agent execution, we can identify two diﬀerent
roles that these hosts can play. First, the role of a client, which allows a user to interact with
the mobile agent (possibly via some special user interface software that is not directly part of
2.2. The World of Mobile Agents 31
the agent). The mobile agent will receive the necessary conﬁguration information required to
accomplish its task during the interaction with the user and deliver the ﬁnal results of its task
back to the user. If the conﬁguration information with which it was launched is insuﬃcient
or if particular problems occur during its execution, the agent may also brieﬂy return to the
user during the execution of some task to receive further instructions. Second, a host can
play the role of a server to which the mobile agent is sent in order to accomplish its task.
Here, the mobile agent can interact with other agents that are located at this platform and
can access resources that are available from this platform. Often it will be necessary for a
mobile agent to interact with many servers to accomplish its task (e.g., TTP, broker/trader,
or name server) or to even visit several of them to interact directly with local resources.
Other important factors for a host are its capabilities (i.e., available resources and con-
nectivity) and, in particular for a host in the client role, its physical form. For a host in
the server role we assume that it will have access to the ﬁxed network, very high bandwidth
communication facilities, permanent connectivity, and huge processing and storage resources.
It will directly interact with end-users only for management purposes, therefore the user in-
terface capabilities are not of immediate importance for its functionality. There will be many
diﬀerent actual systems, but we assume that most of them will satisfy the above requirements.
For a host in the client role we can distinguish between three diﬀerent types of hardware:
• stationary clients
• portable clients
• mobile clients
The stationary clients correspond to current home PCs. These are powerful machines
with high bandwidth communication facilities, permanent connectivity, large processing and
storage resources, and powerful user interaction capabilities (big screen and keyboard, sound,
video, etc.). A stationary client will, in general, be used by many people (such as all the
members of a family, as well as, occasionally, their friends and relatives) and in special cases
it might even be used as information kiosk that provides information services to anonymous
users on the expense of some sponsor.
The portable clients correspond to current laptop computers. These are mid-range ma-
chines with intermittent connectivity (that may frequently change from high to low bandwidth
communication facilities), considerable processing and storage resources, and usable user in-
teraction capabilities (small screen and keyboard). A portable client will be used by a small
number of people.
Finally, the mobile clients correspond to PDAs, mobile phones, or PDA phones. These
are very limited machines with low bandwidth and high cost communication facilities, inter-
mittent connectivity, small processing and storage resources, and restricted user interaction
capabilities (tiny display, pen-based or telephone button input technology). A mobile client
will typically be used by a single person and can, thus, be highly personalized. Since a mobile
client can easily communicate with a stationary client (e.g., infrared links), it can provide its
personal preferences and conﬁguration information in order to allow temporary personaliza-
tion to take advantage of the stationary client’s vastly superior communication, processing,
and interaction capabilities. Furthermore, it can also take the role of a personal security
device in cryptographic protocols (e.g., authentication or signatures).
The distinction between these diﬀerent types of hardware may become blurred, for instance
in the case of very powerful or very small portable computers. Nevertheless, each of them has
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a rather speciﬁc set of properties, that make them suitable for diﬀerent tasks, and users will
adapt their choice of services to the available hardware.
2.2.2 An Example
An often cited example (see e.g., [Yee99, FGS96a, CGH+95]) in the domain of agent based
electronic commerce, which addresses many important issues, is that of a person, say Alice,
who wants to buy an airline ticket using the facilities provided by a mobile agent system. We
assume that Alice wants to ﬂy from Geneva, CH to Nagoya, JP. As there is no direct ﬂight,
available, she will be able to choose from a large number of options varying not only in price
but also in ﬂight times and possible stop-overs.
We assume that Alice has access to a mobile agent that she is familiar with and with which
she had positive results in the past. Due to the continued interaction with Alice, the agent
has created an information base that contains conﬁguration data that Alice should not have
to enter repeatedly (e.g., a phone number to inform her of last minute problems, or payment
data) but also many of Alice’s preferences, such as preferred seating, dietary restrictions,
or other personal constraints Alice regularly expresses on air-travel. While she is riding on
a train to her next business meeting, Alice launches the agent, or rather the program that
provides the user interface for the conﬁguration of the agent, on her PDA and provides it with
the information for the desired trip: destination, travel dates and times, business or leisure,
as well as other constraints that deﬁne when an oﬀer from a service provider is acceptable.
After the agent is conﬁgured it will eventually leave Alice’s PDA. This might be ac-
complished immediately after Alice has ﬁnished the conﬁguration using a low-bandwidth,
high-cost radio based network that is available in the train or (if this is not available or too
costly) the agent might wait until Alice approaches a public network access point with a
connection to the high-bandwidth and low-cost ﬁber based network. The connection between
Alice’s computer and the network access point could be an infrared or short-range wireless
(e.g., bluetooth [Blu]) link, which only requires Alice to point her computer towards a receiver
or simply stay in the coverage area of the network access point for a suﬃcient amount of time
(depending on the size of the agent, a few seconds should be enough).
The agent has to migrate to some service provider1 that oﬀers a suitable agent execution
environment2 and that is both capable and willing to execute it. The capability to execute it
depends primarily on the used technology and limits the agent to those service providers that
support the technology for which it was conceived. This problem is far from being resolved
and will be subject to future standardization eﬀorts [OMG98b, FIP97], which will probably
identify a small number of technologies that may be supported in parallel (even though not
every service provider will support all the competing technologies). The willingness of the
service provider to execute the agent depends on security related issues that we will discuss
later, but also on business related issues dealing with payment for the resources consumed
by the agent while executing at the service provider (e.g., CPU cycles, memory usage, and
communication bandwidth consumption).
Depending on the agent’s conﬁguration it will probably ﬁrst visit a broker that will provide
1We will later on see that the service provider is not necessarily the principal that operates the agent
execution environment, but we do not make this distinction here.
2We want to use this term here in an intuitive way which simply signiﬁes an engine located at some place
that executes the mobile agent properly. It will be explained in more detail in the agent execution service
discussed in Section 2.5.2.
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it with a ﬁrst selection of possible airlines (avoiding, for instance, non-optimal itineraries that
require long detours). The result of this ﬁrst interaction is a list of possible airlines or rather
of the network addresses of their suitable agent execution environments.
The agent will decide on an itinerary and migrate to the ﬁrst airline server on its itinerary.
There it will negotiate with the services accessible on the execution environment in order to
ﬁnd a suitable oﬀer that satisﬁes all (or at least a suﬃcient subset) of the constraints deﬁned
in Alice’s preferences and during her conﬁguration of the agent. The agent will request the
oﬀer to be put on hold and migrate to the next airline server on its itinerary.
When the agent can not ﬁnd a suitable oﬀer, it will return to Alice’s PDA, inform her
about the problem, and possibly propose several relaxations on her constraints based on its
negotiations with the airline servers. Otherwise, when it has visited all the airlines servers on
its itinerary or upon another suitable termination condition (e.g., a certain number of suitable
oﬀers found), the agent will execute a decision algorithm that will identify the best oﬀer (the
location where this decision algorithm is executed, may also be an important issue due to
security considerations and since the service providers are probably eager to minimize their
computational load). The agent will then migrate to the airline server where it obtained this
oﬀer and ﬁnalize the purchase transaction. As a result of the purchase, the agent will obtain a
cryptographically protected ticket. Then the agent may inform the other service providers to
release the oﬀers it had requested to be put on hold. Finally, the agent will return to Alice’s
PDA, possibly waiting in some mailbox in case Alice’s PDA is temporarily disconnected from
the network, inform her about the decision taken, and deliver the ticket to Alice. If Alice
discovers a problem with the arrangements done by her agent, she can not simply undo the
actions, but she rather has to take additional compensatory actions to resolve the problem
We can see that this seemingly innocuous example of an e-commerce agent purchasing an
airline ticket already produces a rather big scenario, in which we have not yet tackled many
interesting issues. In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore some of the technical
details that we have now just glanced over.
2.3 Mobile Code
A prerequisite for mobile agents is some technology for mobile code, which allows to send a
piece of code over the network to be executed at a remote host. Due to the immense success
of Java [GM96], which puts code mobility in the form of Java Applets [Fla97] in the center
of its design, this topic has recently returned to the forefront of attention.
We will ﬁrst have a look at the history of mobile code, then we will explore the underlying
concepts, and ﬁnally discuss two simple paradigms that make use of mobile code.
2.3.1 Some History
Code mobility is not a new concept. It has its origins in the 1960s where the Job Control
Language (JCL) [Bro77] was used in the optimization of networked computers, enabling mini-
computers to submit batch jobs to mainframes using a remote entry system (RES) [CGH+95].
Another direct approach to code mobility is the rsh (remote shell) command that was in-
troduced by 4.2BSD UNIX in 1984 [LMKQ89]. It allows a user to send a shell script to a
remote machine where it will be executed with access to all the local resources of the remote
machine, such as peripherals (e.g., a printer) or data on the local disk of the remote machine.
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A rather prominent and successful example for the use of mobile code is SQL, the struc-
tured query language [Lyn90], which was originally conceived in the late 1970s and ﬁrst stan-
dardized in 1986. Even though the mobility of a particular query was not in the center of
the design of SQL, but rather the declarative, high-level, application neutral formulation of a
query, the compact representation of the interpreted language make it very easy to package
a query into a message, send it to a DB server, where it is interpreted with complete access
to all the resources of the DB server, i.e., the data in the DB. Thus, it can perform ﬁltering
on the large amounts of data in the DB and return the (usually) small result of the query
to the user. An SQL query can be interpreted as a very specialized form of agent, which is
primarily conceived to be executed close to the data, to ﬁlter the data, and to return a much
reduced amount of data in the reply to the query.
A less obvious use of mobile code is illustrated in PostScript [Ado85], which is a page
description language that is primarily used for describing the appearance of printed pages. A
document is sent to a PostScript capable printer, which will execute the code, construct the
described page, and print it. PostScript is actually a fully functional language that can be
used for general purpose computing and served as inspiration for the M0 agent language that
is used in the Messenger Agent Project [TMMH96].
In the domain of distributed operating systems the question of code mobility has been
studied quite comprehensively in the context of process migration, which deals with the prob-
lem of moving a running system level process from one machine to another. This was mostly
done with the goal to improve system eﬃciency by providing load balancing capabilities, but
also to allow a dynamic reconﬁguration of the system so that a process can be moved to an-
other machine if its current host has some scheduled down-time. Examples for systems that
provide process migration are Amoeba [MvRvRvS90], Sprite [DO91], or Condor [TL95]. A
more ﬁne-grained approach to similar problems is studied in the context of object migration,
which enables the mobility of language level objects that can be relocated from one address
space to another. The reason for this relocation are also eﬃciency concerns similar to those
that motivated process migration, but also more subtle advantages, such as the migration of
parameter objects to a remote site for the duration of an object invocation. Examples for
systems that provide such facilities are Emerald [JLHB88] and Obliq [Car95]. An overview
of systems providing process or object migration facilities is given in [Nut94].
A major obstacle for truly mobile code that can potentially be executed everywhere,
is the heterogeneity of the possible execution environments (hardware, operating system,
and installed software). This has led to the development of scripting languages that were
conceived to overcome these problems, such as Perl [WCS96], Tcl [Ous94], or Python [Lut96].
These scripting languages are executed in the context of a runtime system that interprets
the commands of the scripting language. Since the runtime system itself is software, it
can be ported to any suitable hardware platform, which can then execute mobile code of
the corresponding scripting language, thus providing a homogeneous execution environment
for the programs coded in the scripting language. All of these scripting languages have to
some extent been augmented with mobile code facilities (agentPerl [Pur98], agentTcl [Gra95],
Rover [Rus98], Ara [PS97]).
The most recent contenders in the area of mobile code systems are Telescript3 [Whi94] and
the already mentioned Java. Telescript was from its conception designed as a language for
mobile agents and explicitly geared towards its use in electronic-commerce. As a consequence
3Telescript has meanwhile been abandoned by General Magic in favor of Odyssey, which is based on Java.
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it was right from the start designed with strong security features in place [Vigna[91]]. Java
was originally conceived as an interpreted, architecture-neutral, portable language4. However,
it was soon discovered that these properties made it into a suitable language for automatically
downloadable programs on the World Wide Web. With the integration of the Java virtual ma-
chine into the Netscape Navigator in October 1995 it became the ﬁrst widely deployed system
for mobile code. A considerable number of systems try to leverage the code mobility of Java
into a full-ﬂedged mobile agent system, such as Aglets [LC96], Concordia [WPW+97], Jump-
ing Beans [Ast98], Mole [SBH97b], Odyssey [Whi97, Mag], Voyager [Obj], WASP [FM99].
2.3.2 The Basic Concepts of Mobile Code
Given all of these very diﬀerent approaches, we want to brieﬂy summarize the deﬁning charac-
teristics that are relevant (important) for code mobility. These are (mainly) centered around
the concepts of :
• location and
• migration.
These can also be found in [CPV97], where Carzaniga et al. informally deﬁne code mo-
bility as “the capability to reconﬁgure dynamically, at run-time, the binding (this implies the
migration) between the software components of the application and their physical location
within a computer network”.
The basic idea as depicted in Figure 2.1 is to transfer a package that contains the code
and possibly additional (data or) parameters from a sender’s site SA to a receiver’s site SB ,
where it is, eventually, executed. During this execution, the code may produce a result (which
can be a message or even another piece of mobile code) that can be sent to another site or
back to the original sender.
This indicates the necessity for two diﬀerent but closely related technologies. The ﬁrst one
is necessary to instantiate the mobile code together with the data or parameters it requires
on a given location and provides the execution environment for the mobile code. We will refer
to this technology as the platform. This platform can be very simple as in the case of process
migration, where it is identical to the actual hardware, or it can be rather sophisticated as
in the case of a runtime system for scripting languages. We will return to this technology in
Section 2.4.2, where we discuss the agent platform. The other technology is responsible for the
transport of the agent to another location. It consists of a mechanism to marshal the mobile
code into a transportable format that can be sent via some communication infrastructure to
the new location – we will further discuss this issue in Section 2.2.1. Again, this technology
can be quite simple as in the case of scripting languages, which usually require simply the
sending of an ASCII-text ﬁle or it can be relatively complex as in the case of process migration,
where the code segment, data segment, and execution state of the running process have to be
extracted from the current location and properly packaged to allow its transmission to and
rebuilding at the new location. As can be seen in this last example, where the mechanism
that marshals the code requires extensive support from the platform in order to accomplish
its task, it is not always easy to clearly separate the two technologies, since they are strongly
dependent on each other.
4The complete list of buzzwords can be found in [GM96].
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Figure 2.1: The basic idea of mobile code
2.3.3 Simple Paradigms for Mobile Code: REV and COD
The actual usage of mobile code in a real system requires to resolve the question how the
migration of the mobile code is initiated. In the example given above, this can be either one of
the two principals. This diﬀerentiation results in the identiﬁcation of two diﬀerent paradigms
for mobile code [CPV97]:
• remote evaluation (REV) and
• code on demand (COD).
In the REV paradigm, it is the sender of the mobile code who takes the initiative to
transfer the mobile code to the receiver. The idea of the REV paradigm is, for instance,
that a principal can customize the basic low-level services of a provider by transferring some
additional code that composes these low-level services into a high-level service. It is therefore
a straightforward extension to the well-known RPC paradigm, which only allows to call the
basic services of the provider. Without the REV paradigm, an RPC based service has to
provide complex and diﬃcult to manage high-level functions in order to save communication
bandwidth and to reduce latency.
In the COD paradigm, it is the receiver of the mobile code, who takes the initiative to
request the mobile code from the sender. The idea of the COD paradigm is that a compu-
tation running on a particular platform can download and link some code from a provider
to perform a particular task. This can, for instance, be a user interface, that interacts with
the user to seize a certain amount of data, or a computational component that is required to
perform a particular task. This is exactly the paradigm that is naturally supported by Java
applets [Fla97], which consist of a set of Java classes that can be referenced in an HTML
document and are subsequently downloaded and executed when this document is accessed by
a remote user.
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The two paradigms are of high importance since they are easy to implement in real
systems and, thus, more readily available for experimentation. Examples for a straightforward
implementation of the COD paradigm are Java applets [Fla97] and ActiveX controls [Cha96].
Furthermore, in Java it is also easy to implement the REV paradigm based on the object
serialization that is provided with the Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) [Sun98]. To
do this, it is suﬃcient to implement a simple server that accepts serialized Java objects and
instantiates them locally.
The problems raised by mobile code and the services required to tackle these problems, in
particular in the context of security are very similar to those of mobile agent systems, which
are discussed in Section 2.5.
Many problems that we will discuss in the context of this thesis are not dependent on
the full mobile agent paradigm, but could be addressed with one of the simpler paradigms
(see, for instance, the stationary agent in Section 2.6.2). However, for ease and brevity of
presentation we will concentrate on the more general mobile agent paradigm. The changes to
our approach if applied to one of the other paradigms should be obvious and relatively minor.
2.4 The Mobile Agent Paradigm
In this discussion of the mobile agent paradigm, we are primarily concerned with the support-
ing infrastructure that provides the necessary services for mobile agents. This infrastructure,
to which we will also refer to as mobile agent system is made up of several components, as
depicted in Figure 2.2. The functionality of a mobile agent system is to allow the creation
of a society of mobile agents and can be compared to that of a middleware for distributed
applications. The goal of such a middleware is to provide the infrastructure that enables a
federation of interacting objects. To achieve this, it has to specify and standardize services for
the applications as well as the way how the applications interact with these services. There
are many diﬀerent approaches to implement such an infrastructure and it has taken the dis-
tributed systems community more than a decade before converging on CORBA [OMG95] and
DCOM [Red97] as the prevailing architectures for middleware for distributed applications.
We assume that it will probably take the mobile agent community a considerable amount of
time before settling on a small number (ideally one) of valid architectures for mobile agent
systems. It may be possible to learn from the experience made in the design of CORBA to
shorten this time and there are even eﬀorts that try to integrate a mobile agent system into
CORBA [Vin98, OMG98b, Obj].
As we have already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we do not want to focus
on a mobile agent system in particular, but we are concerned with the protection of mobile
agents in general. Therefore, we will not describe a single mobile agent system, but rather
identify the issues that have to be resolved for our approach to be applicable and point out
possible design alternatives.
In the example of Section 2.2.2, we have described a mobile agent system from the view-
point of the diﬀerent application level services, such as the server of an airline operator or the
broker. We will now analyze this system from the viewpoint of a lower abstraction layer and
look at the components that make up the the infrastructure and, in the following Section 2.5,
at the services that have to be provided by the mobile agent system. In Figure 2.2 we have
identiﬁed ﬁve diﬀerent components: the mobile agents, the agent platform, the operating
system, the hardware, and the communication infrastructure. For the sake of the discussion
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of the services, we want to concentrate on the two components that are speciﬁc for a mobile
agent system:
• the mobile agent and
• the agent platform.
We assume that the remaining components provide the well-understood services of a
modern operating system running on a contemporary computer and the connectivity to an
extensively deployed wide area communication infrastructure, such as the Internet. We will
not comment any further on how these components generate their services and refer to the
appropriate literature, e.g., [SG94, Tan90, Tan88].
2.4.1 The Mobile Agent
In the mobile agent paradigm, the mobile agent itself obviously plays a central role. It is the
entity that migrates between the agent platforms, in order to accomplish its task. Since there
is no real consensus on what a mobile agent precisely is, we introduce the following deﬁnition
for our work, which identiﬁes the generic concepts that mobile agents exhibit in most existing
mobile agent systems. A mobile agent is a piece of software that has the following three
properties:
• it is an object (or set of objects) that consists of code and state (i.e., it is active and
has an execution thread (or several threads) of its own),
• it can (autonomously) migrate from one agent platform to another where it will interact
with local objects, data, or facilities, and
• it executes a well-deﬁned task on behalf of a user from whom it also obtains its authority
and tries to accomplish this task without further intervention from the user (unless
unexpected events occur).
Thus, the important properties for a mobile agent in the context of the mobile agent
paradigm are that it is an active object that moves in order to do something for a user.
Other properties that are often associated with agents, such as intelligence, learning, or
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collaboration are not necessary requirements for what we consider to be a mobile agent (even
though an agent may exhibit them).
On a more general level, we assume that a mobile agent is implemented with some object-
oriented methodology, which allows us to encapsulate its state (other than the current ex-
ecution state that is managed by the execution environment, see Section 2.5.2) within the
data structures of the object. This state is then manipulated exclusively via the methods
of the object, of which some are purely internal and not accessible from the outside, while
others are explicitly made accessible and constitute the public interface of the mobile agent.
Furthermore, a mobile agent has an ID that is composed of some unique ID of its owner (see
Section 2.4.3) and a sequence number (attributed under the control of its owner).
2.4.2 The Agent Platform
The agent platform is the other fundamental part of the infrastructure and represents the
static component of a mobile agent system. It belongs to a certain principal (see below),
who also owns the data and facilities that are the primary reason why agents migrate to its
platform.
We have already brieﬂy discussed the agent platform’s general function in the example
of Section 2.2.2 as well as its counterpart for mobile code execution in Section 2.3.2. This
general function is to serve as a landing pad or docking station for mobile agents, i.e., to oﬀer
them an execution environment that supports the language in which the mobile agent was
conceived, hides the heterogeneity of the underlying hardware, and provides the necessary
resources for the agent’s execution. The designers of a particular mobile agent system have
to deﬁne which of the services described in the following Section 2.5 have to be implemented
by the agent platform and how the mobile agents that are part of this mobile agent system
can access them. In this sense, the tasks of an agent platform are very similar to those of an
operating system, which provides standardized services (such as process execution, resource
management, interprocess communication, and protection) and a well-deﬁned means to access
these services (e.g., POSIX [IEE96] or Win32API [SGB96]).
In order for mobile agents to be able to migrate to a certain agent platform, the platform
has to be stationary and must have a valid network address. This indicates that an imple-
mentation of an agent platform has to be built around a stationary server that is permanently
connected to the communication infrastructure. We assume that the relevant information will
be gathered in a structure that consists of the name of the agent platform’s operator, the
physical address in the network, and the available resources. A mobile agent can obtain them
from a broker and combine them to create an itinerary.
2.4.3 Some Agent related Terminology
Before we discuss the services of a mobile agent system in detail, we want to establish some
terms for the roles that principals can take over and relate them to the lifecycle of a mobile
agent. These concepts should help to make the following discussion clearer.
Roles in the Mobile Agent Paradigm
A principal can perform several roles. We want to identify the following roles that are relevant
for the mobile agent paradigm:
• the agent creator also referred to as programmer,
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• the agent owner also referred to as user,
• the agent executor also referred to as platform operator, and
• various third parties, such as name server, broker, or trusted third party (TTP).
The agent creator writes the necessary code that has to be executed in order to accomplish
a given task (we will refer to this unconﬁgured form of an agent as agent program). It is
possible that a user writes his own agents but we consider this to be a rare exception. An
agent program can be very speciﬁc for a certain task, which will limit the usefulness of the
resulting agent, or it can be highly generic so that it can be conﬁgured to accomplish several
diﬀerent tasks, which will make the corresponding agent more useful to its users. Consider, for
instance, an agent that can only purchase long-distance ﬂights from a single airline as opposed
to an agent that can purchase arbitrary transportation tickets from any airline, train, or bus
operator. The latter agent will be more useful, since it can organize trips with diﬀerent means
of transportation. Obviously, the possibility of whether an agent can be highly generic and
conﬁgured to accomplish diﬀerent tasks depends heavily on the amount of standardization
that is in place in a certain application domain. Without such standardization, the agent has
to implement many diﬀerent interaction protocols for the various providers, which make it
more error-prone and more diﬃcult to handle due to its increased size.
The agent owner creates the agent from the agent program, conﬁgures it with the data
that is needed to accomplish a certain task, and provides it with the required authority to
accomplish this task. (It would be possible to split this role into an agent configurator who
provides the conﬁguration information and an agent sponsor who lends the agent his authority
– for most discussions we will limit ourselves to the single agent owner role.)
The agent executor provides and manages the agent platform on which agents can be
executed. It needs to have some vested interest in executing an agent, such as having a
business relation with the agent owner, where it requires payment for the service of executing
the agent, or the agent executor uses the mobile agent paradigm only for the purpose of
interacting with users, where it recovers payment indirectly. In this case it may provide a
completely diﬀerent service, such as the sale of physical goods or some value added service
for which it will charge agent owners.
Finally, the various third parties provide facilitation services that are required for the
smooth interaction of components and principals. For instance, to allow agents to discover
the right agent executors (i.e., those that are capable and willing to execute a particular
agent) or to allow agent executors to verify the authority of a particular agent. If the agent
interacts with these third parties by migrating to an agent platform that they operate, they
become regular agent executors (with the special task of a facilitator). However, we assume
that an agent can also interact with these by simple message passing or via RPC interactions
(see Section 2.5.5).
This technical, agent centric view of the roles of principals in a mobile agent system has
to be matched with the business oriented, application centric view on the same system. In
the case of electronic commerce, for instance, we can identify the following roles:
• customer
• service provider
• TTP (e.g., banks, certiﬁcation authorities (CA))
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agent creator agent owner agent executor
design x
implementation x
distribution x x
instantiation x
conﬁguration x
migration (x) x
operation x
termination x (x)
Table 2.1: The Agent Lifecycle
• non-trusted facilitator (e.g., broker, trader, directory service)
The agent owner can usually be identiﬁed with the customer in an e-commerce scenario.
However, this is not the case for the agent creator or the agent executor, which can both
be associated with the service provider, a non-trusted facilitator, or a TTP. For the ease of
presentation, we will often identify the agent executor with the service provider and the agent
creator with a non-trusted facilitator, even though this is not always accurate.
Agent Lifecycle
The above discussion of the diﬀerent business roles also hints at the lifecycle of a mobile
agent. This lifecycle is depicted in Table 2.1, where the lines signify the various steps of the
agent lifecycle and the columns depict the role of the principal with whom it interacts at a
certain step.
The agent is designed and programmed by the agent creator in order to accomplish a
particular class of tasks. It is then acquired by the agent owner or customer, who needs
an agent for this class of tasks. The business model of how this acquisition takes place can
be rather complex: there might be agent programs that are in the public domain and that
everyone is free to use (these might be sponsored by the service providers who want to sell
their actual value added services), there might be agent programs that a customer can buy
and is then free to use at his own discretion, or there might be agent programs that require
payment of a certain fee for their use (based on the number of usages, the usage duration,
the value of the mediated transaction, or any other appropriate metric). Once an agent
program has been acquired by a customer, he will instantiate it and provide it with the
necessary information for the task at hand5. The agent will interact with the customer in
order to obtain all the information that it (or rather its programmer) considers necessary to
accomplish the task without further interaction with the customer. Depending on the task,
the same agent may request very diﬀerent types of information from the customer during
this interaction. Obviously this requires a very deep understanding of the task by the agent
creator, who has to anticipate as many possible outcomes of the agent execution as possible.
If the customer has previously interacted with the same agent, the agent may even have stored
certain static information (such as the customer’s name, address, or payment data) or it may
5For the sake of simplicity we will assume that the agent contains the user interface for the interaction with
the customer. This assumption might prove rather ineﬃcient in reality, but the user interface could easily be
factored out from the mobile agent and become a standalone program on the customer’s machine.
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read this data from a special preferences ﬁle that can be shared among diﬀerent agents in
order to avoid that the customer has to enter the same information several times.
When the agent is satisﬁed with the information supplied by the customer or if the cus-
tomer considers the information to be suﬃcient, he will instruct the agent to migrate to the
ﬁrst platform with which it will interact. It is possible that the agent will never leave this ﬁrst
platform (this is the case for stationary agents, see Section 2.6.2 or for very simple agents that
may simply return a result to their owner) but most often the agent will acquire a certain
amount of information, (which can be a single address for the next host that it will visit or
some complex information that it extracted during the interaction with other agents or from
resources available on this platform) and then move on to another platform where it will
continue its task.
It is possible that the agent needs some additional information from the customer when
some unforeseen or highly unlikely situation occurs and the original information is not suﬃ-
cient for the task (e.g., in the case of an agent that searches for an airline ticket, no single
seat for the given date available). In such a case the agent can return to the customer and
request the relaxation of various constraints (e.g., a diﬀerent date, an additional stopover,
another nearby airport as destination/origin, a diﬀerent class, a larger group of possible car-
riers). However, this interaction is very similar to a regular migration, with the local resource
required by the agent being the agent owner.
Finally, when the agent has accomplished its task it can either send the result in a message
to the agent owner or return to the agent owner’s platform to deliver it there. After it has
delivered this result, the agent terminates.
2.5 The Services of the Mobile Agent Paradigm
A mobile agent system has to provide the necessary services to enable mobile agents to
accomplish their tasks. These are rather abstract services that are highly dependent on each
other and can be implemented in many diﬀerent ways. Some of them can clearly be allocated
to one of the components of the mobile agent system (e.g., agent execution is a service that
must be provided by the agent platform), while others can not as easily be allocated and
may be realized in diﬀerent components or even be partitioned over several components that
have to cooperate to provide the service. Even though the interface between a mobile agent
and the underlying agent platform has to be well-deﬁned in an actual implementation of the
mobile agent paradigm, there is still a large amount of ﬂexibility in where to put the software
that implements a particular service, provided that the underlying layer oﬀers suﬃciently
powerful primitives. For instance, an agent can integrate the software or at least parts of the
software for agent mobility as explained in Section 2.5.1. This software does not necessarily
have to be programmed by the agent creator, but can be provided by the author of the mobile
agent system and it may not even have to be sent with the agent since it will be available on
all agent platforms of this mobile agent system in the form of libraries. Nevertheless, since
the software is still logically part of the agent, it can, if necessary, be changed by the agent
creator.
In the following discussion, we will describe the service in the context of the component
that we consider the most appropriate for the service’s realization. The goal of this discussion
is to present an overview of what exists and to discuss the services on a conceptual level
without too much technological detail.
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2.5.1 Mobility Support
One of the deﬁning features that distinguishes mobile agent systems from other infrastructures
for distributed computing and consequently one of the most important services in a mobile
agent system is the service that enables agents to be mobile.
In principle all code is mobile. It may have to be physically transported (e.g., on a
ﬂoppy disk or CD-ROM) or electronically transferred (e.g., via ftp, http, or smtp) to its new
location, then manually installed by a human operator (which may include a compilation into
executable code if the original code was transmitted as source), and explicitly started by the
operator. On the other hand, a normal program that is installed on a certain host, which may
even be connected to a network, can not simply suspend its execution and migrate to another
host even though it might be capable to exchange messages with this host. This implies that
agents themselves are not mobile, but have to rely on the support and the cooperation of
the mobile agent system in order to migrate. In the following, we will assume at least some
minimal support for agent mobility and want to note that one of the distinguishing features
of mobile agent systems is the degree of automation for this mobility support.
The problem of a mobile agent, say A, migrating from the agent platform on which it is
currently executing, say Porigin, to another agent platform, say Pdestination, can be divided
into two rather independent parts that have to be dealt with on the respective agent platforms
in a way that allows interoperation.
• On Porigin, the agent A has to be prepared for migration, packaged in a suitable trans-
port format, and the marshaled agent A must be sent to Pdestination.
• Conversely on Pdestination, the marshaled agent A has to be received, extracted from
its transport format, admitted for execution on Pdestination, instantiated on Pdestination,
and launched.
The decision of whether to actually admit a received agent and to launch it on the des-
tination platform is a very diﬃcult problem that depends on various issues. It is mainly a
question of access control, which will be discussed in Section 2.5.6 on security.
In the context of support for agent mobility, we now want to address the more technical
problem, of how a ﬂow of execution on Porigin can be transferred to Pdestination. The most
complex problem in this context is due to the necessary separation of an agent’s state into
its data and its execution state. This distinction is important for the mobility support and
is anchored in the way execution environments are implemented. The data of an agent
comprises the values of the instance variables of the set of objects that make up the agent.
This information can easily be accessed and packaged during an agent migration. New objects
that are dynamically created by the agent have to be added to its set of objects. One of the
problems here is that references held by an object O1 to another object O2 have to remain
valid after the migration to a new platform.
The execution state of an agent comprises the values of the registers of the virtual machine
on which it executes, the thread information, and the execution stacks for each of the threads,
which hold the dynamic variables of the active methods and the method invocation history.
This information is entirely managed in the execution environment and, thus, not directly
accessible to the agent.
In order for an agent to be able to migrate from Porigin to Pdestination, the following
problems have to be resolved:
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• The code of the agent has to be transferred to Pdestination: this is normally quite simple
since the code of an agent is usually immutable, so that the original code that arrived
with the agent can simply be stored and sent as is, when the agent wants to migrate.
• The data of the agent has to be transferred to Pdestination: this requires a complete list
of the objects that belong to the agent as well as access to the instance variables of
these objects. It can be realized with the help of a special method of the object that
returns a stream of bytes, which encodes the values of its instance variables, similar to
the object serialization in Java [Mic97].
• The execution state of the agent has to be transferred to Pdestination. This is the most
diﬃcult part of the agent migration and can be handled in several ways, depending on
the support provided by the agent platform. In the following we want to discuss two
extreme cases for this support.
The literature on mobile agents (e.g., [Ord96, CGPV97] identiﬁes mobile agent systems
that provide strong support for agent mobility, in which case the agent platform takes care
of all the actions required to transfer a mobile agent, and systems that provide weak support
for agent mobility, in which case most of the required actions are taken over by the mobile
agent and the agent platform only provides the support that is absolutely required to enable
the agent to accomplish this task. Other approaches to agent mobility, in which the mobile
agent and the agent platform partition the required actions in some meaningful way are also
possible.
In the case of strong support for mobility, Porigin suspends the agent’s execution, extracts
the current execution state of the agent from its data structures, and marshals it together
with the agent’s code and data into the transport format. This functionality of the platform is
usually coupled with the actual migration of the agent and oﬀered to the agent in some form
of “go (destination)” command. The migration is accomplished by sending the marshaled
agent to the destination platform given in the command issued by the agent. The coupling of
the marshaling with the actual migration makes sense since any further actions of the agent on
the current agent platform would not be reﬂected in the marshaled state of the agent. When
Pdestination receives the agent and decides to admit it for execution, Pdestination instantiates
the objects of the agent, integrates the agent’s execution state in its data structures, and
restarts the agent where it left oﬀ.
In the case of weak support for mobility, most of the actions of the agent platform described
above have to be taken over by the mobile agent itself. In the following we will assume an
absolutely minimal support from the underlying agent platform. This minimal support for
agent mobility consists in accepting a message that contains code and data, to install the code
with proper access to its data, and to launch its execution on the local agent platform. The
mobile agent must be capable to analyze its current execution state (if necessary by using
additional internal object variables to encode this state) and it must have access to its own
code (again, if this is not supported by the underlying agent platform, the agent needs to
carry a copy of its own code in the data stored in its internal object variables). Since the
agent is capable to read all of its data, it can use the information stored therein, to create
a message that consists of the agent’s code and its data, which in turn contains the agent’s
current execution state (as encoded in the additional object variables).
With the help of the communication service discussed in Section 2.5.5, the agent can
then send this message to Pdestination. This agent platform must be capable and willing to
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instantiate the agent contained in the migration message and the instantiated agent must
further be capable to restore itself according to the state encoded in its data, so that it can
continue its execution where it left oﬀ on the previous agent platform. The original agent,
which initiated the migration will wait for an acknowledgement from the migrated instance of
the agent or from the destination agent platform, which conﬁrms the successful migration of
the agent, and can then terminate itself in order to ﬁnalize the migration (or it can continue
its execution which eﬀectively results in a cloning of the agent).
All of this rather complex functionality can (and should) extensively be supported by
appropriate library routines or even completely automated as in the WASP system described
by Fu¨nfrocken et al. in [Fu¨n98]. In this approach, the code is instrumented at compile time
with additional instructions, which take care of encoding the state of the agent in its data,
so that it can simply be migrated by shipping the code and the data of the agent’s objects.
This allows the creator of the agent to use the system as if it provided strong mobility and,
thus, to concentrate on the actual task of the agent.
Even though it is possible to layer support for transfer of the execution state on top of
a system with support for weak mobility, we consider a strong support oﬀered by the agent
platform as the most appropriate approach. However, this is not the approach taken by a
majority of the experimental systems that oﬀer agent mobility. The reason for this lack of
support from the agent platform is that the capture of the execution state of an agent is
quite complex and, for instance, not supported by the Java virtual machine, which serves as
the execution environment in many of the experimental systems (Aglets, Voyager, Jumping
Beans, Odyssey, Mole, etc.). In this situation, it might be simpler and more eﬃcient to create
a custom solution, which only encodes the relevant state information (such as what was the
best oﬀer and where this oﬀer was found) in the agent’s data and otherwise restart the agent
in some well-deﬁned initial state on each new agent platform. This is the solution that is
proposed for creating agents in the aglets system.
In the following we will usually not explicitly distinguish between code, data, and execution
state of a mobile agent. This distinction is not relevant for most other considerations on mobile
agent’s, where it is suﬃcient to distinguish between the immutable part of the mobile agent
(its code and static data) and the mutable part (its variable data and execution state). For
ease of presentation we will mostly use the term code to designate the immutable part of the
mobile agent and the term state for the mutable part.
2.5.2 Agent Execution
The basic task of any mobile agent system is the actual execution of mobile agents. This
means that the code of a mobile agent has to be executed in the context of the data and
facilities available at an agent platform, which were the original reason for the migration of
the mobile agent to this agent platform. The execution of an agent’s code is accomplished in
an execution environment, which is thus the incarnation of the agent execution service. The
execution environment is an integral part of the agent platform and is also responsible for the
provision of a standardized runtime library with a well deﬁned API (application programmers
interface). This runtime library implements the interface between the mobile agents and the
other services oﬀered by the agent platform. It also allows to reduce the size of mobile agents
since they do not need to carry the code which they can be conﬁdent to ﬁnd on the agent
platform.
The code of a mobile agent is written in a certain language that must be supported by the
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execution environment. We can identify three conceptually diﬀerent levels for this language,
which can be:
• machine instructions for a particular physical machine, which reduces the execution en-
vironment to a virtual machine monitor (e.g., ActiveX even though there is no execution
environment that controls the execution of the code);
• an intermediate bytecode, which are the machine instructions for some virtual machine
that is implemented by the execution environment (e.g., Java bytecode).
• a high-level programming language, which has to be interpreted by the execution envi-
ronment (e.g., Tcl, Perl, or Python);
In all three cases, the execution environment has to execute the code correctly (or in the
ﬁrst case supervise its execution), constrain its access to the allocated resources (this is a
very important issue to which we will return to in Section 2.5.3), and provide the access to
the runtime library. The three levels are blurred by the fact that the machine instructions of
a particular machine can be interpreted as intermediate bytecode and executed by a virtual
machine on a completely diﬀerent physical machine or the high-level language can be compiled
into an intermediate bytecode or actual machine instructions before being executed.
It should be clear from the above discussion that the agent execution has to be closely in-
tegrated with most of the other services, notably agent mobility (the agent has to be executed
in the correct state and should start its execution at a well-deﬁned point), but also resource
management, heterogeneity support, security, and fault-tolerance. The agent execution is a
very basic service that must be provided by the agent platform, which in turn may rely on
lower layers for additional support.
2.5.3 Resource Management
For its execution on an agent platform, a mobile agent needs access to a certain amount of
resources on this agent platform, such as CPU cycles, memory, stable storage, or communica-
tion bandwidth. Moreover, the mobile agent needs access to the particular data and facilities
of this agent platform. The allocation of these resources must be guided by some policy of
the agent platform, which identiﬁes what kind of and how many resources should be made
available to a mobile agent.
Once certain resources have been allocated to an agent, conﬁning the agent to these
resources is a very important issue. Most of the mechanisms required for this purpose are
well-known operating system mechanisms. The CPU can be protected from monopolization
or excessive use through a clock interrupt, which limits the amount of time an agent can
execute. The creation of new threads can be regulated via a limitation on memory usage and
on the number of CPU cycles consumed by all the threads that belong to a certain agent.
The access to memory can be protected with base and limit registers or paging mechanisms.
This issue is very important in the context of security and allows us to protect the agent
platform from possibly malicious mobile agents and mobile agents from one another. We
assume that any access to resources other than the CPU and memory (which are required
for code execution) will be mediated through functions in the runtime library oﬀered by
the execution environment (this includes the allocation of new memory). It is therefore the
task of the execution environment to implement generic access control mechanisms for other
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resources and to enforce the access control policy deﬁned for the agent platform. For further
information on these mechanisms, please refer to [Pﬂ89, SG94].
2.5.4 Heterogeneity Support
The notion of heterogeneity has two independent aspects, which are the heterogeneity of the
underlying hardware and the heterogeneity of mobile agent systems. Both of these can cause
problems for the interoperability of mobile agents. To alleviate the ﬁrst problem, the agent
platforms that belong to a particular mobile agent system should hide the heterogeneity of
the underlying hardware from the mobile agents, so that a mobile agent can be executed on
any suitable hardware. This service must be provided by the agent platform and is oﬀered
by almost all experimental mobile agent systems, which can rely on the wide availability of
interpreters for high-level languages, such as Tcl, Perl, or Python, as well as that of Java
virtual machines for agents based on Java bytecode.
The second aspect of heterogeneity is, due to the immaturity of current implementations,
often neglected. It would also be desirable to hide this heterogeneity, in order to enable agents
from diﬀerent mobile agent systems to interoperate. The issues that have to be resolved in
this context are diﬀerent programming languages for mobile agents (possibly even within a
single mobile agent system), diﬀerent APIs that oﬀer similar but not interoperable services,
and the underlying system philosophy, which may have serious eﬀects on the way agents are
designed. For instance, the mobility service in the JumpingBeans system [Ast98] does not
allow mobile agents to move directly from one agent platform to another, but requires them
to move to a central host before moving on.
A possible approach to this issue (as indicated in [CGH+95]) could be to implement the
execution environments of several mobile agent systems within the same agent platform. The
services of these mobile agent systems, which are oﬀered to the mobile agents via the runtime
libraries of the execution environments, should be shared as much as possible in order to allow
a more eﬃcient interaction of mobile agents. This should be completely transparent to mobile
agents, which only see their execution environment and the available services. A mobile agent
that wants to interact with another local agent in a diﬀerent execution environment does not
need to be aware of this separation since any interaction has to be mediated via well deﬁned
interfaces.
2.5.5 Communication
Communication is another indispensable service for mobile agents, which can be used as
the foundation for many other services (mobility, fault-tolerance, directory assistance, or
agent management). The communication services of a mobile agent system should allow
mobile agents on an agent platform to communicate with agents on the same platform, but
also with mobile agents on other agent platforms as well as with local and remote entities
that are not part of the mobile agent system. For this purpose, the agent platform can
oﬀer various communication protocols (e.g., TCP/IP, IIOP, SMTP, or HTTP), that can
be used to implement diﬀerent models of interaction, such as message based, event based,
RPC, or remote method invocation. Another possible option is the realization of multiparty
communication, such as message multicast, group based communication, or publish/subscribe
based approaches. In the following we will, without loss of generality, assume that mobile
agents interact via (remote) method invocation on their public interface with both remote
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and local entities. Depending on the actual implementation, this may have to be explicitly
supported by the mobile agent system with the dynamic creation of local proxies.
An obvious diﬃculty in the communication with mobile agents is to invoke a method on a
receiver that does not have a ﬁxed network address. There are several solutions to this, such
as a registration server, which is updated whenever the agent moves to a new location and
forwards invocations on the agent to its current location, or a proxy, which remains on the
agent platform when the mobile agent moves on and forwards invocations to the new location
(in order for this to be viable, the new location of the mobile agent has to be propagated
backwards to all the proxies). Many optimizations for this problem can be conceived, such
as the ones discussed in [IDM91]. We assume that this forwarding of invocations on moving
agents is not a major problem in mobile agent systems, since agents will only rarely receive
invocations that they did not request previously and if an agent engages in a more active
interaction, it can remain stationary for the duration of this interaction.
Similar to the agent mobility service, it would be possible to implement a considerable
part of the communication protocols in the mobile agent. This requires only a minimal
support from the underlying agent platform, such as the possibility to open a TCP/IP based
connection. However, since many of the communication services are already provided by the
underlying operating system, the agent platform can simply make these services accessible to
mobile agents – under the constraints imposed by resource management.
2.5.6 Security
The security problems in mobile agent systems are manifold and have been identiﬁed by many
authors as one of the crucial issues for the acceptance of these systems [CGH+95, VST97,
KLO97]. These problems are due to the fact that the various principals in a mobile agent
system who are the operators or owners of the diﬀerent components and who lend their
authority to these components (see Section 2.4.3), can not be assumed to trust each other.
Security in a mobile agent system is concerned with the protection of the two primary
components that we have identiﬁed: the mobile agent and the agent platform. The mobile
agent has to be protected from tampering and from disclosure while it is in transit, but it
should also be protected when it is executing on an agent platform. The agent platform in
turn must be protected from malicious or simply buggy mobile agents.
Protecting the mobile agent while traveling over an untrusted network, when it is mar-
shaled into its transport format, amounts to the well-known problems of conﬁdentiality and
integrity protection of messages, as discussed in, e.g., [For94]. A simple method to achieve
this is to use the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [FKK96]. Due to the special structure of mobile
agents we can also diﬀerentiate between the mutable and the immutable parts of an agent,
which can be independently protected. Provided that the mechanisms used for integrity pro-
tection support origin authentication, for instance by using appropriate public-key signatures
(see [MvOV97]), the immutable part can be signed by the agent owner to assert that it has
not been tampered with while in transit. Also, the immutable parts of a publicly available
agent may not have to be conﬁdentiality protected, unless the user wants to hide the fact
that he is using this mobile agent. The mutable part of a mobile agent can be integrity and
conﬁdentiality protected with the help of well-known cryptographic mechanisms [MvOV97].
If additional accountability is required, the intermediate states of the mobile agent can be
signed by the agent executors and gathered in the mobile agent (see Section 3.2.2). The
two parts should be tied together with appropriate cryptographic mechanisms to prevent an
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attacker from arbitrarily composing these parts.
The problem of protecting a mobile agent when it is executing on an agent platform
consists of protecting it from other agents on the same agent platform and from the agent
platform itself, which may be operated by a malicious agent executor. The former problem
is a well-known problem from operating systems that has to be addressed in the resource
management (see Section 2.5.3). As we have already discussed in the corresponding section,
the agent execution service can rely on memory protection and access control mechanisms to
prevent local agents or other entities from accessing or tampering with the code or state of a
mobile agent. The latter problem, which is concerned with preventing undesired access to or
manipulation of the mobile agent’s state or code by the agent platform, is widely accepted as
an important and diﬃcult problem (see Section 3.1). Currently most mobile agent systems
do not explicitly address this problem, but make the assumption that the agent executor is
a trusted principal that behaves correctly [Ord96, Vig98a]. Therefore, the mobile agent does
not have to be protected from the agent platform. As we have noted in the beginning of this
Section, this assumption is not always justiﬁed. In the following Chapter 3 we will discuss
various approaches from the literature and introduce our approach, which is based on trusted
and tamper-resistant hardware.
The remainder of this section is concerned with the problem of protecting the agent
platform from malicious mobile agents that try to circumvent the protection mechanisms
established by the agent platform. These mechanisms are designed to prevent that a mobile
agent can misuse the data (e.g., by destroying, manipulating, or disclosing it) or the facilities
(e.g., excessive and uncontrolled use of cpu, memory, or communication bandwidth) of an
agent platform, which are the primary assets of the agent executor. In addition, they are
also responsible to protect other mobile agents executing on the same agent platform from
malicious agents.
This problem is very similar to the problem of protecting a host from downloadable mobile
code. Both these problems can essentially be addressed with very similar approaches. The
main diﬀerence is that since a mobile agent may visit the agent platforms of several agent
executors it becomes more diﬃcult to identify who is responsible for the behaviour of such
an itinerant mobile agent. Therefore, even though a mobile agent originates from a trusted
principal and its immutable part has not been tampered with, the agent executor can not be
sure that the agent has not become malicious [FGS96a]
Due to the tremendous success of Java applets, which can be executed in a Web browser,
this topic has lately received a lot of attention. A recent survey article by Rubin et
al. [RDEG98] has identiﬁed the following four diﬀerent approaches to address this problem
(a ﬁfth approach results from a combination of the ﬁrst two):
• code signing,
• sandboxing,
• ﬁrewalling, and
• proof carrying code.
Code signing is the most classical of these approaches. Its goal is primarily to establish
accountability by authenticating the principal that lends a mobile agent its authority and
that vouches for its correctness. This can be the agent owner, the agent creator, or even
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both. If the agent executor trusts the signer of the mobile agent, it will execute it with full
access to all the resources available in the execution environment. As we have noted above, it
is not always easy to establish who is responsible for the behaviour of a mobile agent that has
visited many diﬀerent agent platforms. Moreover, it is possible that a malicious agent does
not act immediately, but simply installs a Trojan Horse that can be activated later. Tracing
this installation of a Trojan Horse back to a particular mobile agent can be extremely diﬃcult.
Sandboxing has recently been popularized by Java, where it is implemented within a Web
browser to limit an applet’s access permissions to a well-deﬁned set of resources deﬁned in
a security policy (that is the same for all remote applets6). This is achieved by a complex
interaction of various components that conduct static checks on the code before it is executed
(bytecode veriﬁer), create separate name spaces to isolate trusted code from untrusted code
(class loader), and supervise the actual access to resources during execution of the code (se-
curity manager) [FM96]. Similar goals have also been pursued by Ousterhout et al. [OLW97]
in the design of Safe-Tcl, by Wahbe et al. [WLAG93] in the context of software-based fault
isolation, and by Schneider [Sch98] who describes security automata for policy enforcement.
All of these mechanisms can easily be adapted to work for mobile agents.
Both of these approaches suﬀer from an all-or-nothing problem that either allows complete
access if the signer of the mobile agent is trusted or the same very limited access for all mobile
agents. This can be alleviated by combining them into a hybrid approach. The idea is to
use code signing to identify partially trusted mobile agents that can be executed under a less
restrictive security policy. For instance, an authenticated mobile agent from a registered user
may have access to the entire database of the agent executor, while an unknown mobile agent
can only access a small publicly available part of the database. (This approach has actually
been realized by certain Web browsers in the context of signed Java applets.)
Firewalling, which was independently developed by Malkhi et al. in [MRR98] and by
Digitivity Inc. [Cit], tries to achieve similar results as sandboxing by using a simpler approach
that is less error-prone. It consists of deﬁning an additional protection domain for the host of
the agent platform, which can be located in the perimeter network between an internal and
an external ﬁrewall [CZ95]. The host of the agent platform is considered a sacriﬁcial machine
that does not have immediate access to valuable resources. This requires the use of a trusted
server on a protected machine that implements a security policy. This server has access to the
local resources that should be made available to the mobile agent. The approach is very much
geared towards Java applets and their primary task of providing graphical user interfaces for
a user. It is not clear if it can provide additional security in the context of mobile agents,
which usually have a more complex interaction with the agent executor’s environment and
may in any case be executed on a dedicated machine.
Finally, a potentially very powerful approach is proof carrying code, which was introduced
by Necula et al. in [NL96]. It builds on the formal veriﬁcation of software, which consists
of constructing a proof that the agent’s code respects a given security policy. Since such
a proof is diﬃcult and expensive to create, it is created once by the creator of the mobile
agent, encoded in a safety certiﬁcate, and appended to the mobile agent. This proof can then
easily be veriﬁed by the agent executor. If it is valid, then the agent executor is ensured that
the mobile agent will not violate the security policy. The approach is problematic since it
requires advance knowledge of the security policy under which the code will be executed and
it is currently not possible to produce proofs for arbitrary code automatically [NL96].
6Newer versions of the Java security architecture provide more ﬂexible solutions to this problem.
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Due to the various possibilities to implement security for the agent platform, it is not
clear where this service should be realized. In the case of sandboxing or ﬁrewalling, the agent
platform may rely on many services of the underlying infrastructure for its realization, while
the other approaches have to be addressed in the agent platform. The protection of the mobile
agent in transit can easily be achieved using cryptographic protocols that are readily available
in the form of software libraries from the underlying infrastructure. The protection of the
mobile agent from other local agents must be realized by the agent platform with mechanisms
from operating systems, which can, again, be supported by the underlying infrastructure. The
remaining problem of protecting the mobile agent from the agent platform will be addressed
in the following Chapter 3.
2.5.7 Fault-tolerance Support
The support for fault-tolerance in a mobile agent system is interesting, since a mobile agent
can be executing for an extensive amount of time and thus dispose of rather valuable informa-
tion. This information could be completely lost if the mobile agent cannot survive a simple
crash of the host it is currently executing on. Most existing agent platforms do not deal with
this issue, which is an important problem for an actually deployed system. If users have to
pay for their agent’s execution on a particular platform, they do not want the results of such
a computation to be lost by the crash of another platform that is visited by the agent at a
later point in time. Furthermore, the detection that an agent has been lost due to the crash
of a platform can take a considerable amount of time, which can be longer than a successful
execution of the agent. Users may not be willing to wait for such long periods for the result
of a mobile agent.
The following discussion of support for fault-tolerance is obviously far from being ex-
haustive, but an appropriate discussion would be beyond the scope of this thesis. For more
advanced discussions of this topic, please refer to [JMS+98, MvRS96, Sch97a, RS98].
The minimal goal for fault-tolerance in the context of the mobile agent paradigm would
be to guarantee the survival of a mobile agent despite the possibility of hosts and the corre-
sponding agent platforms crashing. The realizability of this goal depends on the assumptions
that we make about the underlying hardware. We assume that a host that operates an agent
platform has an unlimited amount of stable storage available (modern hard disks make this
an almost realistic assumption), can suﬀer from crash failures only, and recovers within a
bounded amount of time.
This allows us to model the migration of a mobile agent as a transaction between the
sending and the receiving host [RS98], which will eventually be successful provided that the
uptime of both hosts is suﬃciently long to perform the migration transaction. After the
migration transaction has succeeded, the marshaled agent is stored on stable storage and
ready for execution. Since the host may also crash during the execution of the mobile agent,
this again requires a mechanism to ensure that the mobile agent will eventually be executed
on this host. This can also be modelled as a transaction that is successfully completed when
the mobile agent terminates or a subsequent migration transaction with the next host on
the mobile agent’s itinerary succeeds. The described procedure for fault-tolerant migration is
depicted in Figure 2.3.
In the above discussion, most of the necessary actions to ensure fault-tolerance have been
attributed to the agent platform, which we consider to be the most appropriate component.
Similar to the agent mobility service, it might be possible to allocate some functionality to
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Figure 2.3: A strategy to guarantee agent survival
the mobile agent, which would require some not yet speciﬁed basic support from the agent
platform.
2.5.8 Directory Assistance
Mobile agents should be capable to dynamically discover required services and resources before
actually migrating to a new agent platform. The problem of eﬃcient service discovery is a
general problem of distributed systems, such as CORBA or DCOM, where it is addressed
with specialized servers (e.g., broker or trader) [OMG98a, Chapter 16].
The major problem that needs to be addressed in the mobile agent paradigm is the highly
dynamic behaviour of the system. It is possible to use a directory service on a particular
agent platform as a registry for mobile agents, which allows locally executing mobile agents
to discover the presence of other agents on the same agent platform. However, due to the
latency of a remote communication it is diﬃcult to provide this same service to remote agents.
A mobile agent system does not necessarily have to implement this service as part of
the system, but it may simply integrate existing solutions that are made accessible via the
communication service.
2.5.9 Agent Management
The agent management service is concerned with the control of active mobile agents. An
agent owner may want to know about the progress of a mobile agent’s execution or simply its
current location. The latter information can then be used to send a message to the mobile
agent, or even to issue a command that instructs the mobile agent, for instance, to change
its itinerary, to return to its owner, or to terminate. If an agent owner launches several
collaborating mobile agents, then it may be necessary to address these as a group and to be
able to multicast messages to all of them. This does obviously have to be coordinated with
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the security service, to prevent an attacker from issuing a command to the mobile agent of
another principal.
This service does not cause any principal problems, since a mobile agent can simply report
all of its actions back to the agent owner, in order to keep him completely informed (which is
the approach taken by most currently existing mobile agent systems [Obj, LC96]). However,
such an intensive communication goes against some of the reasons to use mobile agents in the
ﬁrst place and is not scalable to a widely deployed mobile agent system with a large number
of mobile agents.
2.6 The Use of Mobile Agents
The mobile agent paradigm is a means to structure distributed applications and has of-
ten been identiﬁed as an extension or generalization to the well-established client-server
paradigm [CGH+95, CPV97]. The “new concept” that is introduced by the mobile agent
paradigm is location awareness. While the location of a particular computation has always
played a major role in distributed computing, this was mostly conceived as an artifact of the
underlying system that causes additional problems (which must be overcome).
The usual solution consists in hiding the location and making the computation inde-
pendent from it. This provides a simple abstraction that makes the design of distributed
applications more tractable and is well suited for tightly coupled distributed applications
(e.g., on a LAN). On the other hand, it can introduce new problems (e.g., partial failures)
and result in considerable ineﬃciencies for loosely coupled distributed applications that have
to operate on a WAN, such as the Internet.
By making a computation explicitly location aware and movable, mobile agent systems
provide a new degree of freedom. The location does not need to be considered during the
design of a distributed application, but can be adapted dynamically during its execution, to
take account of the quality (and cost) of interaction between components.
We will ﬁrst examine the perceived advantages that the mobile agent paradigm has over
the classical client-server paradigm and then illustrate brieﬂy what particular applications
can exploit them.
2.6.1 Advantages of the Mobile Agent Paradigm
The advantages of the mobile agent paradigm as compared to the classical client-server
paradigm can broadly be organized into two categories:
(1) reduction of network traﬃc, which provides support for
• high bandwidth interactions and
• server customization.
(2) decoupling of the interacting principals, which provides support for
• mobile users,
• robust handling of partial failures,
• asynchronous computations, and
• real-time interactions.
54 Chapter 2. System Model and Mobile Agents
The support for high bandwidth interactions is the most often cited reason to promote
mobile agents. It consists of moving the computation (assumed to be small) to the source
of data (assumed to be large). The same approach can be found in systems for remote
database access that allow a remote host to send SQL queries. In a mobile agent system this
becomes more ﬂexible since a mobile agent is programmed in a computationally complete
programming language and can more naturally deal with unstructured data. The goal of
using this approach can be to overcome a low bandwidth connection or to use a high-cost
network connection more economically.
The mobile agent paradigm enables a service provider to oﬀer a ﬁne granular API, for the
access to its services. This allows a mobile agent to customize these services to his particular
needs or even to create new services that previously had to be installed by the service provider.
The problem with this approach is that it usually necessitates the composition of several calls
to the server’s API for the provision of a complex service. This does not constitute a problem
for a mobile agent, but is impractical for client-server interactions. Again, SQL queries provide
an example for this argument.
Mobile users who access the network via small, resource limited computing devices, may
not be able or willing to remain connected for the duration of a particular service provision.
Since a mobile agent can act autonomously without requiring a permanent interaction with
a user, it can be conﬁgured while being disconnected and then injected into the network to
accomplish a well-deﬁned task on behalf of the user. Once the user reconnects to the network
(possibly upon receiving an alarm from its mobile agent), he can collect the result of the
agent or deal with the problems his agent encountered. A particular support for mobile users
can be provided by resident agents, which only perform a single migration from their owner
to the agent platform where they take residence. These can be conﬁgured to handle routine
actions or simple management tasks for their owner (see below).
A well-known problem in distributed client-server applications is that of a partial fail-
ure. Since it is in general undecidable whether an unresponsive communication partner has
crashed, is partitioned, or is simply slow, it is diﬃcult to determine where and how to react in
order to recover a distributed application in a consistent state. This problem may be simpli-
ﬁed in the mobile agent paradigm, by gathering the interacting components on a single host,
which can then use checkpointing algorithms to ensure the correct and complete execution
of a mobile agent. If the agent platform of the service provider is well managed and can
be assumed to never crash forever, it can guarantee that a mobile agent will eventually be
executed exactly once (this requires that a mobile agent has a unique ID and that the service
provider stores the result of a mobile agent until it has received a positive acknowledgement
from the agent owner for the reception of the result).
The support for asynchronous computations means that the machine of a user is not
loaded with the task of the mobile agent and is free to work on other tasks for its owner.
This is particularly interesting in the case of mobile clients (PDA or mobile phone), which
are rather resource limited computing devices.
A mobile agent can interact with remote components directly, without having to suﬀer
from a communication delay due to an intermediate network. This may occasionally be
important when a user wants to use services, that depend on a (soft) real-time interaction,
via a high-latency network connection. An extreme example of this is the control software
for space probes [HCK97] (e.g., the Mars Pathﬁnder Sojourner robot).
None of the discussed advantages mandate the use of mobile agent technology as the only
possible solution to resolve a particular problem (with the possible exception of real-time
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interactions) and can rather be seen as engineering issues. Nevertheless, these can be decisive
for the actual deployment of a particular application.
2.6.2 Applications of the Mobile Agent Paradigm
Mobile agents are often proposed for electronic commerce applications, similar to the example
in Section 2.2.2. In this environment they perform various tasks, such as searching for oﬀers,
negotiating terms of an agreement, or even purchasing goods or services. Electronic commerce
applications utilize many of the advantages of the mobile agent paradigm. For instance, in the
context of users who conduct routine purchases while they are on the move or who conﬁgure
complex requests that require the mobile agent to visit many diﬀerent service providers and
to scan large amounts of data (e.g., organizing a business trip). Likewise, the negotiation
of terms often requires a ﬁne granular interaction, which results in the exchange of a large
number of messages.
The use of mobile agents for searching information (which is an application that has been
deployed on the WWW although with non-mobile agents [Bot]) can be seen as a special case
of electronic commerce, where the good that is sought for, is information.
A slightly diﬀerent approach to use mobile agents is, paradoxically, one where the agent
takes residence at a service provider and remains primarily stationary (after the initial hop).
This can be useful for monitoring applications, where the mobile agent is supposed to observe
a particular event and consequently moves to the location where the event is expected to
occur or to be observable (e.g., scanning for interesting news items or stock ticker values).
This event can be rather complex, such as the sequence of a certain number of primitive
events, or the succession of two primitive events within a certain time frame. The user might
regularly update the agent and deﬁne new events in which he is interested.
Another interesting use for these stationary agents is in communication contexts, where
the user needs a ﬁxed address in the network in order to allow others to get in contact with
him. Instead of being directly connected to this ﬁxed address, the user can place a stationary
agent at this ﬁxed address, which will negotiate with callers on how to proceed. The stationary
agent holds the current network address where the user can be reached (the user has sent this
to the agent7), but it may, for instance during the night, decide to deviate the caller to some
asynchronous communication device (e.g. voice mail or mail box). On the other hand, if the
caller authenticates himself to the agent as a close friend and signals a suﬃcient urgency, the
agent will route the call to the registered network address of the user.
Other often cited applications for mobile agent systems include workﬂow management
systems, groupware applications, and network management [FM99, BGP97]. These applica-
tions are mostly realized as tightly coupled and closed systems, where all components are
under the administration of a single principal. In such a setting the security problems, and in
particular the protection of the mobile agent from the agent platform (which is our primary
interest), are less relevant.
∞∞∞
7This is similar to the task of the HLR in GSM, which manages the current location of the user [MP92].
The location information together with the code that manages it, could be interpreted as a stationary agent
that might also be conﬁgured by the user to protect his interests (see Section 5.2).
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Summary
In this chapter we introduce the system model for mobile agent systems. This provides
the background for the following chapters, where we study the immediate protection of mobile
agents and the less obvious use of mobile agents for the protection of privacy. We present
the environment in which we assume mobile agents to evolve and give an example for their
expected use. The history of mobile agent systems is discussed in the context of the underlying
concept of mobile code, which has given rise to the simpler paradigms of remote evaluation
and code on demand. Then we discuss the mobile agent paradigm ﬁrst with respect to the
components that make up the infrastructure of a mobile agent system and second with respect
to the services that have to be oﬀered by a mobile agent system. We conclude the chapter
with an illustration of the mobile agent paradigm’s advantages over the classical client-server
paradigm and give a brief overview of particular applications that are well suited to exploit
them.
Chapter 3
Protecting a Mobile Agent with
Tamper-resistant Hardware
Yesterday’s magic is today’s science and will be tomorow’s technology.
(anonymous)
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have introduced the mobile agent paradigm and identiﬁed the
problem of protecting the mobile agent from the execution environment (or rather from the
operator of the execution environment). We now want to present our approach to address this
problem, which is based on a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device. The problem of
protecting a mobile agent from its execution environment has been identiﬁed by many authors
as one of the crucial problems for the deployment of mobile agent technology [CGH+95,
Vig98a, VST97, PK98]. This has resulted in a considerable body of work that we will explore
in the following section.
In a conventional mobile agent system, it is easy to protect the conﬁdentiality and the
integrity of the entire agent from external attackers (see Section 2.5.6). Similarly, it is also
easy to protect data gathered by the mobile agent, by encrypting it with the public key
of the agent owner, provided that this data is not needed before the agent returns to its
owner. However, once the mobile agent arrives at its destination where it is supposed to be
instantiated on some local agent platform, the code and the state of the agent have to be
accessible to the agent platform (and thus to the agent executor) in order to execute it. Due
to the problem of information disclosure, the agent owner loses all control over the code and
state of the agent. The agent executor can:
• store the agent for an arbitrary period of time,
• execute the agent arbitrarily often,
• analyze and reverse engineer the agent’s code and state,
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• arbitrarily change the agent’s code and state1, or
• disclose the entire agent to another principal.
The agent owner has no way to control or even know about the actions of the agent
executor, who can thus obtain conﬁdential information from the mobile agent, execute it
incorrectly, or execute it only partially2. This has led to the conjecture that the problem
of protecting a mobile agent from the execution environment is impossible to solve and that
the problem of protecting a mobile agent from the agent executor can only be solved with
tamper-resistant hardware [CGH+95, FGS96b, Vig98a]. This conjecture has been challenged
by the work on computing with encrypted functions of Sander and Tschudin (see Section 3.2.7),
but it is still an open question whether their approach can provide a general solution to the
problem. Currently most mobile agent systems make the assumption that the agent executor
is a trusted principal that behaves correctly [Ord96, Vig98a] and provide no mechanisms to
protect the contents or the execution of a mobile agent.
A mobile agent can be charged with a multitude of tasks that may have important security
and privacy implications. One of the most frequently cited examples where a mobile agent
requires protection is in the context of electronic commerce, in which a mobile agent searches
for a particular service and subsequently pays for using the service or for some goods it
purchased [FGS96a, Yee99]. Such an agent often visits several principals that do not trust
each other and may often be competitors. Possible attacks could be to simply destroy the
mobile agent, to alter or delete information the mobile agent has collected previously at
competitors, to alter data in the mobile agent so that it will not perform correctly (or maybe
even maliciously) on the sites of competitors, or to change the mobile agent’s itinerary such
that it will not visit a competitor. The goal of such an attack is to make it more likely that
the mobile agent will select the malicious attacker as the provider of the service.
These direct attacks on the primary functionality of a mobile agent are, however, not the
only problems. Even if a mobile agent accomplishes its task without problems or interference,
problems related to the data contained in the agent may still persist .
In the example of Section 2.2.2, the mobile agent may contain the payment information
(such as electronic cash, credit card, or even payment information for several methods), the
user’s schedule, or her personal preferences. All of this data, although necessary to process the
request, is conﬁdential information that should only be used for the purpose for which it was
provided. For instance, a service provider should only obtain a single payment information
in case it is selected to provide the service and the user’s schedule should only be consulted
to ﬁnd out if a given departure time is suitable, but it should not be accessed in its entirety.
Other data contained in a mobile agent should only be accessible to the agent executor once
the mobile agent has decided that an oﬀer is acceptable. For instance, in the case of a mobile
agent that mediates translation of foreign language texts, the text should only be accessible
to the translation oﬃce that actually performs the translation3. For other applications it
1It is possible to protect the integrity of the immutable parts of an agent (code and static data) with simple
cryptographic techniques. However, this makes it only possible for an agent executor to detect (at least some)
tampered agents and to avoid executing them. It does not prevent the agent executor from changing the
immutable parts and from experimenting with the agent in the context of a local execution.
2If the mobile agent is never executed to its completion (or not at all), this is often called denial-of-service.
The common understanding is that this can not be prevented. Support for fault-tolerance can at most guarantee
the survival of the mobile agent, which then has to ﬁnd another source for the service.
3Such an interaction could even require the establishment of some form of contract that legally binds the
translation oﬃce to keep the text conﬁdential.
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may be desirable that the mobile agent is capable to digitally sign a message or to verify the
signature on a message it receives4. Finally, even if a mobile agent simply searches for some
speciﬁc data, the query already conveys the interest in the information, which can in itself be
highly sensitive. An example for this is a mobile agent that performs a patent search or the
mobile agent of a major investor that requests ﬁnancial information on a company.
The probability that an agent platform (or rather its operator) acts maliciously depends on
many diﬀerent factors. Two obvious factors, which can directly be translated into approaches
to protect mobile agents are a possible (ﬁnancial) gain and a lack of risk. An agent executor
is more likely to attack a mobile agent if the gain (which must not necessarily be monetary)
is high compared to the cost of mounting the attack, if the risks of being caught are low,
and if the consequences of being caught are moderate. Approaches to protect mobile agents
can therefore consist of making the cost of an attack prohibitively high (this implies that a
single successful attack should not compromise the protection of the entire system), raising an
attack’s probability of discovery, and making an attack provable to an impartial third party
(a court).
3.2 Related Work
The problem of protecting code and data of software modules from the untrusted execution
environment, in which they have to be operated, is not new. A prominent example are highly
sensitive authentication keys in security modules that are used by banks for the veriﬁcation
of customer’s personal identiﬁcation numbers (PINs). These have to be protected from unau-
thorized access by the operators of the security module [AK97]. Another, less known example
is a proposal by Herzberg and Pinter [HP85] for the protection of software against unautho-
rized distribution (piracy), which relies on the presence of a secret key within the CPU that
executes this software. In a recent announcement, Intel proposed to put cryptographic keys
on a CPU, which would allow them to realize this protection. Both of these approaches rely
on trusted and tamper-resistant hardware to achieve the desired goal.
The proliferation of mobile agent systems and the more recent idea to use mobile agents
in the context of mutually distrusting domains (e.g., Safe-Tcl [OLW97] or Telescript [Whi94])
has relaunched the interest in this problem. This has given rise to a considerable body of
work, in which several diﬀerent approaches to address the problem are identiﬁed. These
approaches can roughly be divided into two categories:
• detection mechanisms, which attempt to detect unauthorized modiﬁcation of code,
state, or execution ﬂow of a mobile agent. These detection mechanisms can further
be subdivided depending on whether they:
D1 detect manipulations automatically or require a suspicion,
(automatic/suspicion)
D2 detect manipulations during the execution of the mobile agent or after it has ter-
minated, or
(during/after)
4If the corresponding keys of the mobile agent could be protected from disclosure or tampering, an attacker
could still manipulate the code such that the cryptographic protection is impaired.
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D3 detect all possible manipulations of the mobile agent or only some of them.
(all/some)
These properties allow us to distinguish between eight diﬀerent mechanisms, not all of
which are useful. In the following we will discuss three mechanisms that have been
identiﬁed in the literature, which exhibit the properties depicted in Table 3.1.
D1 D2 D3
cryptographic traces suspicion after all
forward integrity automatic after some
state appraisal automatic during some
Table 3.1: The Detection Mechanisms
• prevention mechanisms, which try to make it impossible (or at least very diﬃcult) to
access or modify code, state, or execution ﬂow of a mobile agent in a meaningful way.
These can, in turn, be subdivided depending on whether they:
P1 prevent attacks on the entire agent or only on parts of it,
(entire/parts)
P2 rely on some trusted functionality, or
(trusted/no trusted)
P3 prevent attacks permanently or only temporarily.
(permanent/temporary)
Again, these allow us to distinguish between eight diﬀerent mechanisms.
In the following we will discuss four mechanisms that have been identiﬁed in the liter-
ature, which exhibit the properties depicted in Table 3.2.
P1 P2 P3
co-operating agents parts trusted permanent
obfuscation entire no trusted temporary
tamper-resistant hardware entire trusted permanent
computing with encrypted functions entire no trusted permanent
Table 3.2: The Prevention Mechanisms
One of the most important diﬀerences of these two categories is that the detection mech-
anisms, due to the way they are constructed, can not cope with the problem of unauthorized
access to code or state of the mobile agent. This limits these approaches to applications
where the data of an agent does not have to be kept secret. The prevention mechanisms,
on the other hand, rely on this protection from access to achieve the protection from mod-
iﬁcation. This is based on the assumption that if an attacker can not access the code or
state, he can not change the behaviour of the agent in a meaningful way – he can at most
apply arbitrary changes, which cause the mobile agent to not execute at all (this constitutes
a denial-of-service).
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We now want to discuss some approaches from the literature, which realize the detection
or prevention with various means. We would like to remind once more that the following
discussion is based on three important assumptions: the conﬁdentiality and integrity of a
mobile agent is protected from external attackers, the immutable parts of a mobile agent
are integrity protected (this allows an honest agent executor to detect tampered agents), and
denial-of-service can not be prevented. Furthermore, the detection mechanisms are ineﬀective
if there is no way to sanction misbehaving agent executors by making them liable for their
actions or through some form of social control (see Section 1.6.1).
3.2.1 Cryptographic Traces
In this approach, which is described by Vigna in [Vig98a], an agent executor creates a trace of
an agent’s execution that contains precisely the lines of code that were executed by the mobile
agent as well as all the external values that were read by the mobile agent. The complete trace
of the agent’s execution is stored for a limited amount of time by the agent executor. When
the mobile agent requests to move, a hash of this trace and of the agent’s intermediate state
are signed by the agent executor (this is a commitment that implies that the agent executor
has reached this state by a proper execution of the mobile agent according to the indicated
trace) and forwarded together with the actual mobile agent to the next agent executor on the
mobile agent’s itinerary. The following agent executor will store the commitment together
with the trace it creates when executing the mobile agent.
The protocol requires several additional messages that have to be stored by the interacting
parties. These establish the non-repudiation requirements that are necessary to make any
misbehaving party liable for its actions (e.g., an agent executor has to commit itself to actually
executing a mobile agent).
When the mobile agent returns, the agent owner receives a hash of the last trace and the
ﬁnal state of the mobile agent, both signed by the last agent executor on the mobile agent’s
itinerary. Additionally, the agent owner knows the ﬁrst agent executor to which he originally
sent the mobile agent. If, for some reason, the agent owner suspects that the mobile agent
was not correctly executed, it will request the complete trace of the agent’s execution from
the ﬁrst agent executor, which can not falsely deny having executed the mobile agent. The
agent owner will then simulate the execution of the mobile agent based on the information
contained in the trace. This simulation will result in an intermediate state and identify the
next agent executor, to which the mobile agent was forwarded. The agent owner requests
from this principal the commitment of the ﬁrst agent executor, which contains a hash of the
trace and of the agent’s intermediate result, both signed by the ﬁrst agent executor. If these
hashes correspond with the trace received from the ﬁrst agent executor and the intermediate
state of the simulated execution, the agent owner knows that the ﬁrst agent executor did
execute the agent correctly.
This process continues until the last agent executor, from which the agent owner has re-
ceived the commitment directly. If at some point a discrepancy is found during the veriﬁcation
of the trace provided by some agent executor, then this agent executor cheated.
This approach allows to detect any manipulation of the agent’s code, state, or execution
ﬂow, without having to anticipate where such manipulations can occur or what goals they
could pursue. It can only detect a manipulation after the agent has terminated its execution
and returned to its owner. Then the agent owner must have a suspicion (based on the ﬁnal
result of the mobile agent or the charges for the resources used by the agent during execu-
62 Chapter 3. Protecting a Mobile Agent with Tamper-resistant Hardware
tion) to launch the veriﬁcation mechanism, which is too expensive to use it systematically.
Furthermore, it places a heavy burden on the agent executors who have to dedicate large
amounts of resources to the storage of enforcement information. Finally, the approach is only
feasible for single-threaded mobile agents – otherwise it becomes too complex.
3.2.2 Forward Integrity
The basic idea for this approach has been presented by Yee in [Yee99] and was extended by
Karjoth et al. in [KAG97]. The approach has been conceived in the context of best price
shopping, which is concerned with a mobile agent that roams the network in search of the
lowest price for some particular good. The information that is found at a particular service
provider can easily be encoded in an oﬀer (that should contain the identity of the mobile
agent, the name of the service provider, the oﬀered good, the price, and a timestamp) that
is signed by the service provider to make it non-repudiable and to prevent later changes to
the oﬀer5. The remaining problem is to avoid that a later service provider, say S, removes an
oﬀer of some other service provider that provides a better deal, in order to trick the mobile
agent into using S’s services.
This problem is easy to solve if the itinerary of the agent is known to the agent owner,
who can then simply verify that a signed oﬀer from each service provider is contained in the
mobile agent. The protocol described by Karjoth et al. guarantees strong forward integrity,
which states that if a mobile agent visits a sequence of servers S1, S2, ..., Sn, and the ﬁrst
malicious server is Sk, then none of the partial results generated at servers Si, where i < k,
can be forged. This allows the agent owner to detect the modiﬁcation or removal of an oﬀer
even if the itinerary is not known in advance.
This is achieved via hash chains, which consist of elements that contain an oﬀer from a
service provider and are linked to the preceding and to the next element by including a hash
of the previous oﬀer and the identity of the next service provider. Such an element is signed
by the service provider who is responsible for the element. When the mobile agent returns,
the agent owner can verify the entire chain to detect if it has been tampered with during the
agent’s execution.
In [Yee99], Yee described a simpler protocol that provides only weak forward integrity but
does this without requiring digital signatures (this makes the oﬀers repudiable by the service
provider). An oﬀer by a service provider is protected with a partial result authentication code
(PRAC), which consist of computing a message authentication code (MAC) [MvOV97] on
the oﬀer based on a key ki that is contained in the mobile agent. Once the PRAC is created,
ki is replaced with ki+1 = f(ki), where f is a one-way function. This new ki+1 is then used
by the next service provider to calculate the PRAC on its oﬀer. The agent owner, who knows
the initial key k1, can compute the complete sequence k2 = f(k1), k3 = f(k2),... and verify
the authenticity of all oﬀers as well as the completeness of the sequence (all the oﬀers have
to be signed with consecutive values of f).
A problem with this is that a server Si that has received ki, can calculate all the keys kj ,
where j > i. If such a service provider manages to obtain the mobile agent at some later time
(when it has visited several other service providers), it can change the oﬀers of all the service
providers the mobile agent visited after it has visited Si. This problem can be overcome with
a small modiﬁcation described in [KAG97].
5If conﬁdentiality is required, this oﬀer can be encrypted with the public key of the agent owner.
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This approach allows to automatically6 detect manipulations of those parts of the mobile
agent that are explicitly protected. This protection can be adapted to the level of protection
that is required. Similar to cryptographic traces, this approach can only detect a manipulation
after the agent has terminated its execution and returned to its owner.
3.2.3 State Appraisal
This approach, which is deﬁned by Farmer et al. in [FGS96a], identiﬁes the notion of state
appraisal, which is a mechanism that allows a mobile agent to decide what privileges it will
need at a particular agent platform. This allows the agent owner to restrict the authority
of his agents in a ﬂexible manner. The approach relies on the fact that the state appraisal
function belongs to the immutable part of the mobile agent, which can be integrity protected
by the agent owner (or even by the agent creator).
This state appraisal function is evaluated with the agent’s state as parameter when the
mobile agent arrives at a new agent platform and checks whether the agent’s state meets
important invariants. Thus, it can protect the agent owner from misuse via dangerous but
detectable state modiﬁcations that would cause the agent to become harmful even though the
code has not been tampered with and is presumed to be benign. Such harmful states may be
deﬁned via arbitrarily complex relations between dynamic state variables of the mobile agent.
The authors of [FGS96a] distinguish the special privilege “run” that deﬁnes if an agent
platform will actually execute a mobile agent. Thus, if the state appraisal function does not
request the “run” privilege (since the mobile agent is in an unsafe state), the agent platform
will not execute the agent, and thus limit the damage that can be done with a tampered
agent.
This approach allows to automatically detect those manipulations that put a mobile agent
into an unacceptable state. These manipulations have to be anticipated and veriﬁcation
functions have to be implemented within the mobile agent, which is a diﬃcult task. Provided
that the state appraisal functions are actually executed (which will be the case for an honest
agent platform), they allow the mobile agent to detect manipulations during its execution.
3.2.4 Co-operating Agents
Approaches that consider to replicate agents in order to leverage ideas from fault-tolerance
have been proposed by Roth in [Rot99] and Schneider et al. in [Sch97a, MvRS96]. The
common idea of these approaches is to share some information among the agent replicas.
The mobile agents, which are now part of some larger application, have to co-operate with
each other, in order to achieve the desired result. It is assumed that the shared information
is protected, as long as no critical number of agent executors collaborate with each other
(this is a generalization of the concept of a trusted third party and constitutes the trusted
functionality on which this approach relies).
A straightforward approach is the one by Roth in [Rot99], which assumes the existence
of two independent subgroups of agent executors that will not collaborate with each other in
attacking the application. The application is then realized with two co-operating agents, each
of which migrates exclusively in one of the two subgroups. These two agents can then use
secret sharing [Sha79], remote authorization, and remote storage of commitments to protect
6It also requires a non-negligible computation to discover a manipulation, but the complete information to
detect an attack is available to the agent owner when the agent returns.
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the application. For instance, one agent can send a commitment from a service provider for
an interesting oﬀer to the second agent. The latter can independently verify that the oﬀer
satisﬁes the requirements of the agent owner, and, if it is satisﬁed, return its shares of a
suﬃcient amount of electronic-cash to the ﬁrst agent. Since no entity ever has access to both
mobile agents, no other entity can reconstruct the electronic cash shared among both mobile
agents or can prevent the respective other agent from returning a commitment back to the
agent owner.
A simple but eﬀective method of assuring that the agent executors of the co-operating
agents will not collaborate to attack the mobile agent is to have one agent execute on a trusted
host while the other agent roams the network. In this degenerate case, the co-operating agent
that executes on the trusted host becomes some form of trusted third party.
The approach by Schneider et al. in [MvRS96, Sch97a] also uses replication and crypto-
graphic mechanisms to guarantee that an application that is constructed from several mobile
agents is resilient to potentially hostile actions of the agent executors. To counter these, the
authors devise replication and voting schemes that can survive various manipulation attacks
based on the assumption that only a minority of the visited hosts are malicious. Since the
actual protocol executes in several stages where a majority of correct servers in each stage
can not guarantee that the shared secret will not be discovered by the combined minorities,
the proposed protocol actually deals with an even more complex problem. As Yee points
out in [Yee99], even the assumption of a majority of correct processes in a single stage can
not necessarily be assumed to be realistic since an attack by some malicious service provider
would occur on all the sites of this service provider (i.e., all the agent platforms of a single
stage) and not independently.
This approach allows to prevent attacks on the protected (i.e., shared) parts of the mobile
agent (this is not limited to state, but can also be applied to code). It relies on the availability
of some trusted functionality that can guarantee that an attack is permanently prevented.
3.2.5 Obfuscation
This approach, which is discussed by Hohl in [Hoh98], proposes a special form of protection
that is assumed to protect a mobile agent from attacks only temporarily. It is based on
obfuscation [CTL98], which is a mechanism that transforms an application into one that is
functionally identical, but much more diﬃcult to understand and therefore to attack. Since
obfuscation can not provide a complete protection, Hohl assumes the existence of a certain
minimal time interval (the agent protection interval) during which it is impossible for an
attacker to discover relevant data or to manipulate the execution of the agent in a mean-
ingful way. An attacker can, at most, apply arbitrary changes to the mobile agent, which
result in denial-of-service. After the agent protection interval the agent and all the sensitive
information it contains becomes invalid, which prevents the exploitation of attacks after the
agent protection interval. An example for this invalidation of information is an electronic
coin that contains an expiration time. The idea is that the coin has to be used before it is
expired – after the expiration time it will not be accepted any more (this obviously requires
synchronized clocks between the principal that applies the expiration time and the principal
that veriﬁes it).
The major problem of this approach is to establish a reasonable agent protection interval,
during which the mobile agent can accomplish a meaningful task and that still provides a
high assurance in the protection of the sensitive data. Another technical problem is that due
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to the technology used in the approach, a mobile agent can not use external libraries of the
agent platform to process sensitive data (this would defeat the purpose of obfuscation). Thus,
a mobile agent has to contain the code of all the security relevant libraries (e.g., cryptographic
library), which also have to be obfuscated.
Since the protection of the mobile agent and thus of the data it contains is only temporary,
this approach can only be used to protect data that can easily be invalidated – it is not
appropriate for protecting long lived data (e.g., credit card numbers or address information).
The advantages are that it does not require the existence of trusted functionality and that it
protects the entire agent with software-based mechanisms.
3.2.6 Tamper-resistant Hardware
This approach, which relies on the existence of powerful tamper-resistant hardware that can
withstand potent physical attacks (see Section 3.3) has independently been identiﬁed by Yee
in [Yee99] and by Wilhelm et al. in [WD97, Wil97, WBS98a, WSB99]. We will provide an
extensive description of our ideas on how to use tamper-resistant hardware to prevent attacks
on mobile agents in the remainder of this chapter.
The approach by Yee, which is based on his previous work on tamper-resistant de-
vices [Yee94, YT95], is only brieﬂy introduced in [Yee99]. The basic idea is to encapsulate
the entire execution environment within the tamper-resistant hardware, which is a physically
sealed environment. It protects a mobile agent that is executing on this execution environment
from any illegitimate access or modiﬁcation by the agent executor. No detailed information
on how mobile agents can be installed on such a protected execution environment or otherwise
take advantage of the tamper-resistant hardware is provided.
Provided that the mobile agent can not be attacked before it is installed on the execu-
tion environment of the tamper-resistant hardware (see Section 3.4.5 for our solution), the
approach allows to permanently prevent all attacks on the entire mobile agent. The major
disadvantage is that the possibly expensive hardware has not yet been developed and must
also be widely deployed before it can become useful (this is a typical chicken and egg problem).
A more limited approach that only assumes the existence of a very restricted tamper-
resistant hardware (e.g., a smart card) has been proposed by Fu¨nfrocken in [FM99]. The
idea of this approach is to identify a small part of a mobile agent that will be executed in an
execution environment that is protected by tamper-resistant hardware. It is conjectured that
this constellation can achieve a better protection for the entire mobile agent even though parts
of it are executed in an untrusted environment. The security implications of this approach are
rather complex since the agent executor can control the entire communication between the
protected and the unprotected parts of the mobile agent7 (e.g., manipulate the parameters
or the results of function calls between the two parts). It could, for instance, be used to
realize a protected signature routine that augments messages it signs for the mobile agent
with particular, application speciﬁc information, such as “this signature is only valid for a
single purchase not exceeding $100”. This idea, which is adapted from the “Undetachable
Signatures” in [ST98], can prevent at least some abuse of the signature routine.
Nevertheless, we believe that the limited approach is only viable if the protected part
7A similar problem exists in the context of a secure interaction between a user and his trusted smart card
via an untrusted terminal. A malicious terminal could provide completely diﬀerent data to the user and to his
smart card, which could trick the user into authorizing an undesired action (e.g., payment of $5000 instead of
$5) [ABKL91].
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is in complete control of the mobile agent’s actions and uses the unprotected part only as
untrusted co-processor. This means that all the operations of the unprotected part have to be
veriﬁable by the protected part. Such an approach could take advantage of protocols similar
to the ones described by Stubblebine in [DS98], which allow to securely store data outside of
the tamper-resistant hardware.
3.2.7 Computing with Encrypted Functions
A particularly interesting approach by Sander and Tschudin [ST98] promises to provide a
protection similar to the one that can be achieved with tamper-resistant hardware relying on
software only.
The idea is to encrypt a function f to obtain some other function E(f) that hides the
function f . This encrypted function can then be implemented as a program P (E(f)), which is
interpreted as a mobile agent and sent to the agent executor. The latter can execute the mobile
agent P (E(f)) on an input value x, which leads to the encrypted result: P (E(f))(x). Since
the agent executor does not know what function it actually computed, it can not meaningfully
tamper with the code or its execution and is restricted to random modiﬁcations (which result
in denial-of-service) and replay attacks. The encrypted result is returned to the agent owner
who can apply the decryption function, that only he knows, to obtain the desired result of
the function f applied to the input value x: E−1(P (E(f))(x)) = f(x).
In its current form their approach is still quite limited since it does not allow the evalu-
ation of arbitrary functions but is restricted to polynomials and rational functions. Another
limitation is that the model presented in [ST98] does not allow for continuous interaction
between the encrypted function and its executor, i.e., the function can not compute a clear-
text result that is then used by the executor to provide new inputs – all the outputs of the
encrypted function are themselves encrypted. Finally, since an attacker can execute the en-
crypted function arbitrarily often in a controllable setting he may be able to collect suﬃcient
data to recover the original function despite the encryption. Nevertheless, if the approach
can be extended to arbitrary functions that are protected with strong encryption schemes,
then it has the potential to permanently prevent all attacks on the entire mobile agent or, at
least, on the parts that are encrypted. This is similar to what can be achieved in the previous
approach but without the need to deploy expensive hardware on a large scale.
3.2.8 Evaluation
The presented approaches provide very diﬀerent protection properties at varying costs. For
any speciﬁc application that is based on mobile agents, it has to be evaluated what level of
protection for the mobile agent is required.
In particular it has to be decided if the mere detection of manipulation that leaves the
agent executor with complete access to the mobile agents code and state is suﬃcient. For
instance, if the amount of money that can be stolen from a mobile agent is too small to
justify legal action, if law enforcement is too diﬃcult (see Section 1.6.1), or if the mobile
agent must have access to conﬁdential information that should not readily be available to the
agent executor, then the use of prevention mechanisms becomes necessary.
The application that we are interested in is the protection of the data agent in the con-
text of privacy protection (see Section 1.6.4). According to the requirements that we have
identiﬁed, which mandate the permanent prevention of disclosure of a mobile agent’s data
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and prevention of tampering of an agent’s code (that could lead to the disclosure of its data),
the only adequate solutions are tamper-resistant hardware and computing with encrypted
functions. An approach that requires only the protection of critical parts of the agent, which
could then be based on co-operating agents, would be possible. This would correspond to the
solution based on a TTP that was discussed in Section 1.6.2. Due to the close interaction
between the agent executor and the data agent we were concerned with problems of scale,
bandwidth, latency, and intermittent connectivity. Therefore, this approach was not retained.
Finally, since we were, at the start of this work, not aware of the potential of computing with
encrypted functions, which was proposed only recently, we naturally pursued an approach
based on tamper-resistant hardware.
3.3 Tamper-resistant Devices
The notion of tamper-resistance usually applies to a well-deﬁned hardware device, sometimes
called black-box, that contains a certain amount of sensitive information and executes a given
task. The outside environment cannot access this sensitive information or interfere with the
task of this device. Any interaction with the tamper-resistant device must pass through a
restricted interface, which is under the control of the tamper-resistant device. Any attempt to
access the internals of a tamper-resistant device should lead to the destruction of the sensitive
information it contains. Examples for tamper-resistant devices that are widely used today
are the following [AK96, YT95, And94]:
• meter devices for postage, electricity, gas, or water;
• smart cards for payment systems, GSM mobile phones, pay-TV installations, or access
control systems;
• security modules for payment authorization in the banking industry;
• cryptographic coprocessors for protected and authenticated communication;
• missile sensors for the supervision of access to nuclear weapons; and
• seismic sensors for the supervision of the nuclear test ban treaty.
This proliferation of tamper-resistant devices has led to the Federal Information Process-
ing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 140-1 [NIS94], which is a standardization for crypto-
graphic modules, as well as to the creation of certiﬁcation services that verify compliance to
the standard. The more advanced tamper-resistant devices usually contain a processor, mem-
ory, tamper detection circuitry, and a battery. All of these components are either contained
in some form of safe, which makes them easy to maintain but vulnerable to insider attacks
(e.g., security modules for payment authorization), or are arranged on a circuit card that is
wrapped in many layers of ﬁne wire and embedded in hard, opaque epoxy (e.g., cryptographic
coprocessors). If the system detects any form of tampering (e.g., a physical attack or an envi-
ronmental attack, such as ﬂuctuations in voltage or temperature), it destroys all the sensitive
information it contains. Recent systems, such as the IBM 4758 PCI Cryptographic Coproces-
sor [IBM97] have been constructed to meet the highest security requirements of FIPS PUB
140-1.
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The usage of these devices is often assumed to provide a comprehensive and high level of
protection, which is not always justiﬁed [AK96, AK97]. Given suﬃcient time and resources, it
becomes probable that an attacker can violate the physical protection of the tamper-resistant
hardware device. Furthermore, it is sometimes possible to extract secret information from
a tamper-resistant device without violating the physical protection using electromagnetic
radiation attacks8, such as the ones described by Kocher [KJJ98]. Therefore, the level of
tamper-resistance oﬀered by any particular hardware device can be measured by the time and
cost penalty that the protective mechanisms impose – these should ideally be higher than the
possible gain that can be achieved by breaking the tamper-resistant hardware device.
The most diﬃcult task for a tamper-resistant hardware device is if it must permanently
operate in an untrusted environment. As explained by Anderson et al. in [AK96], such
systems are very diﬃcult to build. However, if the goal is to merely detect tampering with
a high probability and if challenge inspections can be performed to verify that no tampering
has occurred, then the task becomes more tractable. It seems very unlikely that a physical
attack on systems such as the IBM 4758 [IBM97] or the DS5002FP (as described in [AK96])
can be conducted without leaving detectable traces. Yet, this does not protect the device
from protocol or electromagnetic radiation attacks that do not need to overcome the physical
tamper-resistance [AK96, KJJ98]. Both of these have to be addressed with careful design of
the software and the cryptographic algorithms, such as described by Kuhn et al. in [KA98].
The latter class of attacks based on electromagnetic radiation can further be addressed with
physical shielding.
Despite all the problems of the approach, it still is a well understood technology that
can, if properly used, considerably improve the security of a system. This is acknowledged in
several more critical discussions of tamper-resistant technologies [PPSW97, Kuh97].
3.4 Realization
We will now describe the tamper-resistant hardware device on which our approach is built.
This device will be referred to as the trusted processing environment (TPE), since it contains
the execution environment for mobile agents and must be trusted by the agent owners. Ac-
cording to our deﬁnition of trust in Section 1.5, all trust should be tied to a policy. In the case
of the TPE, this policy is explicitly deﬁned for and enforced by the TPE (see Section 3.4.2).
This means that the TPE allows us to realize a pessimistic approach to trust with respect to
the operator of the TPE, who can not violate the policy of the TPE since it is realized as a
tamper-resistant device. On the other hand, the trust in the actual enforcement of the TPE’s
policy must be derived from yet another principal, the TPE manufacturer, who designs and
produces the TPEs. This, in turn, is based on an optimistic approach to trust and will further
be discussed in Section 3.5.1.
An agent executor can buy a TPE from a manufacturer (this makes it a TPE owner) and
advertise this fact, together with the policy that is enforced by the TPE, to potential users
(i.e., agent owners) with the help of a broker. The broker is a simple directory service that
allows to locate other principals and to obtain their credentials. Figure 3.1 gives an overview
of the principals in the system.
8The technology required to conduct or prevent such attacks is often referred to with the term TEMPEST,
which stands for transient electromagnetic pulse emanation standard. However, due to the strong military
implications of this issue, it is diﬃcult to obtain comprehensive information [McN].
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Principals in the CryPO protocol
If an agent owner wants to use the services oﬀered by some agent executor, he has to
obtain the credentials for the agent executor’s TPE from the broker or directly from the
agent executor. Based on the information contained therein, he can decide if the TPE’s
policy is adequate and whether the TPE manufacturer (not the agent executor) is considered
trustworthy.
Once the agent owner has decided to send the mobile agent, he needs a means to safely
transfer the mobile agent to the agent executor’s TPE. This is achieved via the cryptograph-
ically protected objects (CryPO) protocol (see Section 3.4.5).
3.4.1 Notation
The described approach relies on public key cryptography [DH76, RSA78]. A detailed de-
scription of cryptography and the corresponding notations is not within the scope of this
presentation. For information on this topic see e.g., [MvOV97, Sch94, Bra88]. The notation
we will use is as follows.
We will use uppercase characters for the keys and algorithms of a public key cryptosys-
tem and lowercase characters for the corresponding keys and algorithms of a symmetric key
cryptosystem. The “;” denotes concatenation.
A principal P has a pair (or several pairs9) of keys (KP ,K−1P ) where KP is P ’s public
key and K−1P its private key. We assume the existence of a public key infrastructure, such
as X.509 [ITU93] or SPKI [EFL+98], that allows to establish the association of a principal’s
identity with the corresponding public key by means of certiﬁcates. These are statements
that express a certain fact, which are signed by some authority that asserts the accuracy of
this fact10.
Given the proper keys and the corresponding algorithms, it is possible to encrypt a message
m using the receiver P ’s public key KP , denoted {m}KP = m′, such that only P can decrypt
it with its private key, denoted {m′}K−1
P
= m. A signed message, including a digital signature
9It is advisable to have, at least, two pairs of keys, one for encryption/decryption and one for digital
signatures.
10For instance a Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) will thoroughly check the identity of a principal (e.g., by
verifying a picture ID) and then issue a certiﬁcate that asserts that the CA has conducted this check and binds
the public key of the principal to his public key.
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on the message m, generated by P using its private key K−1P and veriﬁable by anybody using
the respective public key KP , is denoted {m}K−1
P
.
In the following we assume the usage of optimization schemes for encryption and signing.
Whenever we need to encrypt a large message, we will encrypt it with a symmetric cryptosys-
tem using a randomly generated symmetric key, which in turn is encrypted using the public
key cryptosystem. To encrypt m using KP , we create krnd and compute {krnd}KP ; {m}krnd ,
which is also written as {m}EP . Additionally, we will use a hash algorithm h to reduce the
computational complexity of signing a message m, which means we calculate a cryptographic
hash and apply the signature only to the hash of the message. To sign m using K−1P , we
compute m; {h(m)}K−1P , which is also written as {m}SP . For ease of presentation, we will not
make this explicit.
3.4.2 The Trusted Processing Environment
The trusted processing environment (TPE) that is at the center of our approach is depicted in
Figure 3.2. It is an advanced tamper-resistant hardware device according to the description
given in Section 3.3, that should satisfy security level 4 of FIPS PUB 140-1 [NIS94] (this level
foresees that the device can operate in a physically unprotected environment). According
to currently available technology, this requirement excludes a smart card based system and
mandates at least a PC-card (e.g., PCI or PCMCIA) based hardware, which can be operated
in a regular PC or workstation.
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Figure 3.2: The trusted processing environment
The TPE embodies the functionality that we have identiﬁed for the agent platform in
Section 2.4.2. It is a complete microcomputer that consists of a cpu, ram, rom, and non-
volatile storage (e.g. eeprom or ﬂash ram). The main task of this hardware is to run a
virtual machine (VM) that, in turn, provides the execution environment for mobile agents.
The VM is governed by an underlying operating system, which coordinates and controls the
resources of the TPE, namely the cpu, the access to memory (which can provide an additional
protection of agents from each other), the I/O library, and the cryptographic library. We will
collectively refer to this essential software on the TPE that has to be installed by the TPE
manufacturer as firmware (see Section 3.4.3).
The I/O library connects the TPE to a host computer that is under the control of the
TPE owner. It provides well deﬁned interfaces that allow the host computer, for instance, to
initiate the following management operations on the TPE:
• upload, interrupt, or remove agents;
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• facilitate interactions between processes on the host and agents on the TPE; and
• observe certain activities of the TPE (such as which agents are currently executing).
The cryptographic library contains a private key K−1TPE that is known to no principal
other than the TPE – even the physical owner of the TPE does not know the private key.
The secrecy of this private key is a crucial requirement for the task of the TPE and must be
ensured with utmost certainty (see Section 3.4.4).
All these components are physically protected by the tamper-resistance of the TPE and
any access or manipulation is mediated and restricted by the operating system, which must
provide a very high level of protection. This conﬁguration makes it impossible to access
or manipulate the information that is contained in the TPE without proper authorization
and allows the TPE to protect locally executing agents from disclosure and manipulation.
A closer analysis of this last statement allows us to distinguish between the fundamental
protection guarantees of a TPE, which have to be oﬀered by every TPE (i.e., every access
to or manipulation of information on the TPE is controlled by the operating system, see
Section 4.2.1), and the policy that is enforced by a TPE (e.g., the protection of locally
executing agents11).
The former is concerned with what protection the TPE is capable to provide. The fun-
damental protection guarantees are ensured by the TPE manufacturer, which designs and
produces its TPEs with care, and declared in a certiﬁcate CertTPE (that is signed by the
TPE manufacturer). This certiﬁcate contains essential information about the TPE, such as
its properties (e.g., size of non-volatile memory), its manufacturer, its type, and its public
key. It conveys a level of assurance in the validity of the fundamental protection guarantees,
which is dependent on the employed technology for the construction of the TPE. We assume
that this will be a major subject for competition among the TPE manufacturers, but since
this is mainly dependent on hardware issues, we will not discuss it any further – despite its
importance for real implementations,
The latter is concerned with what protection the TPE is conﬁgured to provide. This
is speciﬁed in the policy12 of the TPE, which is a set of rules that will be enforced by the
ﬁrmware of the TPE (i.e., primarily the operating system). This policy can be conﬁgured by
the TPE owner according to his particular needs and within the limits of what the TPE and
its ﬁrmware support. If this ﬂexibility is not required, the policy could also be speciﬁed by the
TPE manufacturer, implemented statically in the ﬁrmware, and included in the certiﬁcate of
the TPE. This approach would remove some of the complexity related to the management of
policies, but may be too inﬂexible for many applications.
In order to guarantee the enforcement of the policy, the following two conditions must
be satisﬁed: (1) the TPE must be informed about the policy and (2) it must be capable to
enforce every rule deﬁned in the policy. The ﬁrst condition requires that the policy is passed
to the TPE, where it will be analyzed in order to verify if the second condition is satisﬁed. If
this is the case, the TPE will store the policy and sign it with its private key (without this
signature the policy is not valid). Once the TPE has signed a policy, it will not accept to
sign another one that is weaker than its current policy. This last issue may be too restrictive,
11Even though the TPE is tamper-resistant, the operating system could simply give the TPE owner full
access to all its data.
12The speciﬁcation for a policy should be formally deﬁned and easy to analyze within a program. We
will present a simple speciﬁcation in Appendix B, but use an informal, natural language speciﬁcation for the
discussion.
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since it would prevent a TPE owner from ever weakening the policy of its TPE, and can be
resolved by assigning an incarnation number or, if the TPE can rely on a trusted time service,
a validity period to a policy. The second condition has to be decided based on the properties
of the TPE and the available resources. The enforcement relies primarily on the fundamental
protection guarantees of the TPE, which allow the ﬁrmware, for instance, to implement the
following simple rules that are in some similar form part of every policy:
• The code of a mobile agent will not be disclosed or altered.
• The code of a mobile agent will be executed correctly (according to the deﬁnition of the
used language, e.g., Java bytecode).
• The state of a mobile agent can exclusively be accessed and manipulated through the
interface of the mobile agent.
• A mobile agent is protected from any interference from other agents on the same TPE
(other than calls on its public interface).
This simple policy, which we will later identify as the basic protection, does already
provide a rather comprehensive protection for the mobile agents executing on a TPE that
enforces it. Since it allows a mobile agent to eﬀectively hide parts of its state, it can carry
cryptographic keys that can not be accessed by the agent executor (the TPE owner). This
enables the mobile agent to send and receive encrypted messages, to sign messages, and to
verify signatures on messages it receives (possibly using the cryptographic library on the TPE
for the computation). Nevertheless, if the TPE disposes of more elaborate resources (e.g., a
battery powered clock) or if the ﬁrmware on the TPE can rely on other (as yet unspeciﬁed)
services, it is possible to guarantee the enforcement of more interesting policies. This will
extensively be discussed in the following Chapter 4.
3.4.3 Controlling the TPE Manufacturer
In order to ensure a proper operation of TPE manufacturers, they should be tightly con-
trolled by independent external auditors. This consists of a control of the hardware and of
the ﬁrmware installed on a TPE, similar to the certiﬁcation procedures deﬁned in existing
hardware evaluation criteria, such as TCSEC [DoD85], ITSEC [CEC91], or the Common
Criteria [Com98].
A TPE of some manufacturer should contain the TPE manufacturer’s public key, several
public keys of renowned auditors, a small bootloader, and a signature veriﬁcation algorithm
in the rom. The correctness of this rom can be controlled by occasionally checking it in a
randomly chosen TPE (the tamper-resistance of the TPE cannot prevent a determined and
well equipped attacker from gaining access to the contents of this rom).
The bootloader is responsible for installing the ﬁrmware on a TPE, which consists of
all the components discussed in Section 3.4.2 that should be upgradeable (i.e., the VM, the
operating system, and the various libraries), but also software that is not permanently needed
(e.g., key management algorithms) or any other software that the TPE manufacturer does not
want to put in the rom. Before installing the ﬁrmware, it must be archived and certiﬁed (i.e.,
signed) by the external auditors – an actual code review might not always be possible but can
later be conducted on the archived copies. The bootloader will then install this ﬁrmware only
if it is certiﬁed by the TPE manufacturer and by a suﬃcient number of external auditors.
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This scheme cannot prevent that the TPE manufacturer introduces an intricate Trojan
Horse in the design of its TPE that can overcome the described mechanism (e.g., an obfuscated
part of the ﬁrmware or a hidden feature of the hardware). Nevertheless, it makes this task
very diﬃcult and expensive for the TPE manufacturer and would later on allow a specialized
auditor to analyze and prove an oﬀense.
3.4.4 Key Management
One of the most important properties of the TPE, which has to be guaranteed with utmost
certainty, is that the private key of the TPE (K−1TPE ) is never disclosed. To ensure this
property, the TPE should create this key itself based on random input strings from several
diﬀerent sources (e.g., TPE manufacturer, TPE owner, or an independent third party), which
should be combined into one string that is completely random and secret if at least one of
the input strings is (see [PPSW97]). This initialization is a highly critical operation that
should be executed under the control of certiﬁed ﬁrmware that can be loaded on the TPE
and erased afterwards. Once a TPE has generated its private key, it should be prevented
from ever generating (or otherwise accepting) another one. Using this approach, the private
key is never available outside of the TPE and, thus, protected by the tamper-resistance of
the TPE. The proposed mechanism is compatible with the cryptographic key management
described in FIPS PUB 140-1 [NIS94].
The problem with this approach is that if the TPE is destroyed, all the data (that might
have been backed up in encrypted form and still be available) is also lost. To make the private
key of the TPE recoverable, it must be stored independently from the TPE. To achieve this,
the TPE could encode its private key after it is generated in several key shares according to
some (n, k) threshold secret sharing scheme [Sha79] and encrypt these with the public keys of
n independent trusted third parties13 (escrow agencies). These escrow agencies have to store
their share of the TPE’s private key and it is suﬃcient to combine k out of these n shares,
to recover the private key of the TPE and to decrypt its data. The escrow agencies have to
ensure that this procedure is only initiated if the TPE was actually destroyed and that the
recovered key cannot be abused. A possibility to ensure this, is to not actually provide the
private key of the TPE, but to reconstruct it in a secure place, where the encrypted data
of the TPE is decrypted and reencrypted with the public key of a replacement TPE. This
replacement TPE has to provide at least the same physical protection as the destroyed TPE
and would enforce the same policy.
3.4.5 The CryPO Protocol
The cryptographically protected objects (CryPO)14 protocol is concerned with transferring
a mobile agent to a TPE and should provide a protection to the mobile agents in transit
that is at least as good as that of the receiving TPE. To achieve this, it transfers mobile
agents exclusively in encrypted form over the network, using the receiving TPE’s public key.
Provided that the corresponding private key is only known to the receiving TPE, no other
principal can access the code or state of such a protected agent. To prevent any tampering
13The transfer of these public keys to the TPE is again highly critical and should be controlled by certiﬁed
ﬁrmware of the TPE manufacturer.
14We had originally chosen the term object since it is more general than the term agent. Also, if pronounced
in German it sounds like “kripo”, which is a colloquial term for “Kriminalpolizei” – a police force that can
loosely be compared to the FBI – should I put this???
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with the encrypted mobile agent (or rather to detect and ignore tampered mobile agents) it
is suﬃcient to concatenate the mobile agent A with a hash of the entire agent h(A), including
its execution state, before encrypting it {A;h(A)}ETPE . The receiver simply has to verify the
correct hash before starting the mobile agent to ensure the integrity of the received agent.
The protocol is divided into two distinct phases. The ﬁrst phase consists of an initializa-
tion, which has to be executed once before the execution of the second phase of the protocol.
The second phase is concerned with the usage of the TPE and the actual transfer of the
mobile agent. The protocol is based on the interactions given in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
In order to send a mobile agent to an agent executor, the agent owner needs some infor-
mation that we assume will be gathered in a structure that we call a reference to an agent
executor. This structure consists of the name of the agent executor, its physical address in
the network, the policy of its TPE, and the certiﬁcate CertTPE for its TPE. Moreover, we
assume that the agent owner can verify the validity of a public key with the help of the public
key infrastructure.
Phase 1: Initialization
In the initialization phase, the participants exchange the required key information (see Fig-
ure 3.3):
• The TPE manufacturer publishes its certiﬁcation key KTM .
• The TPE manufacturer sends the certiﬁcate CertTPE = {...,KTPE }STM to the agent
executor.
• The agent executor registers its reference RefAE 15 with one or several brokers.
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Figure 3.3: Initialization of the CryPO protocol
Phase 2: Usage
After the participants have ﬁnished the initialization, they can execute the main part of the
CryPO protocol, which is concerned with the transfer of a mobile agent (see Figure 3.4):
15The broker can also verify that the agent executor actually controls the corresponding TPE by executing
a challenge-response protocol with the TPE via the agent executor.
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• The agent owner queries the broker for the reference to the agent executor with which
it wants to interact (or it already holds this reference from a previous interaction).
• The agent owner veriﬁes whether the TPE’s policy is adequate and controls the certiﬁ-
cate CertTPE to check the manufacturer and the type of the TPE, in order to decide if
it satisﬁes the security requirements of the mobile agent. If any of these checks fail, the
agent owner will abort the protocol.
• Otherwise, the agent owner sends the mobile agent encrypted with the public key of
the TPE, {A;h(A)}ETPE , to the agent executor.
• The agent executor cannot decrypt {A;h(A)}ETPE nor can it do anything other than
upload the agent to its TPE.
• The TPE decrypts {A;h(A)}ETPE using its private key K−1TPE and obtains the exe-
cutable agent A, which will eventually be started and can then interact with the local
environment of the agent executor or other agents on the TPE.
• When the mobile agent has ﬁnished its task, it can simply migrate back to its owner
(protected with the public key KAO of its owner) {A;h(A)}EAO or continue its itinerary
as explained below.
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Figure 3.4: Usage of the CryPO protocol
If the mobile agent is appropriately supported by the TPE, it can follow the same protocol
when it wants to migrate from the TPE on which it is executing, say T1, to another TPE, say
T2. For reasons of simplicity we assume that the agent owner has deﬁned a ﬁxed itinerary and
provided the mobile agent with the required references (otherwise the mobile agent needs the
certiﬁcation keys of trusted TPE manufacturers, has to autonomously discover the references
for appropriate agent executors, and must implement the veriﬁcation of the policy and the
certiﬁcate). When the agent wants to migrate, it calls the appropriate service of T1 with
the public key and the network address of T2 as parameters. T1 will then take the necessary
actions for an agent migration (which are dependent on the underlying mobile agent system),
encrypt the marshaled agent with the public key of T2 and send it to the provided network
address. The receiving TPE can deal with the mobile agent as usual.
76 Chapter 3. Protecting a Mobile Agent with Tamper-resistant Hardware
The obvious problem of protecting the TPE from malicious agents (as opposed to simply
tampered agents that were discussed above) is independent of the described approach and
has to be tackled with the same mechanisms that are used in other mobile agent systems
(see Section 2.5.6). The concept of the TPE does not provide any particular support for this
problem other than through the fact that it is a dedicated hardware that was constructed by
a specialized principal explicitly for the execution of mobile agents. This constellation could
make the implementation of protection mechanisms simpler or more eﬃcient, but this is not
within the scope of this thesis.
3.5 Problems
The TPE and the CryPO protocol described above allow us to protect the code and state of
a mobile agent from disclosure and manipulation, both in transit and during execution. This
protection hinges on the trustworthiness of the TPE manufacturer and is also constrained by
other limitations of the approach. In the following we will illustrate some of these problems.
3.5.1 Trust in the TPE Manufacturer
The complex architecture built from TPEs and the CryPO protocol can oﬀer an extensive
protection for mobile agents, provided that all the components operate according to their
speciﬁcation. In order to rely on the enforcement of a TPE’s policy, an agent owner has to
trust the TPE manufacturer to properly design, implement and produce its TPEs. Due to the
complexity of this task, it is impossible to enforce this. The TPE manufacturer can always
introduce hidden backdoors (Trojan Horses) in the TPE, which would allow it to access any
information on its TPEs. Therefore, this problem can only be addressed with an optimistic
approach to trust that relies on controls and sanctions. Since this optimistic approach to trust
could also be applied to the agent executors directly, it seems that the presented architecture
simply replaces one required trust relationship with another one. This is a correct observation
from a theoretical point of view.
Nevertheless, we believe that this replacement of trust in an arbitrary agent executor,
which is the operator of a TPE, with trust in the manufacturer of this TPE has several more
subtle implications. These result in the following advantages that we have identiﬁed:
• high expertise,
• resources to build reputation,
• separation of concern, and
• eﬀective control.
The TPE manufacturer is a specialized principal, which primarily deals in the ﬁeld of
the provision of security devices. Therefore, it has a profound understanding of security and
privacy problems and the potential pitfalls. This makes it a much more capable entity to
ensure a good protection. The regular TPE owner, on the other hand, is primarily concerned
with his core business and does not necessarily have the proper expertise to ensure a secure
operation of its hardware and to guarantee the protection of the processed data.
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The production of TPEs is considered to be a diﬃcult task (see Section 3.3), which will
only be undertaken by major corporations. Since these have the necessary resources to build a
good reputation and an incentive to protect it, we can rely on this reputation as a foundation
for the trust in the TPE manufacturer (see Section 1.6.1). This allows the TPE owner, which
can be an individual or a small company without any particular reputation (and therefore
none to lose), to leverage the trust that potential customers have in the manufacturer of its
TPE over to his business relation with the customer.
The TPE manufacturer, which is responsible for the correct operation of its TPEs, has
nothing to gain from not accomplishing its task. Since the TPE will be operated by another
principal that works in a completely diﬀerent business, the TPE manufacturer has no direct
interest in the data that is processed on its TPEs and therefore no simple possibility to draw
a direct beneﬁt from a TPE that does not enforce its policy (it could only collaborate with
the TPE owner or sell the data to a competitor of the TPE owner). This is obviously not
the case for the TPE owner, who has an immediate interest in all the data that is processed
on its TPE and who might have short term goals that (in his point of view) justify a policy
violation.
Finally, we assume that there will be relatively few TPE manufacturers16 (on the order of a
few hundreds) compared to the number of possible operators of a TPE (on the order of several
millions). This makes the control of the operation of the TPE manufacturers much easier for
external auditors, as explained in Section 3.4.3. Even if such stringent controls might not be
obligatory, it is conceivable that a TPE manufacturer might do this voluntarily, in order to
obtain a better position in the market (similar to the approach for quality assurance in the
ISO-9000). A comparable control of the TPE owners would be impossible due to the sheer
number of principals.
3.5.2 Limitations
The presented approach does have some serious limitations, which are all concerned with the
use of tamper-resistant hardware devices. These devices are perceived as:
• diﬃcult to construct,
• a possible performance bottleneck,
• diﬃcult to maintain, and
• expensive.
The most problematic of these limitations is the actual construction of tamper-resistant
devices that can be operated in an untrusted environment. This task is extremely diﬃcult
and an attack can at most be made time consuming and expensive (see Section 3.3). If a
TPE owner would succeed to obtain the private key of his TPE, he could pretend to run a
TPE (using the certiﬁcate for the TPE of which he has the private key), while he is actually
capable to access all the information in the mobile agents sent to his TPE, to manipulate
them at will, and to completely ignore the TPE’s policy.
Under the assumption that the key can not be accessed without physically tampering
with the TPE, this could be countered with regular inspections of the TPE by independent
16There are currently three producers of smart card technology that control more than 80% of the market
(Gemplus, Schlumberger, and De La Rue).
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third parties (such as the TU¨V17) that can detect such tampering18. If this level of security
is not suﬃcient, this could be improved with unannounced challenge inspections of the TPE.
This would at least limit the amount of time during which an attacker can beneﬁt from a
successful attack and it could provide an eﬀective deterrent if an attempted or successful
breaking of a TPE is severely punished. However, for highly sensitive installations, where
eventual detection of tampering is not suﬃcient, other approaches have to be devised (e.g.,
continuous video surveillance).
Since the TPE is necessarily involved in all computation related to mobile agents, it could
easily become a performance bottleneck in the installation of some service provider. This is
an extremely diﬃcult problem that requires a more thorough analysis. The only simple way
to address this problem is to overdimension the system so that it can cope with most high
load situations. This might not be an option for small companies who have a tight budget,
but these are the ones that have the most to gain from the availability of a TPE.
The problem of maintaining and upgrading a tamper-resistant device that is by design
inaccessible to its owner is grounded on an actual dilemma. It can only be alleviated by
establishing a suitable maintenance contract with the TPE manufacturer, in which it ensures
a proper operation of a service provider’s TPE installation. Again, such a maintenance
contract may not be available to small companies.
Finally, the often cited argument that tamper-resistant hardware is expensive, must be
weighed against the advantages of the approach. As it is quite likely that a large installation
would anyway require some dedicated hardware, the TPE would only make this marginally
more expensive. On the other hand, since for a small company, that tries to establish itself in
the market, some interactions with its customers would not be possible without a TPE, this
might be a reasonable price to pay.
3.6 Open Systems
If agent based systems are to become a reality, they have to provide security not only for the
agent executor and its installation, but also for the mobile agents themselves. This is due to
the fact that truly useful mobile agents often rely on conﬁdential information that the agent
owner would rather have protected.
If a principal would like to create an agent based service, in which a mobile agent needs
conﬁdential information, then it needs to convince potential customers that it will not abuse
this information. This may be very diﬃcult for a small and unknown company. Trust based on
reputation is diﬃcult and expensive to build (and thus hardly an option for a small company)
and trust based on control and punishment might not be suﬃcient for the customer especially
if the provider is located in a diﬀerent country with an unknown legal system.
With the presented approach, this principal can simply buy an appropriate TPE (i.e., one
that convinces potential customers that their mobile agents will be suﬃciently well protected)
from a reputable TPE manufacturer, conﬁgure the policy that it would like its TPE to enforce,
and advertise this to potential customers. It can then immediately beneﬁt from the trust that
customers have in the manufacturer of its TPE in order to convince them that it will not
17The Technischer U¨berwachungs-Verein is an independent, government-approved expert appraisal and in-
spection organization.
18As explained in [AK96], a tamper-resistant device that requires only detection of tampering is conceivable
to even resist massive attacks.
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maliciously abuse agents sent by the customers and that the agent’s conﬁdential information
is suﬃciently well protected. This allows for simpler bootstrapping of trust and favors the
open systems philosophy, where any principal can potentially become a service provider.
∞∞∞
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Summary
In this chapter we identify the problem of protecting a mobile agent from its execution
environment or, more precisely from its operator, as an important issue. We then analyze
the existing approaches from the literature and propose a classiﬁcation that identiﬁes various
properties that these approaches exhibit. Based on the requirements that were identiﬁed for
the data agent in Chapter 1 (prevention of access to data, prevention of manipulation of code
and data, and permanent protection), we choose to pursue an approach based on tamper-
resistant hardware. We examine the general possibility of using tamper-resistant hardware
and develop our particular approach which relies on the trusted processing environment (TPE)
and the cryptographically protected objects (CryPO) protocol.
The entire approach hinges on the trustworthiness of the TPE manufacturer which is
discussed together with other limitations. Finally, we point out the relevance of the approach
for the development of open mobile agent systems.
Chapter 4
Usage and Extensions
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.
– Albert Einstein
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we have shown how a mobile agent can be protected from the agent
executor with the help of a tamper-resistant TPE. This protection is primarily concerned with
preventing access to or manipulation of the mobile agent and guaranteeing its correct execu-
tion, which constitutes the basic protection that we have already identiﬁed in Section 3.4.2
and that will be further developed in Section 4.2.1
In this chapter we explore how the basic protection oﬀered by the TPE and the CryPO
protocol can be used within the mobile agent paradigm and extended to achieve more elab-
orate goals that may be desirable for the agent owner. This will often require additional
hardware guarantees from the TPE and/or the existence of TTPs that provide a certain ser-
vice. Moreover, it is necessary that both the ﬁrmware of the TPE and the TTP (if one is
required) adhere to and enforce additional rules that have to be clearly stated in a policy. The
desired goal can then be achieved via a collaboration of the diﬀerent components (i.e., the
mobile agent, the hardware, the ﬁrmware, and the TTP). We will refer to all of the presup-
positions that have to be combined in order to achieve a particular goal as a conduct. These
conducts will be the major topic of this chapter. The ideas for the various conducts have
been developed in several publications [WD97, Wil97, WBS98a, WSB99], which explore their
use in the context of diﬀerent applications: general protection of mobile agents, electronic
commerce, and telecommunication systems.
Several of the conducts that we will explore in the next section are, in fact, inspired by
the client-server paradigm. This paradigm has many commonalities with the mobile agent
paradigm and most distributed applications can, in principle, be realized with either one of
them [HCK97]. However, while some applications can exploit the advantages of the mobile
agent paradigm (see Section 2.6), others may rely on particular safety or security properties of
the client-server paradigm that are so basic that one hardly ever thinks of them. These prop-
erties allow the provision of certain guarantees to the client part of a distributed application
that cannot be provided to a mobile agent (e.g., code will be executed correctly, code can rely
82 Chapter 4. Usage and Extensions
on a reasonably reliable time service, code will not be executed more than once, etc.). This
is due to the fact that the client implementation resides in a physically trusted environment
of a user, where it can rely on the availability of trusted services and, for instance, log any
irregularities. These logs can then be provided as evidence in the case of a dispute with some
server.
In the mobile agent paradigm, on the other hand, the agent owner has no guarantee
whatsoever concerning the execution of his mobile agent (see Section 3.1). Since the agent
executor has complete control over the agent platform, it can, for instance, simply delete any
logged data. Digitally signing the mobile agent’s state can considerably limit the malicious
actions of an agent executor but it cannot prevent them (see Section 3.2.2).
With the help of the TPE and the CryPO protocol, we intend to create an environment
for mobile agents that allows them to base their execution on guarantees similar to the ones
provided by the client-server paradigm, so that it becomes possible for a mobile agent to
protect itself from a possibly malicious agent executor.
4.2 Conducts
In the following we will develop several conducts, which are concerned with the realization
of diﬀerent goals that may be desirable for the agent owner. We will describe each of these
conducts in a structured way, which consists of:
• a brief introduction into the general idea of the conduct,
• the statement of the goal(s) that should be achieved,
• the identiﬁcation of the requirements that have to be satisﬁed for this particular con-
duct1,
• the policy, which describes the rules that will be followed by diﬀerent participants in
the conduct, and
• a discussion that explains how the goal(s) can be achieved based on the requirements
and the policy; occasionally we will also point out additional uses for this conduct.
The following list of conducts is not assumed to be complete and we expect to expand it in
the future with new ones we discover.
4.2.1 Basic Protection
This conduct describes the basic protection guarantees that every TPE must oﬀer and on
which all of the following conducts rely2. It is exclusively concerned with the TPE and the
installed ﬁrmware.
1If these requirements identify another conduct, say C, as requirement, then this means that not only the
requirements of C have to be satisﬁed, but also that C’s policy must be enforced.
2It would be a reasonable modiﬁcation to integrate the following two conducts (migration control and
protected invocations) into the basic protection. However, since these are not required for many of the other
conducts, and for reasons of clarity we isolate them into separate conducts.
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Goals:
• The mobile agent can rely on its own resources (e.g., its code).
• The mobile agent can hide (parts of) its state (e.g., cryptographic keys).
Requirements:
• The TPE is tamper-resistant and its private key has not been compromised.
• The VM correctly implements the speciﬁcation of the language used by the mobile agent
(according to the deﬁnition of the used language, e.g., Java bytecode).
• The cryptographic library implements the cryptographic algorithms correctly (encryp-
tion, signatures, hashes, key generation, nonce generation, etc.).
• Any access to or manipulation of data on the TPE is under the control of the operating
system.
• The operating system can protect a mobile agent from other agents on the same TPE.
Policy:
a) The TPE will not disclose the code of a mobile agent.
b) The TPE will not alter the code of a mobile agent.
c) The TPE will not permit access to the state of a mobile agent other than via the mobile
agent’s public interface.
d) The TPE will not permit the manipulation of the state of a mobile agent other than via
the mobile agent’s public interface.
e) The TPE will execute the code of a mobile agent correctly.
f) The TPE will protect the mobile agent from any interference from other agents on the
same TPE (other than calls on the mobile agent’s public interface).
Discussion
The implementation of this conduct is diﬃcult, but straightforward. The most critical parts
are the tamper-resistance of the TPE and the correctness of the ﬁrmware of the TPE (see
Sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.5). Any violation of the physical protection of the TPE or serious
problem in the implementation of the ﬁrmware of the TPE (i.e., the fundamental protection
guarantees of the TPE) will invalidate the basic protection. Obviously the TPE cannot
prevent that the mobile agents it receives may have been tampered with while in transit.
Nonetheless it can detect any manipulation of the mobile agent’s code or state (as explained
in the CryPO protocol, Section 3.4.5). In that case it can simply ignore the mobile agent and
possibly inform the mobile agent’s sender and/or owner of this problem.
A TPE that provides this basic protection already oﬀers a rather comprehensive protection
to mobile agents executing on it. Since the mobile agent can rely on the proper execution of
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its code and eﬀectively hide parts of its state3, it can implement and enforce an access control
policy on the data it contains and disclose data only under its own discretion. Moreover, since
the mobile agent can contain cryptographic keys and implement cryptographic algorithms (as
an optimization, it may be allowed to use the cryptographic library of the TPE), it can
authenticate other principals, sign and encrypt messages it sends, as well as decrypt and
verify signatures on messages it receives.
4.2.2 Migration Control
In order for a mobile agent to actually be mobile and to be able to migrate to a diﬀerent TPE,
rules a) and c) of the basic protection’s policy, which disallow any disclosure of the mobile
agent’s code or state, must be relaxed. This relaxation should remain under the control of
the mobile agent.
Goal:
• The mobile agent can prevent that it will be executed on a TPE that does not pro-
vide suﬃcient protection (i.e., that does not oﬀer a suﬃcient level of assurance in its
fundamental protection guarantees or that does not enforce a suﬃciently strong policy).
Requirements:
• Basic protection
Policy:
a) The TPE will allow agents to leave the TPE only in encrypted form.
b) Prior to a migration, the TPE will provide the certiﬁcate and the policy of the designated
receiver’s TPE to the mobile agent and ask for conﬁrmation.
c) The TPE will honour the mobile agent’s decision.
d) The actual transfer follows the CryPO protocol using the public key of the receiver’s TPE
contained in the certiﬁcate.
Discussion
Due to the large variety of TPEs4, assessing the fundamental protection guarantees of a TPE
based on its certiﬁcate can be a daunting task for a mobile agent. This may require an ex-
tensive support from the TPE or from external appraisal organizations (which provide some
simple grading scheme that may even be included in the TPE’s certiﬁcate). The evaluation
of the policy on the other hand, should be supported by some formal speciﬁcation (see Sec-
tion 1.5.1 and Appendix B). We assume that the mobile agent contains a minimal policy that
ensures that all its security related requirements will be satisﬁed, which can be compared
3A mobile agent that does not act at all, actually hides all of its state. Since we assume that the agent
does act and since any action allows an observer to draw conclusions on the underlying state, we assume that
the mobile agent can only eﬀectively hide parts of its state.
4Even though we assume that the number of TPE manufacturers is rather small, each of them will produce
several types of TPEs, which will also evolve over time.
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with the policy of the destination TPE to verify that the latter is suﬃciently strong. In
conjunction the two checks allow the mobile agent to ensure that it will never be executed on
a TPE that does not provide a suﬃcient protection.
Since each TPE has a unique identiﬁer (its public key may be used for this purpose),
this conduct also allows the mobile agent to follow a pre-deﬁned itinerary. This itinerary
may be given to the mobile agent in the form of a list of references to agent executors (see
Section 3.4.5), which among other information contain the certiﬁcate of the TPEs. Provided
that the mobile agent starts on the ﬁrst TPE on its itinerary (which can be ensured by the
agent owner), it simply has to verify upon each migration that it will only migrate to the
next TPE on its itinerary. In Appendix B, we discuss how the mobile agent can, based on a
more low-level policy of the TPE, implement most of the migration itself.
4.2.3 Protected Invocations
This conduct is concerned with the optimization of method invocations between mobile agents
on the same TPE. Since the TPE is in control of all interactions between locally executing
agents, it can ensure many guarantees that make further cryptographic protection unneces-
sary.
Goal:
• The mobile agent can rely on the conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authenticity of local
method invocations.
Requirements:
• Basic protection
Policy:
a) The TPE establishes one or several unique identiﬁers for each mobile agent on the TPE
(this can either be the ID of the mobile agent (see Section 2.4.1) or a temporary
pseudonym).
b) The TPE invokes a method exclusively and unaltered on the mobile agent with the ID
provided in the invocation.
c) The TPE provides the invokee with the ID of the invoker (this information is consistent).
Discussion
The realization of this conduct is based on regular operating system mechanisms. Two in-
teracting mobile agents can authenticate each other (using any appropriate mechanism) and
subsequently interact without any further protection mechanism. No other entity can ob-
serve, intercept, or alter the information that is exchanged. A man-in-the-middle attack can
be prevented with the help of the unique identiﬁer oﬀered by the TPE, provided that the
mobile agents know each other’s identity (the identity of the agent owner may be suﬃcient)
or can rely on digital signatures for the authentication.
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4.2.4 Authentic Code
For certain applications it may not be suﬃcient that a mobile agent knows that the agent
with whom it interacts, is from a particular trusted entity (this can be veriﬁed with a regular
authentication), but it might need to know exactly with what code it interacts.
Goal:
• The mobile agent can determine whether it interacts with some given code.
Requirements:
• Basic protection
• Protected invocation
Policy:
a) The TPE provides an operation that, given the ID of a mobile agent, returns the crypto-
graphic hash of the immutable part of this mobile agent (provided that the mobile agent
approves).
b) The TPE will query the mobile agent on which a hash is requested if it allows this operation
to take place.
Discussion
In order for this conduct to be useful, the agent owner needs to have access to the code
of some other mobile agent to analyze its behaviour (this requires either an analysis of the
executable code or the use of a deterministic compiler). If he is satisﬁed with this analysis,
he will provide his mobile agent with the hash of the analyzed code. When the agent starts
an interaction with some other local agent, it has access to the local identiﬁer and can, thus,
obtain the hash of its partner in the interaction. Then the mobile agent can verify that it
actually interacts with the code that was analyzed by its owner.
This can, for instance, be used in a pragmatic approach to solve the Millionaire’s Prob-
lem [Yao82], where two principals want to compute who is the richer of both, without either
one being able to determine the wealth of the other (besides what can be deduced from the
result). Both principals can independently analyze a comparison agent, which is simply a
piece of code that authenticates the sources for two input values, compares the two values,
and returns the result to the sources. If both of them are convinced that this code computes
exactly what it is supposed to compute and has no other side eﬀects, they will proceed. They
create a carrier agent that contains their wealth, the hash of the comparison agent, and a
private key for authentication and signatures. Both carrier agents and the comparison agent
will be loaded on a suﬃciently well protected TPE, where they interact. The comparison
agent will authenticate the carrier agents to prevent masquerading attacks and the carrier
agents will verify that they interact with the comparison agent that was analyzed by their
owner. After receiving the result, they sign it with their private key to prevent that it can
later be altered.
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Another possible use for this conduct could be the implementation of a veriﬁable mix (see
Section1.3.3). The actual implementation of the functionality of a mix is well understood; in
its simplest form it has to buﬀer a certain number of messages (of equal length), transform
them (e.g., by decrypting them), reorder them, and forward them to the receivers indicated
in the decrypted messages. The only additional complication is that the mix has to ignore
duplicate messages5. We assume that this functionality is implemented in a mix agent, the
code of which is publicly available. This allows the users of the mix to analyze the code and
to verify that the mix implements exactly the functionality it is supposed to implement.
This mix agent is then instantiated as a stationary agent on a TPE, where it oﬀers its
services.
A message that is to be protected by the mix is encoded in a message agent, which also
contains the hash of the analyzed code of the mix agent. When the message agent arrives at
the TPE, it will verify that the code of the mix agent is the one that was previously analyzed
by its owner and if this is the case, hand over the message to the mix agent for processing.
Since the basic transfer of mobile agents with the CryPO protocol already implements
most of the encryption and decryption, the main task of the mix agent is to coordinate the
ordering of outgoing message agents and the detection and elimination of duplicates.
4.2.5 Synchronized Clock
For many applications it may be important to have an approximate knowledge of the actual
real time. This can be useful for an agent owner, who may want to limit the duration during
which a mobile agent can be active. We will refer to this as an agent with a limited lifetime.
Goal:
• The mobile agent can obtain a suﬃciently accurate time or is informed that no accurate
time is available.
Requirements:
• Basic protection
• The TPE contains a suﬃciently accurate clock (that can not be inﬂuenced by external
actions; e.g., made to run slower or faster)
• The TPE cooperates with a trusted time server6 (TTS).
• The TPE holds an authentic copy of the TTS’s public key.
5This constitutes a serious problem since a mobile agent can not store a long message history in the limited
amount of non-volatile storage that is available on the TPE. It could be addressed by concatenating the message
with a random number and reencrypting it with the public key of the designated receiver, which will cause
duplicate messages to have a diﬀerent encoding. Nevertheless, since all duplicate messages will be sent to the
same receiver, an attacker may be able to link messages via this information (in particular if the attacker is the
TPE owner who can feed the mix agent on the TPE with arbitrary messages and intercept them before they
are forwarded to the designated receiver). Probabilistic methods that enable the mix agent to detect duplicate
messages with a suﬃciently high probability but do not require the storage of the entire message history, may
help to further complicate the task of an attacker. This problem requires further study.
6The TTS must be trusted by the agent owners – since they have to trust the TPE manufacturer in any
case, it seems appropriate to let the TPE manufacturer select the TTSs with which its TPEs will cooperate.
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Policy:
a) The TPE will synchronize its clock with the TTS.
b) The TPE will inform mobile agents if this synchronization does not succeed.
c) The TTS will duly reply to all requests with the signed real time.
Discussion
The TPE simply sends a request with a nonce (to prevent replay attacks) to the TTS, which
will immediately reply with a message that contains the nonce and the real time signed by the
TTS. Upon receiving this message, the TPE knows that its time is accurate within the delay
of the request. For most practical cases, assuming that the message is not artiﬁcially delayed
by an external attacker, this will be within a few seconds, which is suﬃcient for the intended
use (we expect mobile agents to have lifetimes on the order of at least several minutes). If
the TPE does not succeed to synchronize its clock, it will inform mobile agents about this
problem and periodically retry the synchronization.
With the help of the accurate time from the TPE a mobile agent can now easily implement
a limited lifetime. The problem is that once an agent executor obtains a mobile agent, he
can store the originally received, encrypted mobile agent and execute it repeatedly for an
unlimited duration, which may not be in the interest of the agent owner. To prevent this, the
agent owner provides his mobile agent with an expiration time texp, which limits the agent’s
lifetime. Upon its arrival the mobile agent inquires if the TPE has a suﬃcently accurate
time, requests the local time of the TPE, and checks if this time is still within its attributed
lifetime. If its expiration time has passed or if the TPE did not succeed to synchronize its
clock, the agent will abort; otherwise, it will continue its execution. This conduct allows, for
instance, to decide that a particular mobile agent has eﬀectively been lost – if its lifetime has
expired, it can not unexpectedly reappear at some later time when it may cause damage.
Another possible use of this conduct is to realize a deferred activation, which allows a
mobile agent to delay the start of its activity until some time tstart that is speciﬁed by the
agent owner. Upon its activation, the mobile agent requests the local time of the TPE and
executes some form of sleep operation that will wake it when its activation time has been
reached.
4.2.6 Local Logging
In this conduct we want to further improve on the protection of the previous conduct, by not
only limiting the duration, but also the number of times that an agent can be executed. This
can entirely prevent replay attacks by an agent executor.
Goals:
• The mobile agent can base its execution on results from previous executions that are
logged on the TPE.
Requirements:
• Basic protection
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• Synchronized clock
• The TPE disposes of a considerable amount of non-volatile storage that is protected
from any external interference.
Policy:
a) The TPE provides a small amount of non-volatile storage up to some expiration time even
to a mobile agent that has terminated its execution on the TPE.
b) The TPE will authenticate a mobile agent that allocates such an area of non-volatile
storage and store the authentication information with the data (this authentication
information can be a public key or the ID of the agent owner who has signed the mobile
agent).
c) The TPE guarantees that the data stored by a mobile agent can exclusively be read and/or
written by a mobile agent that provides a proper authentication (e.g., one that can prove
knowledge of the private key that corresponds to the public key stored with the data or
belongs to the same agent owner).
d) After the expiration time, the TPE will delete the data.
Discussion
The implementation of this conduct is very simple and consists of a small database that has
to be managed in the TPE’s non-volatile storage. This database contains a list of entries that
consist of a tag (provided by the mobile agent to access the data), the expiration time, the
authentication information, and the actual data. The TPE will regularly delete entries that
have expired. The major problem with this is the limited size of the non-volatile storage in
the TPE7, which must be realized with expensive technology (e.g., eeprom of ﬂash ram; a
harddisk inside the TPE seems currently not realistic). To overcome this problem, the TPE
could use the resources of the host computer, which can easily provide several megabytes of
storage on a contemporary harddisk.
The obvious problem with this is that the external storage is under the control of the
TPE owner and consequently not protected from external interference, which contradicts the
requirements. A similar problem has been addressed by Devanbu et al. in [DS98], where they
propose to use cryptographic mechanisms to allow a resource limited trusted device to detect
integrity violations on stacks and queues that are stored on an external and possibly malicious
host computer. The main idea is to create a digest of the data that is held within the trusted
device and to apply integrity protection on the externalized data. Whenever the data is read,
the integrity protection allows to verify that it has not been tampered with, while the digest
allows to verify that the data is current (otherwise the external host could try to provide
outdated data). Whenever the TPE notices that its host provides incorrect or outdated data,
7Even a trivial example, where an entry consists of 128 bytes (a hash of the tag requires 160 bits, a
timestamp 64 bits, the authentication data 512 bits, which leaves 288 bits for the data; i.e., 36 characters or
9 integer values), the average expiration time is 1 hour and the agents on the TPE create 1 entry per second
requires 450 Kbytes (128 bytes ∗ 3600 sec ∗ 1 sec−1). A more realistic example with entries of 512 bytes, an
average expiration time of 10 hours, and 10 entries per second requires 180 Mbytes (512 bytes ∗ 36000 sec ∗
10 sec−1), which can not be handled with solid state memory within the TPE.
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it will stop working and try to inform some supervising entity of this problem (e.g., the TPE
manufacturer). If conﬁdentiality is an issue, the externalized data can be encrypted (since
the data will only be read by the TPE, symmetric cryptography is suﬃcient.)
This conduct allows a mobile agent to control the number of times it is executed on a
particular TPE or to selectively disclose data based on what data it has previously disclosed
in other executions. For instance, in the example of Section 2.2.2, if the mobile agent contains
several payment informations, it could ensure that it will disclose at most one of them.
To take advantage of this, the mobile agent needs to implement a limited lifetime. When
it is started on a TPE, it will access the entry that corresponds to a particular tag, in
order to ﬁnd out about possible previous executions on this TPE. The TPE will request the
authentication information from the mobile agent (e.g., a public key or the mobile agent’s
ID) and authenticate the mobile agent against this information. If this is successful and if the
authentication information provided by the mobile agent corresponds to the one in the entry
(supposing it already exists), the TPE will provide the stored data or inform the mobile agent
that no such entry exists8. In the latter case the mobile agent will create the entry with an
expiration time that is suﬃciently later than its own lifetime (this needs to take the accuracy
of the clock on the TPE into account). The TPE may, for instance for reasons of unavailable
non-volatile storage, refuse to create the entry, which will result in an abort of the mobile
agent. After its execution the mobile agent will update the stored data to reﬂect the result
of this execution. This may have to be done before actually disclosing some information to
an external entity, to prevent that the mobile agent can be interrupted before performing the
update.
Since the TPE will not delete the entry before the speciﬁed expiration time, the mobile
agent will either be guaranteed to ﬁnd the logged data or the mobile agent is past its attributed
lifetime and will not execute at all.
4.2.7 External Logging
For certain security relevant or otherwise critical actions of a mobile agent it may be desirable
to log this action with an external logging server, which is a principal that is trusted by the
agent owner. If the mobile agent can also access logs it created previously, this can even be
used to coordinate its actions across several TPEs (e.g., limit the number of items it buys at
diﬀerent service providers).
Goals:
• The mobile agent can store information that will be unconditionally recoverable.
• Optionally, the mobile agent can base its execution on previous executions that are
logged by the logging server.
Requirements:
• Basic protection
8The preceding authentication of the mobile agent prevents some other mobile agent that does not know
the authentication information from probing whether a particular mobile agent has recently been executed on
this TPE.
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• The agent owner cooperates with a trusted logging server (TLS).
• The mobile agent holds an authentic copy of the TLS’s public key.
Policy:
a) The TPE allows mobile agents to perform remote invocations.
b) The TLS stores all log entries9 it receives and replies with a signed acknowledgement.
c) Optionally, the TLS may allow a mobile agent (that is properly authorized) to access log
entries.
Discussion
The implementation of this conduct is fairly easy and does not cause unsurmountable storage
problems at the TLS (which can rely on inexpensive mass storage media). The mobile agent
simply has to prepare the log entry, apply the necessary cryptographic protection (the inclu-
sion of a nonce will prevent replay attacks by the TPE owner), and invoke the log method
of the TLS. If the log was successfully stored by the TLS, the TLS will return a signed
acknowledgement which can be veriﬁed with the help of the TLS’s public key.
This can, for instance, be used by the mobile agent to log a contract, which it has negoti-
ated with some service provider, before actually providing the payment. If the mobile agent
is lost and cannot return the contract to its owner directly (as the contract is signed by the
service provider, this would be suﬃcient for non-repudiation), the agent owner can retrieve
the contract from the TLS.
The optional variant enables a mobile agent to implement the goal described in Sec-
tion 4.2.6 across several TPEs, which allows the mobile agent to coordinate global actions.
A particularly interesting use of this conduct is the installation of legal backdoors within
mobile agents. Assume that a mobile agent contains a data item that it will not disclose via
its public interface but only use internally (e.g., a private or symmetric key). However, the
mobile agent may oﬀer a special method that will disclose this data item provided that this
request is properly authorized (e.g., signed with a private key that is accepted to authorize
this action, such as the key of a judge that can order the surveillance of a person). To make
this mechanism acceptable for the agent owner, the mobile agent will not disclose the data
item before it has logged the operation with a logging server that is trusted by the agent
owner (e.g., to inform him about the operation after a certain delay, say a few months), but
also by the entity that requested the data item (e.g., to not inform the agent owner earlier).
The mobile agent itself must also be trusted by both parties to perform this method correctly.
This can be subject to public code review, where the code itself can be authenticated (see
Section 4.2.4) or ensured by a trusted agent creator. A similar mechanism for access to
medical information has been proposed by Anderson in [And96], but he does not comment
on how the mechanism can be enforced.
4.2.8 Anonymity
For certain actions of mobile agents on a TPE it may not be necessary to identify the mobile
agent that is responsible for the action. This makes every agent currently executing on the
9These may also be marked with an expiration time that allows the TLS to delete unnecessary entries.
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TPE equally likely as the initiatior of such an action (except when an agent is controlled by
the TPE owner). To allow external entities to interact with an anonymous mobile agent, the
TPE can provide temporary pseudonyms, which are exclusively known to the TPE.
Goal:
• The mobile agent can perform actions anonymously while it is executing on the TPE
Requirements:
• Basic protection
Policy:
a) The TPE allows mobile agents to act anonymously from the TPE.
b) The TPE oﬀers one or several temporary pseudonyms for mobile agents, with which
external entities can interact with a mobile agent.
Discussion
Since the TPE is in control of all the information that is communicated to the host computer,
it can simply omit any information on the identity of a mobile agent that does not want
to be identiﬁed. This does not preclude a proper authorization of the actions of a mobile
agent, which can still be performed by the TPE or a special agent on the TPE. This can
consist of an authentication of the mobile agent and the consultation of some access matrix
or of more elaborate methods [BFL96]. The TPE owner will simply be informed whether this
authorization was successful.
This conduct allows a mobile agent on the TPE to execute a database query without
being identiﬁed to the TPE owner, which may, for instance, be useful for the patent search
that was mentioned in Section 3.1.
Another possible use is to enable mobile agents to send and receive remote invocations
anonymously. The mobile agent can be addressed with the temporary pseudonym attributed
by the TPE or if the remote entity knows the ID of the mobile agent, it can encrypt this
ID (and possibly the entire invocation) with the public key of the TPE. The TPE needs to
ensure that it does not disclose any information on whether such an invocation was successfully
delivered or not, since this may be used by the TPE owner to discover the destination of the
invocation (a required acknowledgement should be created by the receiver).
The problem of anonymity is that it is only meaningful within a suﬃciently large set of
entities, who may possibly perform an action at a particular point in time. This is often
called the anonymity group. If this anonymity group has only a single member at the time
when the action is performed, then this member is perfectly identiﬁed. Therefore the member
should be informed about the size of the anonymity group within which it operates. In the
context of the TPE this could be the number of mobile agents that are currently executing
on the TPE. However, since all of the other agents on the TPE may be dummy agents of
the TPE owner that do not act at all, this metric may not be very helpful. The TPE may
compute the number of mobile agents on the TPE from diﬀerent agent owners, which can
oﬀer a better metric for the anonymity of the mobile agent. The entire domain of anonymity
of mobile agents is highly complex and still subject to further research.
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4.3 An Example: The TTP Agent
We now want to brieﬂy illustrate how the presented conducts can be used to create a service
that is simple to use and takes full advantage of the mobile agent paradigm. Many security
related protocols, in particular those that deal with non-repudiation, rely on the cooperation
with a trusted third party (TTP) [MvOV97]. The role of this TTP can be to provide a well
deﬁned functionality (e.g., timestamping or logging) to create non-repudiable evidence that
can later be used to resolve a dispute. The special character of this functionality requires that
it is provided on a trustworthy environment, which can be guaranteed in the administrative
domain of the TTP. Thus, a user of this functionality has to interact with a host of the TTP
via a remote interaction, which suﬀers from the usual problems of limited bandwidth, high
latency, and inﬂexibility of the interface (this also applies to the conduct for external logging
described in Section 4.2.7). In order to get rid of this remote message exchange we propose to
encapsulate the functionality of the TTP in a mobile agent that can be executed on a TPE,
which is also a trustworthy environment. This allows us to gather all interacting parties on
a single platform, where they can interact via local method invocations and, thus, take full
advantage of the mobile agent paradigm (see Section 2.6.1).
In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to the host of the TTP (which is still required)
as the TTP server (TS) and to the mobile agent that executes on the TPE on behalf of the
TTP as the TTP agent (TA).
4.3.1 The Shopping Agent
Consider the shopping agent of Section 2.2.2. Once it has decided on a particular service
provider, it will negotiate a contract that settles the exact details of the following purchase.
This contract should be logged with some trusted logging server10, before actually providing
the payment information. This is necessary to prevent the service provider from intercepting
and destroying the mobile agent after it has provided the payment information and subse-
quently oﬀering a service that is not the one it negotiated with the shopping agent11. The
described shopping agent can be implemented based on the conducts for basic protection, mi-
gration control, and external logging, which guarantee that it is protected from any external
interference and can enforce the logging with a trusted logging server.
The interaction between the shopping agent and the service provider allows for an eﬃcient
negotiation exploiting all the performance advantages of the mobile agent paradigm. However,
due to the non-repudiation requirements of the agent owner, the mobile agent has to interact
with a TS via a remote interaction. This may cause considerable performance penalties and
in particular the TS can become a bottleneck if its resources are consumed by a large number
10The agent could send the corresponding information directly to the agent owner, but since it needs an
acknowledgement for the receipt of the log entry and since the agent owner might not have a permanent
connection to the network, it is preferable to delegate this task to a TTP (which could also add a timestamp
to the log entry).
11The shopping agent could also rely on the conduct for local logging and ensure that it will sign at most
a single contract. This would allow the agent owner to request the contract signed by its mobile agent from
the service provider. Since the service provider will only be capable to provide a single contract signed by the
mobile agent, he is also prevented from oﬀering a diﬀerent service than the one negotiated with the mobile
agent. Nevertheless, due to the rather high cost of non-volatile storage, we assume that the conduct for local
logging will not always be available to all mobile agents. Furthermore, the service provider could simply refuse
to provide the contract at all, if this is in its interest.
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of clients. Therefore, we propose to encapsulate the functionality of the TTP in a mobile
agent, the TA, that can be executed on the TPE.
4.3.2 The Logging Service
In the case of logging, the task of the TA is to act as a proxy for the actual TTP on the TPE.
For this discussion we assume that the TA can rely on the following conducts:
• basic protection,
• migration control12,
• protected invocation,
• synchronized time,
• local logging, and
• external logging.
The TA will accept log entries from mobile agents on the TPE, store them in a local
cache, and respond with an acknowledgement in which it guarantees that it will forward the
message to the TS13 unless the TPE is destroyed (see below). Once a log arrives at the TS, it
will be handled like a regular log request. In order for the TA to provide such a guarantee, it
needs access to a suﬃcient amount of non-volatile storage on the TPE, in which it can safely
store the log messages. Since this non-volatile storage is a limited resource of the TPE, the
TA needs a special authorization to use it. Since the TA is a special agent that is assumed to
manage the non-volatile storage eﬃciently and that also provides a service to the TPE owner,
we assume that the TPE owner will grant this authorization; otherwise, the TA will abort.
The remaining problem is how the TA can guarantee that logged messages that are stored
in the non-volatile storage of the TPE will eventually be forwarded to the TS. The TPE owner
could simply intercept all the messages of the TA to the TS or, ultimately, request the TPE
to terminate the TA. (This functionality has to be oﬀered by the TPE to protect its owner
from malicious or simply buggy agents that refuse to terminate.)
This problem can be solved with a supervision of the TA by the TTP and with the help of
the synchronized clock provided by the TPE. The TTP has to keep track of all the TAs it sent
to the various service providers and of the expiration date that is associated with each TA.
A TA will accept log messages only until its expiration date. After this date it will refuse to
accept and acknowledge any further messages. Thus, the TTP has to receive a ﬁnal message
from the TA after its expiration date (there should be an additional delay to accommodate
for clock skew) indicating that no further messages for the TTP are stored in the non-volatile
storage of the TPE. Provided that the TA only deletes messages from this non-volatile storage
after sending them to the TS and obtaining an acknowledgement, the TTP knows that all
the messages that the TA acknowledged have been forwarded to the TS. If this ﬁnal message
is not received within a given time, the TTP will request the TPE owner to restart the TA
and to forward any messages it sends to the TS. Under the assumption that the TTP has a
possibility to enforce the access to the TPE by legal means (we assume that the TTP has a
12The TA is a stationary agent that will not request a migration, so this is simply a safety assemption.
13Since the TA is conﬁgured by the TTP, the use of a symmetric key cryptosystem is suﬃcient.
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special legal relationship with the TPE owner otherwise it would not send its agents to the
TPE), the only possibility of the TPE owner to avoid the provision of missing messages is
to destroy the TPE. Thus, the approach cannot guarantee that all logged messages will be
delivered to the TS. But it can guarantee that a TPE owner can not cheat without being
discovered. Furthermore, if it can be proven that the TPE owner intentionally destroyed the
TPE, he can be punished with adequate ﬁnes.
The problem of destruction of storage media is not new and also applies to a regular TTP.
However, it is assumed that the TTP operator implements adequate measures to avoid this
problem.
4.3.3 Other Services
The concept of the TA is suitable for any TTP functionality that can be wrapped up in a
reasonably small object and that does not have to rely on a large centrally managed database.
Other interesting examples are timestamping or fair-exchange.
The former consists of a TA that adds a timestamp to a message and signs the resulting
message with its signature key. The latter is a classical security problem, for which several
solutions relying on a TTP have been proposed [BP90]. The problem of fair-exchange is that
of principals A and B who want to exchange the data items DA and DB , but neither of
them wants to provide its data item before being sure that it will eventually receive that of
the other principal. A TA can facilitate the exchange by accepting the data items as well
as a description of the data items expected by the designated receivers. It will verify if the
descriptions match the actual data items (e.g., in the case of payment, it veriﬁes if the paid
amount corresponds with the amount expected by the receiver) and, if this is the case, deliver
the data items to the designated receiver.
4.3.4 Discussion
The relocation of the TTP functionality from a remote host to the locally managed TPE
allows us to prevent it from becoming a bottleneck that slows down other components. This
is possible since the TPE owner can allocate as many resources as necessary to the TA without
having to coordinate this with the TTP. Also, in the case of logging, since the TA can collect
and merge several log entries from interactions of diﬀerent agents with the service provider, it
can forward them in a single remote interaction. Another major advantage of the described
approach is that the remote interaction with the TS is taken oﬀ the critical communication
path between a mobile agent and the service provider. They can continue their interaction
as soon as the TA has stored the log message and sent the acknowledgement. Moreover, the
entire interaction can exploit the locally available communication links with higher bandwidth
and lower latency. This enables not only a better overall performance of the system, but allows
interactions that were previously not possible due to an unreasonable overhead. For instance,
a TA could be used by two interacting parties as an intermediate through which all messages
are exchanged. Therefore, the TA can easily log the entire interaction and subsequently
forward it as a single log entry to the TTP.
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4.4 Other Application Areas
Apart from its usage for the protection of mobile agents in the mobile agent paradigm, that
was discussed above, and for the protection of personal privacy, which is the topic of the
following Chapter 5, the presented approach based on the TPE and the CryPO protocol, can
also be used for other application areas. We want to brieﬂy sketch two of these.
4.4.1 Copyright Protection
If we invert the basic architecture, by allocating the TPE not to the service provider but
to the customer, the presented approach can be used to address the problem of protecting
the copyright on digital works. This problem is concerned with the fact that digital works
(e.g., news items, music, or computer programs) can currently be copied freely for a marginal
cost. This situation provides no incentive for copyright holders to make their work available
in digital form (apart from computer programs, which can only be distributed in this form).
In [Ste96], Steﬁk describes an architecture for the distribution, acquisition, and use of
copyrighted digital works, which is based on a trusted system that is located at a customer
and that enforces the copyright. It does this by preventing the creation of any unauthorized
copies or by charging the copier a set fee for an authorized copy. In his discussion Steﬁk
identiﬁes the issue of integrity, which has three parts: physical integrity, communications
integrity, and behavioural integrity. These could easily be enforced by the TPE, the CryPO
protocol, and an appropriate policy for the TPE.
4.4.2 Secure Circuit Evaluation
A well-known problem in cryptographic research is that of secure circuit evaluation, which
has been described by Abadi et al. in [AF90] as follows: Bob has an algorithm to compute a
function f and is willing to compute f(x) for Alice. Alice wants to compute f on her private
input x but does not want to reveal x to Bob. Furthermore, Alice should not learn anything
substantial about the algorithm of Bob for computing f14.
The presented approach provides a pragmatic solution to this problem. Bob can encode
the function f in a mobile agent Af , that he sends to Alice, who operates a highly secure
TPE. Alice installs Af on her TPE and provides it with x. The mobile agent Af calculates
f(x) and gives the result to Alice, but will provide no other information on f to Alice. If Bob
wants to limit the usage of Af to a certain duration or number of calculations, he can use the
techniques described in Section 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 respectively. Since Alice can control all the
communication to and from her TPE, she can ensure that Af does not secretly communicate
x to Bob. In an extreme case she could even destroy the TPE after the computation to
guarantee that Bob will never be able to obtain any information on x.
The transformation in our pragmatic solution that requires Alice to perform the compu-
tation instead of Bob, is not necessarily a major limitation, since in [AF90] Alice also has to
perform several computations
∞∞∞
14The problem of secure circuit evaluation can also be interpreted as a stronger version of the conﬁnement
problem identiﬁed by Lampson in [Lam73]. The conﬁnement problem also requires Bob not to learn anything
about x. However, it is not concerned with the protection of f from Alice.
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Summary
In this chapter we explore the usage of the TPE for various goals that may be desirable
for an agent owner, such as the assurance to interact with authentic code, a limitation on the
number of times a mobile agent can be executed on a particular TPE, or the possibility to
interact anonymously with other entities. This is described in the form of conducts, which
identify the requirements, the policy, and the necessary collaboration among the diﬀerent
components to achieve the desired goals.
We then illustrate the usage of several conducts with the example of a TTP agent. The
TTP agent acts as a proxy for a TTP on a TPE and allows us to take full advantage of the
mobile agent paradigm. The chapter concludes with a brief outlook on two other application
areas for the TPE and the CryPO protocol.
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Chapter 5
A Framework for the Protection of
Privacy
O negligence!... what cross devil made me put this main secret in the packet I sent
the king? Is there no way to cure this? No new device to beat this from his brains?
– W. Shakespeare
5.1 Introduction
We will now return to the discussion of privacy protection in Chapter 1 and use the mecha-
nisms that we have developed for the protection of mobile agents for the protection of privacy.
The idea that we want to pursue in this chapter is to make the data active, in order to let it
implement some self-defense. This is accomplished by encapsulating the data within a mobile
agent, which acts as a vehicle for active data. We will refer to these mobile agents as data
agents. Such a data agent encapsulates arbitrary data items, which can be very small (e.g.,
a single integer) or quite large (e.g., a complete medical record). These can then be given to
a controller (which is the principal who uses the data) and used by the controller very much
like a regular data item. The crucial diﬀerence, however, is that the encapsulation allows
the data agent to protect its data with appropriate access control mechanisms, to perform
additional external actions before an access to data is granted (e.g., log an access with an
external TTP), or to simply expire in order to force the controller to replace the old data
agent with a fresh data agent. Such a fresh data agent may hold updated data items or a
new (and possibly more restrictive) access control policy.
This interpretation of mobile agents as a vehicle for active data allows us to ensure the
basic principles of privacy protection that we identiﬁed in Section 1.4, which are the principles
of:
• notiﬁcation,
• control, and
• trust.
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The goals that we want to achieve with our framework are thus threefold, ﬁrst to provide
data subjects with information on who uses what data related to them for what purposes.
Second, we want to give them some limited control over the contents of this data (to correct
erroneous data) and over who can access it. Third, the data subjects should have reason to
believe that the principles of notiﬁcation and control are actually observed.
The main idea that we pursue to realize these goals, is to require that all personal data
on individuals is exclusively held within data agents. The ﬁrst two goals can then easily
be achieved with a straightforward realization of the naive implementation for notiﬁcation
and control within the data agent, which consists in querying the data subject for every
access, change, or disclosure of data (see Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2). However, since the data
agents can be freely programmed and can thus implement any access control policy and
realize any additional behaviour, it becomes possible to considerably improve on the naive
implementation for notiﬁcation and control. For instance, a data agent may only log the ﬁrst
access to a particular data item or request a conﬁrmation from the user only after well deﬁned
timeouts. Nevertheless, this still leaves us with the following two problems that need to be
addressed to ensure the principle of trust:
DA1: how can the controller be prevented from simply bypassing the protection of the data
agent (i.e., from accessing the data directly) and
DA2: how can the controller, once it has obtained some data via a regular access, be pre-
vented from storing it in his own database for later use and thus circumventing any
further protection by the data agent.
In order to resolve the former problem DA1, we rely on the approach discussed in Chap-
ters 3 and 4 and require that a data agent is executed on a TPE located at the controller. We
further assume that the data agent can rely on the following conducts to ensure its protection:
• basic protection: this allows the data agent to implement access control on its data;
• migration control: since data agents are usually stationary, this is mainly a safety
assumption to prevent that a data agent is moved to an insecure TPE;
• synchronized clock: this allows data agents to implement a limited lifetime, which is
one of the measures for control that we will discuss in Section 5.3.3; and
• external logging: this conduct allows the data agent to send notiﬁcations to the data
subject or to some logging server designated by the data subject.
The latter problem DA2 does not have a convincing technical solution due to the basic
problem of information disclosure (see Section 1.2.4). Our approach to address this problem
is quite ordinary and consists of requiring laws that make any storage or communication of
personal data on individuals outside of protected data agents illegal1. If at some point personal
data on individuals is discovered on the storage media of a principal or communicated between
principals, then these principals will be prosecuted and punished according to the appropriate
1The actual deﬁnition of such laws is in itself a very diﬃcult problem and not within the scope of this
dissertation. A particular problem is, for instance, the communication of the data subject’s address to the
network operator, in order to send a message to the data subject. This needs to be resolved with the creation
and maintenance of an explicit catalog that identiﬁes what kind of disclosures are permitted.
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laws. Obviously this is very diﬃcult to enforce (short of a complete surveillance of a controller)
and does not lend itself to technical support. Nevertheless, we believe that if the presented
approach based on protected data agents allows all interacting parties to conduct their regular
business without signiﬁcant complications, then there is little reason not to follow the rules
and to risk punishment. We will brieﬂy discuss this issue in Section 5.3.4.
5.2 An Example: Mobile Telecommunications
A simple example for the possibilities of privacy protection with the presented approach is the
protection of location information in mobile telecommunication systems, such as GSM [MP92]
(Global System for Mobile Communications). In such a system the serviced area is subdivided
into cells, which correspond to the coverage area of a radio transceiver (in GSM this is called
a Base Transceiver Station, BTS ). In order for a user, say Alice, to remain reachable (i.e.,
available to receive incoming calls), she has to register the cell in which she currently resides
with a well known location register (in GSM this is called Home Location Register, HLR).
This location information is required by the telecommunication provider, in order to route
an incoming call to Alice’s current cell (see Figure 5.1). However, for the operation of the
system it is not necessary that the telecommunication provider knows the location of Alice at
all times, but it is suﬃcient to know her location when she has to be contacted for an incoming
call. Since it is impossible to foresee when this will occur, Alice has to send continuous updates
on her current location, which will be stored in the HLR and subsequently overwritten with
more recent information whenever she moves to a new cell. This location information is
conﬁdential data that should not be available to anyone without a compelling reason (such as
law enforcement personnel with an order issued by a judge). Furthermore, it could be abused
by the telecommunication provider who could use this information to create a continuous
trace of Alice’s movements (a movement proﬁle, see Section 1.2.1).
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Figure 5.1: Location management in GSM
Currently this data is solely protected by legal means, which prohibit its use for anything
other than the intended purpose (i.e., locating a user for an incoming call). Since this is not
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suﬃcient in the presence of malicious insiders, who can potentially access all the data without
any constraints, we want to add a stronger protection based on technical means that allows
only authorized access to this conﬁdential information.
By storing the location information in a data agent that is executed on a TPE in the
domain of the telecommunication provider, the location information can be protected more
eﬃciently (see Figure 5.2). Since Alice can conﬁgure the data agent according to her personal
preferences, she can instruct it on how to handle her location information. Moreover, she can
establish a symmetric session key with her data agent that can be used to protect information
communicated between her and her data agent. We assume that the location updates will be
sent by Alice in encrypted form to her data agent, using this symmetric key2. Hence, Alice’s
location is exclusively known to her data agent, but not to the telecommunication provider.
In the case of an incoming call, the telecommunication provider will query her data agent
to obtain her current location. Depending on the conﬁguration of the data agent, there are
many possibilities how it can react to such a query. The simplest would be to always disclose
the current location of the user. This would not really protect the location information, but
if the data agent keeps a log of all the queries, the user can verify that his location was only
disclosed for genuine communication requests3. On the other extreme, the data agent could
act as reachability manager [DFRB97] by requesting each caller to authenticate himself and
by accepting only communication requests from a set of users deﬁned by the owner of the
data agent (other callers can be deviated to a voice mail system).
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Figure 5.2: Location management with a data agent
Since Alice trusts her data agent to never disclose her current location without proper
2Obviously this would require a rather profound change in the operation of GSM, which currently puts the
responsibility for location updates on the base transceiver station. In the presented approach this responsibility
would be shifted to the mobile user. This is a typical example of a general problem, which is concerned with
the tradeoﬀ between moving the “intelligence” into the end devices or keeping it in the network. For security
related problems it is often beneﬁcial to move the “intelligence” closer to the user. However, this can often
cause a considerable overhead since it prevents certain optimizations.
3The data agent can autonomously detect systematic attacks, such as continuous probing that could be
conducted to obtain a trace of the user’s locations.
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authorization, the amount of conﬁdential information that is available to the telecommunica-
tion provider is greatly reduced. Instead of having instant and permanent access to Alice’s
location, it only gains access to her location if she is called by an authorized user. Therefore,
even without explicitly addressing the problem DA2, the goal of protecting the access to con-
ﬁdential information is partially achieved. A similar approach to address this problem, which
is based on a ﬁxed terminal within the network that is under the user’s exclusive control is
presented by Pﬁtzmann in [Pﬁ93].
5.3 A Simple Framework
We now want to develop the framework that we envision for the protection of personal data on
individuals. We will only present a simple version of data agents, which can not be updated
by the controller. An extension to updateable data agents is possible, but not immediately
relevant for the protection of privacy.
A data agent is a simple mobile agent that implements a limited lifetime (for instance on
the order of one month) and manages a list of entries. These entries contain the actual data
items as values and can be accessed via a simple interface that allows another principal to
query which entries are contained in this data agent and to query for the value of a particular
entry. The latter query can be subject to an additional access control decision or to further
actions, as explained below. A data agent has a unique identiﬁer (daID) that is exclusively
known to it and to the data subject4. This identiﬁer can be used to create local pseudonyms for
the data agent, which consist of the daID concatenated with some well-known information,
encrypted with the public key of a TPE: {daID; “This is a daID”}KTPE . This guarantees
that any two pseudonyms for the data agent of a data subject at diﬀerent controllers (with
diﬀerent TPEs) will be unlinkable but nevertheless consistent over many incarnations of the
data agent at the same TPE. This pseudonym can also be obtained from the data agent via
a method invocation on its interface. Each of the entries of the data agent is a four-tuple
<tag, value, access, log>, where the ﬁelds are used as follows:
• The tag ﬁeld contains the name of this entry and is used to select the corresponding
data item.
• The value ﬁeld holds the actual data item that is stored in this entry.
• The access ﬁeld contains the access control information that deﬁnes the constraints
under which the data item can be accessed. This can, for instance, be a list of public
keys towards one of which an accessor needs to authenticate itself in order to get access
to the data item.
• The log ﬁeld deﬁnes whether and how accesses to the data item should be logged with a
logging server trusted by the data subject (for performance reasons this logging server
should be implemented by a local TTP agent on the TPE as described in Section 4.3).
The log may be created immediately before disclosing the data item and can therefore
contain information generated during the access control.
The described approach allows the data agent to implement and enforce the access control
policy desired by the data subject and to notify the data subject of the actual use of its data.
4This identiﬁer has to be suﬃciently long to prevent guessing attacks.
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Furthermore, since the TPE on which the data agent is executing supports migration control,
the data agent can refuse to migrate to a diﬀerent TPE, which prevents the controller from
legally disclosing personal data on individuals to another principal.
5.3.1 The Use of Data Agents
The way a controller uses data agents is quite classical. We assume that the controller operates
a regular database, in which the data agents are stored in encrypted form. Whenever it wants
to access a particular value that is stored in a data agent, it will search the corresponding
data agent in its database, load it on its TPE (where it is decrypted and launched), and query
it for the desired value. In order to manage a potentially large number of data agents, the
controller can use the local pseudonym of the data agent as a unique identiﬁer to organize
the storage of the data agents. This pseudonym can also be used to reference the data agent
in various indices managed by the controller and furthermore it allows the controller to store
additional information related to the data subject in regular database entries that are linked
to the data agent via the local pseudonym (e.g., billing data). Since this local pseudonym
is only meaningful in the context of a particular TPE, it is not considered as personal data.
Therefore, it would be possible to communicate the local pseudonym to a third party, but
since it is prohibited to communicate identifying personal data, this third party would not be
able to link a particular data subject’s local pseudonyms from diﬀerent controllers.
Upon its instantiation on the TPE, the data agent will verify that its lifetime has not
expired (see Section 4.2.5) and then wait for accesses to its data. When the controller provides
the tag of a certain entry that it would like to access, the data agent will implement the access
control policy that is speciﬁed in the access ﬁeld of this entry and, if necessary, notify some
logging server of the access. If both the authorization and the notiﬁcation are successful, the
data agent will provide the data item that is stored in the value ﬁeld.
On the other hand, if the lifetime of the data agent has expired, then the data agent will
grant no further access to the data it contains. This forces the controller to obtain a fresh
data agent from a service provider that should be accessible via the network, to which we will
refer to as the operator of the repository. The only information that the expired data agent
will still provide after its expiration is what is needed by the controller to obtain the fresh data
agent. This information must contain the address of the repository and some identiﬁcation for
the requested data agent. It would be possible that the data subject operates the repository
for his data agents himself, which would give him direct control over the dissemination and
the contents of his data agents. However, this has two serious disadvantages:
• the address of the data subject could be suﬃcient to identify him, which contradicts
the requirement that the data agent provides no further useful information after its
expiration and
• the server that is connected to the data subject’s address is a private computer, which
may be unreliable or too slow for the task (it is also likely that the data subject does
not have suﬃcient expertise to administrate and operate such a server).
To overcome these problems, we decouple the data subject from its data agent and assume
that the repository is operated by an independent third party. Since this principal provides its
service with the help of a highly secure TPE, it does not necessarily need to be trusted with
respect to the possibly conﬁdential data it manipulates – nevertheless, it needs to be trusted
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for other reasons, for instance, to provide its service with a high reliability. The required
protection can be ensured by specialized mobile agents, data agent factories, that execute on
the TPE of the repository.
5.3.2 The Distribution of Data Agents
One of the goals of the more centralized distribution of data agents by the repository’s operator
is to create a suﬃciently large anonymity group that prevents a particular individual from
being identiﬁed via the address of his repository. However, it also creates the risk of a single
point of failure for all the users of this repository, which needs to be addressed by more
stringent security requirements towards the TPE of the repository.
We now want to brieﬂy discuss the mechanism with which a controller can obtain a fresh
data agent from a data agent factory executing on the repository’s TPE. Figure 5.3 gives an
overview of the interactions. When the data agent of a controller expires, it will still provide
the address of the repository on which the data agent factory of its owner is located as well as
a reference to the data agent factory that can only be used by the repository. It is important
to ensure that this reference can not be used as a global identiﬁer for the data subject. This
can, for instance, be achieved by concatenating the secret identiﬁer of the data agent factory
(which may be the same as the identiﬁer of the data agent, daID) together with a well-known
information and a random number. The resulting bitstring is then encrypted with the public
key of the repository’s TPE (KR): {daID; “This is a request for a data agent”; rnd}KR . Due
to the random number, the reference created by any data agent will always be a completely
diﬀerent bitstring, which does not help the controllers to match data agents of the same data
subject.
The controller will send a signed request for a fresh data agent together with this
reference to the operator of the repository. The ﬁrmware on the repository’s TPE
will decrypt this reference and create the local pseudonym of the data agent factory5
{daID; “This is a data agent factory”}KR , and provides this to the operator of the reposi-
tory. The operator will then locate the encrypted data agent factory, load it on its TPE, and
provide it with the request from the controller.
The data agent factory is a mobile agent that belongs to a data subject and is capable
to create data agents for this principal. However, it does not implement the functionality of
the data agent itself, which prevents the operator of the repository from accessing any of its
data. The data agent factory is assumed to be in close contact with the data subject (they
can share a symmetric encryption key for eﬃcient interactions) and is conﬁgured by its owner
with the entries that it should include in the data agents it creates. Moreover, it contains
a list of the public keys of all the controllers who are entitled to receive a fresh data agent
(this could also comprise an information on the entries a particular controller should obtain
in a fresh data agent). When it receives the request for a fresh data agent from a particular
controller it checks if this controller is on its list and veriﬁes the signature on the request. If
both checks are successful, the data agent factory will create a fresh data agent with a certain
lifetime and send it to the controller.
The act of providing a data agent to a controller consists thus of notifying the data agent
factory that this controller is entitled to a current copy of the data agent (this notiﬁcation
may also contain an information on the entries this particular controller should obtain) and
5This local pseudonym could be used as a global identiﬁer for the data subject. To prevent this, the operator
of the repository must not disclose this local pseudonym to any other principal.
106 Chapter 5. A Framework for the Protection of Privacy
TPE
-1K
DAF
TPE
-1K
Repository
Controllerconfigure
DA
DA
requestData Subject
Legend
DAF
DA
Data Agent Factory
Data Agent
Figure 5.3: The distribution of data agents
of providing the controller either immediately with a valid data agent or with the necessary
information with which it can obtain a fresh data agent from the repository.
A positive side eﬀect for controllers is that the data in the data agents will almost always
be accurate. For instance, when a user moves to a new address, then he only has to update his
data agent factory in the repository and eventually all the controllers with whom he interacts,
will receive a fresh data agent that reﬂects these changes.
5.3.3 Withdrawal of Data
Based on the use and distribution of data agents described above, it now becomes possible to
“withdraw” data from a controller. This does not constitute a general solution to the basic
problem of information disclosure, but within the presented framework it achieves a similar
result.
Since we assume that information on individuals can exclusively be held in data agents,
a controller will not keep a copy of the data stored in the data agent in a separate place (this
would be illegal). Thus, if the data subject removes a controller from the list of those entitled
to obtain a fresh data agent as deﬁned in the data agent factory, the controller will not be
able to obtain a fresh version of the data agent after its current copy has expired. The data
has eﬀectively become inaccessible to the controller who will therefore no longer be capable
to interact with the data subject. What is left to the controller is some anonymous data that
can not be linked with the data of any other controller and an encrypted data agent that
refuses to provide any usable data. We assume that the controller, due to the large number
of data agents with which it interacts, will not be capable to otherwise reconstruct the data
that is stored in the data agent.
Nevertheless, there may be situations when the controller has a legitimate right to continue
its interaction with the data subject. For instance, if the data subject has open bills with the
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controller. For such a case there must be mechanisms that permit a legal body (e.g., a judge
after review of the evidence) to force the data agent to provide its data or the data agent
factory to provide a fresh data agent. This can be accomplished with the installation of legal
backdoors as discussed in Section 4.2.7. The veriﬁcation that a data agent actually implements
the legal backdoor can either be accomplished with the help of the TPE or implemented based
on the conduct for authentic code (see Section 4.2.4).
The presented approach may obviously be extended by using more elaborate methods
in the construction of the data agent by the data agent factory, which may allow the data
subject to selectively withdraw access to particular entries in the data agent.
5.3.4 Enforcing the Use of Data Agents
As we have already noted in Section 5.1, the enforcement of the presented approach is ex-
tremely diﬃcult. This is due to the fact that a controller can simply store all the data it
obtains from a data agent in a private database, possibly in encrypted form to avoid pun-
ishment if this illegal data storage is discovered. The problem with the enforcement of the
presented approach is similar to the enforcement of laws in other domains, such as the re-
quirement for a proper technical condition of cars or the prohibition of insider trading on
stock exchanges. However, despite the inherent problems of enforcing these laws, they are
still largely adhered to, e.g., in Switzerland with respect to cars.
The reasoning behind the enforcement of such laws must be to make them easy to follow
and to severely punish any violation. Therefore, our approach relies on the following three
points:
• The laws require that the infrastructure to work with data agents is put in place (there-
fore, the money to build the infrastructure has to be spent in any case).
• The infrastructure allows all necessary operations on data (therefore, there is no com-
pelling reason not to use data agents and the corresponding infrastructure).
• Non-compliance with laws will be punished (we assume that most people and companies
simply prefer to stay within the laws).
The creation of a comprehensive database in a country that does not enforce a law that
requires the use of data agents can not be prevented. Yet, since this data can not easily be
sold to countries that enforce such a law, there is less incentive to create such a database in the
ﬁrst place. Consider, for instance, the eﬀect of the EU-Directive on Data Protection [EC95]
on the IRSG (Individual References Services Group) that was mentioned in Section 1.3.2.
Even though there is no compelling law in the US that requires self-regulation, the desire
to conduct business with individuals and companies of the European Community caused the
members of the IRSG to adapt their business practices.
5.4 Making it Manageable
The major problem with the presented approach is complexity. The problem is that if in-
dividuals are provided with too much choice they may easily be confused and overwhelmed.
The system should not require them to make choices about technical matters that are more
suited to expert analysis. Furthermore, a regular user can probably not cope with the amount
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of information that is created in the system and that has to be managed. Therefore, there
must be standard procedures and standard principals who organize the ﬂow of data.
5.4.1 The Data Agent – Accessor Agent Paradigm
To overcome this complexity we propose to encapsulate most of it in a specialized mobile
agent, to which we will refer to as the accessor agent. Consequently we refer to the entire
approach as the data agent – accessor agent (da3) paradigm. For the realization of this
paradigm, we have to rely on the protected invocations conduct (see Section 4.2.3) that has
to be supported by a TPE.
The basic idea of the da3 paradigm as depicted in Figure 5.4 is to interpose the accessor
agent between the data agent and the controller, where it can mediate accesses by the con-
troller. All entries of the data agent are thus protected by an additional access control, which
grants access only to accessor agents issued by a trusted principal (i.e., the accessor agent
must hold a private key to authenticate itself to the data agent).
Controller
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Figure 5.4: The data agent – accessor agent paradigm
We assume that the accessor agent is a highly specialized agent from an expert principal
that acts as some form of lawyer for the data subject, which can make better decisions about
the right of a controller to access a particular data item. However, the ultimate decision
remains with the data subject who can decide whether he wants to provide his data agent
and grant access to a particular accessor agent or not.
This means that most choices about technical matters should be dealt with by the imple-
mentor of the accessor agent, while the data subject only has to deﬁne some general guidelines
on how he would like his personal data to be handled. The issuer of an accessor agent can, for
instance, handle this with the deﬁnition of several categories of users who have diﬀerent pri-
vacy preferences. Each accessor agent it issues will then request the category that was chosen
by the owner of a data agent (this can be an entry in the data agent) and then implement a
policy that respects the privacy preferences for this category of users.
If at some point the user remarks that there is a problem with the way data on him is
used, then he can consult with an expert, who will suggest remedies to the data subject. Since
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all the data items and business relations of a data subject are encoded in his data agent, it
is possible for the expert to analyze the problems based on this data. The remedies can then
be put in place and will start to work after a reasonable period of time, say on the order
of one month (when the data agents at the controllers expire and have to be refreshed with
new data agents). This means that the data subject is not left alone and can conduct his
daily business without having to trust in the good behaviour of a controller who has a direct
interest in the data. Rather he can rely on an independent expert who has no direct interest
in this data, who is more apt to decide if some data is actually needed by a controller, and
who will contain the complexity of data interactions6.
5.4.2 Using the da3 Paradigm
Consider a person who applies for renting an apartment. Depending on the market situation
it is often the landlord who can select among several applicants and who wants to chose an
applicant who is capable to pay the rent for the apartment. Therefore, he will often request
very detailed information on the ﬁnancial situation of an applicant, even though he might
legally only be entitled to a more limited information (e.g., whether the applicants monthly
income is higher than three times the monthly rent). The applicant in turn knows that he
will not be considered by the landlord if he does not provide comprehensive information on
his ﬁnancial situation and may often not know what information the landlord is entitled to
obtain.
This dilemma can easily be resolved with the da3 paradigm. The landlord needs to obtain
an accessor agent from a trusted principal that will ensure that the landlord will only obtain
the information he is legally entitled to. The applicant can then simply provide its entire
data agent, which contains an entry that holds his monthly income, signed by the applicant’s
bank. This entry is protected by an additional access control, which grants access only to
the agents of principals that are trusted by the data subject. Provided that the data subject
trusts the issuer of the accessor agent used by the landlord, the data agent will provide it
with the information on the data subject’s monthly income. Subsequently the accessor agent
will then use this information to compute exactly the information that the landlord is legally
entitled to obtain.
∞∞∞
6On the other hand, this also makes users less responsible by moving responsibility to another entity, but
this is simply the way our society works (e.g., government).
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Summary
In this chapter we discuss a framework for the protection of personal privacy that relies
on the use of mobile agents. These mobile agents are used as carriers of data that implement
the principles of notiﬁcation and control; they are referred to as data agents.
In order to protect the data agents we require that they are executed on a TPE and in
order to ensure the protection of the data they contain, we prohibit any storage of personal
data outside of the protected data agents. We then describe a simple example in the context
of mobile telecommunication systems that allows a mobile user to protect his location infor-
mation from the telecommunication provider. The chapter then continues with an overview
on the use of data agents for the control of access to personal data, explains how this can be
used to “withdraw” information from a principal and comments on the enforceability of the
approach.
Finally, we sketch an extension to the basic framework that contains the complexity of
access decisions in specialized agents, the accessor agents. These mediate every access to the
data between the controller and the data agent and, hence, act as some form of lawyer for
the data subject.
Conclusion
It’s dangerous to be right when the government is wrong.
– Voltaire
The problem of protecting the personal privacy of individuals is a diﬃcult issue that
needs to be addressed in a convincing way in order for the information society to become a
desirable reality. In this thesis we have analyzed some of the problems related to privacy in
the information society and have developed a technical approach to privacy protection that is
based on the principles of notiﬁcation, control, and trust. The principle of trust is identiﬁed
as a central issue and leads us to the distinction between an optimistic approach to trust and
a pessimistic approach to trust. The former tries to control the actions of principals and to
subsequently sanction malicious actions that are detected, while the latter tries to prevent
malicious actions in the ﬁrst place.
The technical approach to privacy protection is based on the mobile agent paradigm and
on a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware device. It requires us to rely on an optimistic
approach to trust with respect to the manufacturer of the trusted and tamper-resistant hard-
ware device but enables us to rely on a pessimistic approach to trust with respect to the
executor of the mobile agent.
The remaining results of this thesis are twofold. First we have developed an approach to
protect a mobile agent from its executor that is based on the trusted and tamper-resistant
hardware device which is referred to as TPE. This approach is then explored in great detail
with the help of conducts, which describe how and under what assumptions an agent owner’s
protection goals can be realized. Second we have sketched a hypothetical framework to address
the problem of privacy protection with the help of mobile agents. Furthermore we have brieﬂy
presented the data agent - accessor agent (da3) paradigm, which allows us to make privacy
protection more manageable.
Assessment of the Protection of Mobile Agents
We believe that our work on mobile agents and their protection within TPEs is interesting in
its own right. Tamper-resistant environments become ever more common place, so that some
of the conducts that we have described may soon be implemented in real systems.
On the other hand, it seems not clear that highly mobile agents, which visit many agent
platforms in order to collect information or conduct business with the operators of these
platforms, will be the actual use of mobile agents in the context of electronic commerce.
(This might be conﬁned to special application domains such as network management.) It is
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possible that mobile agents may be used in a much more restricted way. This would consist
of mobile users who conﬁgure a mobile agent for a particular task and send it to the agent
platform of a trusted executor. This trusted executor implements the execution of mobile
agents as a service and oﬀers the mobile agents a high speed, high bandwidth access to the
network, advanced failure handling, as well as a protection similar to the basic protection of
the TPE.
This is a much simpler model that can realize many of the discussed advantages of the
mobile agent paradigm, while at the same time being more manageable. The issue of service
customization may be addressed with sub-agents, which are created by the mobile agent
and sent to unprotected agent platforms at some service provider to accomplish non-critical
tasks. This model does not invalidate the results of the presented work (which is geared
towards the protection of privacy), but the trusted executor can be interpreted as some form
of TPE, which also has to implement a policy. This may be used to realize some of the goals
described in the conducts. The main diﬀerence is that this model relies on rather diﬀerent
trust assumptions.
Assessment of the Framework for Privacy Protection
We believe that the problems of privacy will become ever more important and will require
solutions that give the data subjects more information and control over the use of their
data. This may not immediately be achieved in universally deployed system such as the one
described. However, it may be applied to a particular application domain where the data that
has to be protected can be well identiﬁed and isolated within a special subsystem. Within this
subsystem it may then be possible to realize the presented approach to privacy protection.
An example for such an application domain is healthcare, in which large amounts of
privacy relevant data have to be handled in a complex distributed system. The data that
needs to be protected are patient records, which could be implemented as data agents that
can only be accessed via accessor agents from some independent principal. This principal
mediates between the diﬀerent interests of data subjects, doctors, nurses, hospitals, insurance
companies, and employers. In this setting it would be illegal to store identiﬁable (i.e., non-
anonymized) health-related data outside of protected data agents.
Once such a pilot application is deployed, it might lead to the development of other
domains. This may additionally result in a fragmentation of not interoperable systems, which
can be an advantage for privacy protection since it prevents data from easily travelling into
another application domain where it is not suitable.
Personal Conclusion
During my Diploma at the University of Kaiserslautern [Wil92], I designed and implemented
the user interface for the MOSKITO operating system kernel [NG90]. The most fascinating
problems that I encountered in the course of this work were those related to security, which
led me to the decision to further pursue this topic.
The initial starting point of this thesis was a single unfocused idea: “I want to do something
on privacy protection”. This idea has shown itself as quite diﬃcult to address in a meaningful
way and has led me to explore many diﬀerent issues, such as:
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• fault-tolerance in distributed systems, which was the major research area of the LSE
when I started there. Before the funds for working on my primary ﬁeld of interest were
available, I got the chance to explore some problems of fault-tolerance in the context of
Phoenix [MFSW95, WS95].
• security in distributed systems provides the basis for most of the presented ideas. Since
privacy protection is concerned with problems in the real world, where actions are
naturally distributed, this has to be modelled in the computer system. A useful tool
for the design of secure protocols in distributed systems are logics [BSW98].
• CORBA is a very interesting approach for the design of distributed applications and
still lacks convincing implementations for security. The research we conducted in this
area was particularly inﬂuential for the development of this thesis [WSWZ97, SBC+99].
• TINA is a quite recent eﬀort that tries to merge the ﬁelds of telecommunications and
computer science. Since privacy protection is concerned with individuals, it is necessary
to consider a system that deals with people, which is obviously the case in telecommu-
nications systems. The CrySTINA project, which evolved concurrently with the work
presented in this thesis, oﬀered another setting for discussions and provided valuable
input [SBH+97a, SW97a, SW97b, SW97c, SBW98, BSW99].
• GSM is the dominant standard for mobile communication systems in Europe. Due to
the initial diﬃculty to obtain documentation on TINA, it was easier to investigate some
ideas in the context of the well documented GSM architecture [Wil97].
• UMTS is a research eﬀort of ETSI to deﬁne the third generation mobile communications
system. I investigated into this topic as it could be the immediate application area for
the ideas developed in the context of GSM. Due to our focussing on TINA this direction
was soon abandoned.
• Mixes are a prominent and well developed technology for the protection of privacy
in communication systems. It was interesting to examine this approach in order to
investigate whether the ideas could be transferred to other application domains.
• electronic cash is also an application domain that already has many approaches for
privacy protection and also served as an inspiration for the presented approach.
This exploration has resulted in several interesting results and some dead ends. The discovery
of the mobile agent paradigm as a possible and viable solution to some of my problems was
made in late 1996 and soon resulted in a ﬁrst publication on this topic [WD97].
This thesis is basically an attempt to linearize many of the results in a comprehensible
way and to explore them in an adequate depth. I hope it can serve as a small component in
the design of socially acceptable information systems.
∞∞∞
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Appendix A
Enforcing an Itinerary
The TPE and the CryPO protocol guarantee the integrity of the agent platform to the agent
owner and protect the code and state of a mobile agent against manipulation and disclosure,
both in transit and during execution. These guarantees can be extended to formulate the
requirements and the policy that have to be satisﬁed by a TPE in order to allow a mobile
agent to follow a pre-deﬁned itinerary.
This problem consists of ensuring that the agent does not visit any agent platform that
is not on its itinerary, that it does visit all the agent platforms that are on its itinerary, and
that it visits them in the correct order. Therefore, it suﬃces to make sure that the agent
will migrate exactly to the TPE that is next on its itinerary. This resolves the problem of
ensuring the safety part of this problem. The complementary problem of ensuring liveness
(i.e., to make sure that the agent will actually continue its execution on the next TPE), is
another diﬃcult task that has to be addressed with the concepts discussed in Section 2.5.7.
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that the agent owner provides the agent with a pre-
deﬁned itinerary upon its start and that the agent owner has also veriﬁed that all the TPEs
on the itinerary enforce a suﬃciently strong policy.
Goals:
• The mobile agent can autonomously enforce its itinerary.
Requirements:
• Basic protection
• The TPE allows mobile agents to perform and receive remote invocations.
• The operating system of the TPE implements standard process management function-
ality.
Policy:
a) The TPE allows the mobile agent to create new agents.
b) The TPE supports capabilities that allow an agent to perform process management op-
erations on another agent.
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c) the TPE provides a capability protected management operation to freeze1 an active agent.
d) the TPE provides a capability protected management operation to marshal a frozen agent
into a sequence of bytes.
e) the TPE provides a cryptographic interface to encrypt a sequence of bytes with a public
key.
Discussion
The rules of the policy rely solely on regular operating system functionality that can be real-
ized with memory protection and standard process management mechanisms. The capability
that is required in rules b), c), and d) can be a simple random bit-string that is suﬃciently
long to prevent guessing attacks from other agents.
The use of this policy to guarantee that an agent will migrate from a TPE T1 to a speciﬁc
TPE T2 is now straightforward. We assume that the original agent AO carries the code for
a send-agent AS with it. AO will now take advantage of rule a) and b) to instantiate AS on
the TPE (using a primitive similar to fork on the UNIX operating system) and provides it
with a capability to access the management functionality on AO as well as the certiﬁcate for
T2, which contains T2’s policy, the public key of T2, and a network address for T2.
AS will now take the necessary actions to freeze AO (rule c)) and to marshal AO into a
sequence of bytes (rule d)). For this, AS needs the capability that it received from AO. Then
AS will encrypt the marshaled AO (rule e)) using the key in the certiﬁcate for T2 and send it
to the network address given in the certiﬁcate.
In order for AS to ensure that AO will actually continue its execution on T2, it is necessary
that AS waits for a conﬁrmation stating that AO has successfully started on T2. If AS does not
receive such a message after a certain timeout, it might simply re-instantiate AO on T1 and
inform it about the unsuccessful migration attempt. AO can then take appropriate actions
to recover from this error.
Since no other agent on T1 is capable to execute the operations that give access to AO’s
code or data in any way and since T1 will never disclose any information on any agent executing
on it (basic protection), the only way that any information about an agent on a TPE can
become available outside of this TPE is through proper actions of the agent itself (by sending
regular messages or by using the presented approach for migration). Therefore, we conclude
that the presented approach allows to guarantee that an agent will migrate exactly to the
next TPE on its itinerary and will, thus, follow its pre-deﬁned itinerary.
1The agent that will be frozen will be informed about this action, so that it can perform any necessary
cleanup operations before being frozen.
Appendix B
Policy Issues
When an agent is at a certain agent platform and wants to move to another agent platform,
it has to ﬁnd out if the new agent platform will provide an adequate privacy protection. To
assess this, the agent will obtain the policy of this agent platform PAP (which is included in
the reference to the agent executor, together with the address of the new site, the public key
for conﬁdential communication, the identity of the operator, a list of the available services,
etc.). To make the assessment easier, we assume that the mobile agent itself has a minimal
policy, say PMA, which describes in some way the minimal protection requirements that the
agent wants the new agent platform to provide.
The agent can now simply compare the two policies, which can lead to 4 diﬀerent results:
• PMA = PAP (very unlikely)
• PMA < PAP (the new agent platform’s policy is adequate)
• PMA > PAP (the protection of the new agent platform is not good enough)
• PMAPAP (the two policies are incomparable, which means that the protection is in
some areas not good enough)
Based on this result, the agent can now decide that it will move to the new agent platform
or search for a diﬀerent agent platform which provides more adequate protection (for instance,
the new agent platform might not provide a very good protection for locally executing agents,
but it is willing to provide service to agents that are executing at a nearby special service
provider (which may be more expensive).
Examples for this policy could be:
• the mobil agent requires a clock that is accurate to a precision of 10 seconds
(clock-accuracy 10)
• the agent would like to be able to receive messages while executing on the agent platform
(receive-messages TRUE)
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A service provider would have a policy that says:
(NameOfServiceProvider ...
(POLICY
(clock-accuracy 3)
(receive-messages TRUE)
(send-messages TRUE)
)
)
A comparison of the two policies would result in the conclusion that the policy is adequate,
since it provides an accuracy that is better than the one we wanted and since it will allow us
to receive messages. The fact that it also allows us to send messages is of no interest to us,
since we don’t intend to send any.
Another service provider might have the following policy:
(NameOfAnotherServiceProvider ...
(POLICY
(clock-accuracy 20)
(receive-messages TRUE)
(send-messages TRUE)
)
)
Depending on the order that we have deﬁned on policies, these two may be incomparable
or my policy is larger than the provider’s policy. In both cases it would be judged inadequate.
The agent would decide not to move to this agent platform (without precisely having to know
why it should not move to this agent platform).
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